There is only one solution to the nuclear threat: not to have nuclear weapons at all.

Developments and trends, 2022

---

The year 2022 began on a high note when, on 3 January, the nuclear-weapon States[1] of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) issued a joint statement affirming that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The joint statement also reaffirmed those States’ commitments under the Treaty, including those related to nuclear disarmament.

Such optimism was short-lived, however, following the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation on 24 February. The conflict had significant negative ramifications for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The Russian Federation's veiled threats to use nuclear weapons, for example, raised the imminent danger of such use to heights not seen since the cold war. The invasion also undermined non-proliferation through a false narrative that Ukraine could have deterred Russian aggression if it had kept the nuclear weapons stationed on its territory at the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Additionally, it raised the unprecedented issue of the safety and security of nuclear power plants in armed conflict, derailed bilateral arms control and risk reduction dialogue and, ultimately, was responsible for the failure of the tenth Review Conference of the parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, when the Russian Federation broke consensus over language related to Ukraine.

Compounding those negative developments were the continued fracturing of relations between States possessing nuclear weapons. That fracturing was especially apparent between the United States and China, with further allegations about Chinese nuclear expansion. Deteriorating relations were also reflected in the continued growth of global military spending; the acquisition and deployment of sophisticated conventional weapons systems, including at regional flashpoints; and armed clashes between States that possess nuclear weapons.

Meanwhile, proliferation drivers accelerated in regional hotspots as States openly debated the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons or stationing allied weapons on their territory. Concerns regarding nuclear accidents and miscalculation continued to grow amid increasing military activity related to new domains in cyberspace and outer space, as well as new investments in conventional weapons systems with potential strategic capabilities. On the occasion of the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, the Secretary-General said, “We can hear once again the rattling of nuclear sabres. Let me be clear. The era of nuclear blackmail must end. The idea that any country could fight and win a nuclear war is deranged. Any use of a nuclear weapon would incite a humanitarian Armageddon.”

The Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START Treaty), the bilateral arms control agreement between the possessors of the world's two largest nuclear arsenals and the only cap on strategic nuclear forces, was not fully implemented in 2022, largely owing to disagreements over inspections. In August, the Russian Federation advised the United States that it would not allow inspections of its treaty-accountable weapons owing to travel restrictions imposed by the United States on Russian inspectors. A proposed meeting of the Treaty’s Bilateral Consultative Commission in December to resolve the issue was indefinitely postponed by the Russian Federation.

The Russian Federation-United States bilateral Strategic Stability Dialogue, announced in 2021, was effectively in abeyance in 2022. Although the leaders of both countries signalled their willingness to engage in negotiations on a successor framework to the New START Treaty when it expires in 2026,[2] no steps were taken, largely owing to ongoing tension over the conflict in Ukraine. The High Representative for Disarmament Affairs consistently called for the Russian Federation and the United States to commence negotiations on a successor arrangement to the Treaty, noting that “time is running out to negotiate a successor, and that cannot happen without dialogue and engagement”. Separately, the war in Ukraine also froze the P5 Process, the only forum in which China had stated its willingness to participate. The process had previously received support, including as a venue for future efforts designed “to deepen engagement on nuclear doctrines, concepts for strategic risk reduction and nuclear arms control verification”.

The war in Ukraine raised the alarming prospect of an accident at a nuclear energy facility with potentially catastrophic results. The occupation of the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant — the largest nuclear-power-generating station in Europe — and the ongoing conflict around that facility raised concerns and spurred calls for an agreement to prevent an accident. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was active in attempting to avoid such an outcome through its IAEA Support and Assistance Mission to Zaporizhzhya and the stationing of its experts at the plant (GOV/2022/66). Furthermore, the Agency articulated seven indispensable pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security during an armed conflict that should be followed to prevent an accident. The Agency’s Director General also called on all relevant parties to agree on establishing a nuclear safety and security protection zone around the plant. As at 31 December, discussions about such a zone were ongoing.

The nuclear risks generated by the Russian invasion of Ukraine increased fears within the international community about the possible use of nuclear weapons. According to one United States poll, for example, more than half of those surveyed worried that the United States was about to engage in nuclear war. A review of polls conducted within European Union States revealed similar results. Threats to use nuclear weapons received significant condemnation in 2022, including by the Group of 20, which argued that such threats were “inadmissible ”.

The nuclear-weapon States expressed support for a world free of nuclear weapons but also continued to modernize their arsenals in ways intended to qualitatively improve their reliability, accuracy, speed and stealth. While the United States reiterated, in a new Nuclear Posture Review, its commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons and emphasized the importance of arms control, it disappointed disarmament advocates with its effective continuation of a focus on great power competition and arsenal modernization introduced in the preceding review. Many advocates were concerned, in particular, about the decision to maintain the low-yield W76-2 warhead for submarine-launched ballistic missiles and the failure to reduce the salience and role of nuclear weapons in the United States strategy, including through a “sole purpose” doctrine, which had been a campaign priority for President Biden. In the new Nuclear Posture Review, the United States also confirmed that it would modernize all three legs of its nuclear triad and expressed concern that increasing competition with China and the Russian Federation would impact further deliberations on arsenal reductions. Separately, the United States, backed by allies, alleged that China was accelerating expansion of its nuclear arsenal such that it could have around 1,500 nuclear weapons by 2035. China strongly rejected the allegations and pointed to its long-standing policies of no first use and minimum deterrent. However, China also declined to engage in further transparency initiatives related to its nuclear arsenal or in bilateral dialogue on the matter. In April, the Russian Federation tested its new intercontinental ballistic missile, the RS-28 Sarmat. It also deployed the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle to one regiment.

Optimism for a breakthrough in restoring the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action dissipated in 2022. The remaining parties[3] to the Plan of Action and the United States were unable to produce an outcome during their talks in Vienna to facilitate a return to the Plan’s full and effective implementation. Reaching an agreement was reportedly close in March[4] but eluded the parties amid unresolved differences between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States, for example on a prospective binding commitment by the United States not to withdraw.

In 2022, IAEA continued to provide quarterly reports to its Board of Governors and the Security Council on the implementation of nuclear-related commitments of the Islamic Republic of Iran under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, as well as on matters related to verification and monitoring in the country. The Agency noted in those reports that the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to engage in several activities that were inconsistent with the Plan of Action, including breaching the cap on its stockpile of enriched uranium (GOV/2022/62), enriching to levels above 3.67 per cent U-235 at two sites (GOV/INF/2022/24), and operating, manufacturing and developing advanced centrifuges (GOV/INF/2022/10).

The Islamic Republic of Iran also reduced its cooperation with the IAEA verification and monitoring of its nuclear programme. In June, the Islamic Republic of Iran requested the Agency to remove all its equipment previously installed for surveillance and monitoring under the Plan of Action, a total of 27 cameras. The Agency responded that the removal of the monitoring equipment would have detrimental implications for the Agency's ability to provide assurance of the peaceful nature of the country's nuclear programme (GOV/2022/62, paras. 64–65). In that context, in 2022, the Agency continued its efforts to obtain clarification from the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding information related to anthropogenic uranium particles found at an undeclared location in the country in early 2019, as well as possible undeclared nuclear material and nuclear-related activities at three locations that had not been declared (GOV/2021/15). In March, the Agency and the Islamic Republic of Iran agreed on a series of steps to resolve the impasse. However, in his June report to the Agency’s Board of Governors, the Director General stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran had not provided technically credible explanations (GOV/2022/26, para. 36). Subsequently, the Board adopted a resolution expressing “profound concern” that the safeguards issues remained unresolved. The situation remained at an impasse as at 31 December.

Perhaps the most anticipated nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation event of the year was the tenth Review Conference of the parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, postponed multiple times owing to the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic but finally held from 1 to 26 August in New York. The Conference faced a variety of challenges, ranging from the new issues — the provision of nuclear propulsion technology to non-nuclear-weapon States and the safety and security of nuclear power plants, for example — to enduring topics, such as the pace and scale of disarmament, the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear programme and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. States parties engaged in four weeks of active discussion across all three of the Treaty’s “pillars”: nuclear disarmament; nuclear non-proliferation; and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The draft outcome document that emerged from deliberations contained a range of measures to strengthen all aspects of the Treaty, including the implementation of existing commitments (a core priority for non-nuclear-weapon States), risk reduction and, especially, the role of nuclear science and technology in sustainable development. Few States parties were completely satisfied with the ambition of the document, which represented limited progress in many areas. However, they were prepared to join the consensus in adopting the document in order to achieve an outcome and bolster the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the regime it underpins. Unfortunately, on the final day of the Conference, the Russian Federation announced that it could not join the consensus on the draft document, effectively preventing its adoption. The Russian Federation’s last-minute objections to language related to the conflict in Ukraine did not allow time to resolve their concerns. Consequently, the Conference concluded without a final document, although the President of the Conference did submit the draft outcome as a working paper (NPT/CONF.2020/WP.77) under his authority. States parties agreed, however, to establish a working group on further strengthening the review process of the Treaty (NPT/CONF.2020/66 (Part I), para. 23). That working group would meet before the first Preparatory Committee meeting of the 2026 review cycle to recommend measures to the Committee to “improve the effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, accountability, coordination and continuity of the review process of the Treaty”.

A brighter spot for many States, which saw it as a counter to increasingly negative trends in nuclear disarmament, was the successful holding of the first Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Postponed twice owing to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Meeting was held from 21 to 23 June in Vienna. It was notable for its inclusivity, featuring strong roles of observers and civil society, who were present in large delegations. The Meeting emphasized the progressive elements of the Treaty, notably its concerns about victim assistance and environmental remediation and, above all, the understanding of the devastating humanitarian consequence of any use of nuclear weapons.

In the lead-up to the Meeting, States parties held extensive virtual consultations on the key areas of universalization, positive obligations, provision of scientific advice and the creation of a competent international authority to verify disarmament. Despite the limited time during the Meeting, such consultations enabled States parties to produce several progressive yet practical outcome documents: a political declaration; and an action plan and intersessional structure for the Treaty’s future implementation. Although the Meeting was held in a largely constructive manner, it too was not immune from the ramifications of the war in Ukraine, as any references — including oblique ones — had to be deleted from the declaration in order to preserve consensus.

Another positive outcome from 2022 resulted from efforts by the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization to accelerate the universalization of the Treaty. As part of efforts to commemorate the Treaty’s twenty-sixth year since opening for signature, six new States (Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Sao Tome and Principe, Timor-Leste and Tuvalu) ratified the Treaty, effectively bringing it into force for all of Latin America and the Caribbean and South-East Asia.

Issues related to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is a landmark international treaty whose objectives are to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament.

Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The tenth Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was scheduled to be held in New York from 27 April to 22 May 2020, in accordance with the decision of its Preparatory Committee in 2018 (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/DEC.3) and pursuant to General Assembly resolution 70/28. However, owing to the COVID-19 pandemic, States parties agreed to four postponements of the Conference.[5]

The tenth Review Conference eventually took place in New York from 1 to 26 August 2022, with Gustavo Zlauvinen (Argentina) serving as President. Representatives from 151 States parties, 11 international organizations and 160 non-governmental organizations participated in the session (NPT/CONF.2020/INF/6). The Conference adopted three procedural final documents: Final Document Part I – Organization and work of the Conference (NPT/CONF.2020/66 (Part I)); Final Document Part II – Documents issued at the Conference (NPT/CONF.2020/66 (Part II)); and Final Document Part III – Summary records and list of participants (NPT/CONF.2020/66 (Part III)). The Russian Federation broke consensus on the draft outcome document on 26 August, preventing the Conference from adopting a substantive final report.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine posed multiple challenges to the attainment of a substantive outcome across all three of the Treaty’s “pillars”, disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. However, even prior to the war in Ukraine, the Review Conference was under significant pressure owing to increasingly antagonistic relations between the nuclear-weapon States and the concomitant spike in nuclear risk, entrenched divides over the pace and scale of nuclear disarmament, the growing prominence of nuclear weapons in security strategies, and proliferation crises in North-East Asia and the Middle East. In addition to deliberating on perennial topics of contention, such as disarmament commitments, the safeguards standard and the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, the Conference addressed new issues, such as the safety and security of nuclear power plants in zones of armed conflict, the provision of nuclear naval propulsion technology to non-nuclear-weapon States and the role of nuclear science and technology in the fulfilment of the Sustainable Development Goals.

In his opening statement to the Review Conference, the Secretary-General warned that, “today, humanity is just one misunderstanding, one miscalculation away from nuclear annihilation”. He stressed that, for that reason, the world needed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as much as ever. He stated that the Review Conference presented an opportunity to “hammer out the measures that will help avoid certain disaster” and “to put humanity on a new path towards a world free of nuclear weapons”.

The Review Conference set aside eight meetings for a general debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Committee. States parties made 132 statements, either in their national capacities or on behalf of various groups. A plenary session was set aside for civil society to address the Conference, during which 20 statements were delivered, including a joint statement, on article VI of the Treaty, endorsed by 37 non-governmental organizations.

The general debate was addressed by Heads of Government and ministers, including Prime Minister Josaia V. Bainimarama of Fiji, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida of Japan, and the foreign ministers from Argentina, Bangladesh, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Hungary Jordan, Slovenia, Sweden and the United States. The Minister of Disarmament and Arms Control of New Zealand also spoke.

Per rule 34 of the rules of procedure (NPT/CONF.2020/1, annex III), the Conference established three Main Committees. Following the decision of the Preparatory Committee, the Main Committees were chaired by representatives of the States parties that chaired the three meetings of the Preparatory Committee. The Chairs were as follows: Main Committee I — Syed Mohamad Hasrin Aidid (Malaysia); Main Committee II — Dominika Krois (Poland); and Main Committee III — Ingeborg Denissen (Netherlands).

Also consistent with the decision of the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.2020/1, annex V), the Main Committees engaged in reviews of the following aspects of the Treaty:

• Main Committee I: Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament and international peace and security (articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1 to 3, article VI and preambular paragraphs 8 to 12, and article VII, with specific reference to the main issues considered in the Committee); security assurances (Security Council resolutions 255 (1968) and 984 (1995) and effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons); and the role of the Treaty in the promotion of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and of nuclear disarmament in strengthening international peace and security, and measures aimed at strengthening the implementation of the Treaty and achieving its universality.
• Main Committee II: Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones (article III and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5, especially in their relationship to article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7, articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1 to 3 in their relationship to articles III and IV, and article VII); and the role of the Treaty in the promotion of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and of nuclear disarmament in strengthening international peace and security, and measures aimed at strengthening the implementation of the Treaty and achieving its universality.
• Main Committee III: Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to the inalienable right of all parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II (articles III, paragraph 3, and IV, preambular paragraphs 6 and 7, especially in their relationship to article III, paragraphs 1, 2 and 4, and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5, and article V); other provisions of the Treaty; and the role of the Treaty in the promotion of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and of nuclear disarmament in strengthening international peace and security, and measures aimed at strengthening the implementation of the Treaty and achieving its universality.

The Review Conference also decided to establish subsidiary bodies under each of the Main Committees (NPT/CONF.2020/66 (Part I)). In that regard, it decided on the following: (a) Subsidiary Body 1 would be chaired by Lachezara Stoeva (Bulgaria) and would examine nuclear disarmament and security assurances; (b) Subsidiary Body 2 would be chaired by Annika Markovic (Sweden) and would examine regional issues, including with respect to the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 Middle East resolution; and (c) Subsidiary Body 3 would be chaired by Philbert Johnson (Ghana) and would examine peaceful uses of nuclear energy and other provisions of the Treaty, as well as improving the effectiveness of the strengthened review process. The Conference further decided that the meetings and discussions of the subsidiary bodies would be closed.

Main Committee I

Main Committee I held eight formal meetings from 5 to 19 August, and Subsidiary Body 1 held six private meetings from 9 to 18 August. During those meetings, States parties discussed a variety of issues related to the topics outlined in its procedural report (NPT/CONF.2020/MC.I/1). At the eighth meeting of Main Committee I, held on 19 August, the Chair circulated a document reflecting the results of the discussions held both in the Committee and in Subsidiary Body 1. At the same meeting, the Chair concluded that there was no consensus on the substantive part of the report and issued a working paper, under his own authority, reflecting the discussion in Main Committee I and Subsidiary Body 1 (NPT/CONF.2020/MC.I/WP.1).

Main Committee I discussed, among other areas, the need for the full and effective implementation of all provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a means of promoting and preserving international peace and security, preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and achieving a world without nuclear weapons.

The nuclear-weapon States reaffirmed their commitment not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon States to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices, in accordance with article I of the Treaty. The non-nuclear-weapon States reaffirmed their commitment not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly, not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and not to seek nor receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with article II of the Treaty.

States parties stressed the importance and discussed the continued validity of all commitments they had undertaken towards the full and effective implementation of the objectives and provisions of the Treaty, including those contained in the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference (“Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”), the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference (the 13 practical steps for achieving nuclear disarmament (NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II), pp. 14–15)), and the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference (the “64 point action plan” (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), pp. 20–29)).

States parties reaffirmed their commitment to the full and effective implementation of article VI of the Treaty, while many of them regretted the lack of tangible progress in implementing that article and related commitments. Expressing concern that the lack of progress jeopardized the integrity and credibility of the Treaty, those States argued that the commitments were not open ended, and that concrete and urgent progress towards nuclear disarmament was essential in maintaining the integrity and credibility of the Treaty. Some States parties reiterated the ultimate goal of the Treaty to achieve general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Participants also raised concerns regarding the increase in nuclear rhetoric and nuclear threats, as well as the impact of that increase both on international peace and security and on the integrity and credibility of the Treaty. To that end, many States parties stressed the need for concrete steps to reduce the alert status of nuclear-weapon systems that promoted international stability and security, as well as the importance of confidence-building measures to reduce the risk of the use of nuclear weapons. However, they noted that risk reduction was not a substitute for tangible progress in the fulfilment of nuclear disarmament obligations under the Treaty.

The Committee discussed the importance for all States parties to report regularly on their implementation of obligations and commitments under the Treaty. It also considered the need for the nuclear-weapon States to continue efforts to agree on a standard reporting form and appropriate reporting intervals, including on steps taken by States parties towards further decreasing and eliminating the role of nuclear weapons in all their military and security concepts, doctrines and policies, whether national or collective.

In that context, States parties noted the nuclear-weapon States’ conferences in Beijing (2019), London (2020) and Paris (2021), which aimed to foster dialogue and common approaches among them to strengthen the implementation of the Treaty. Participants also welcomed the affirmation by the nuclear-weapon States on 3 January 2022 that, inter alia, a nuclear war could not be won and must never be fought, as well as their reaffirmation of the importance of addressing nuclear threats and of preserving and complying with bilateral and multilateral non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control agreements and commitments. Additionally, many States parties highlighted the importance of preserving and continuing to implement bilateral arms control agreements between the Russian Federation and the United States. Welcoming the extension of the New START Treaty in 2021, States called for the negotiation of a successor agreement leading to further reductions in the nuclear weapon stockpiles of the Russian Federation and the United States. They also stressed the urgency of rapidly moving towards an overall reduction in the global stockpile of all types of nuclear weapons.

States parties discussed the application of the mutually reinforcing principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in relation to the implementation of their Treaty obligations. Many of them expressed concern over the qualitative improvement and development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons, as well as the lack of progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies and the low level of transparency surrounding those activities.

A large group of States parties underscored their deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and the need for all States, at all times, to comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law. They highlighted the presentation, during the past two review cycles, of findings and evidence on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons.

Many States parties recalled the adoption and opening for signature of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons on 7 July 2017 and 20 September 2017, respectively. They further noted the holding of the Treaty’s first Meeting of States Parties from 21 to 23 June 2022, which concluded with the adoption of a declaration and an action plan. They also recalled the International Court of Justice advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, issued at The Hague on 8 July 1996.

States parties engaged in dialogue on the failure of the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations either on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices or on legally binding arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by all nuclear-weapon States.

On the latter topic, concerning negative security assurances, Committee participants recalled Security Council resolution 984 (1995). In that resolution, the Council noted the unilateral statements in which each of the nuclear-weapon States gave conditional or unconditional security assurances against the use and the threat of use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty (S/1995/261, S/1995/262, S/1995/263, S/1995/264 and S/1995/265). States parties further recalled the relevant protocols to nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties, recognizing that treaty-based unconditional and conditional security assurances were available to such zones. Additionally, States parties discussed the importance of security assurances in the context of the invasion of Ukraine. (For additional information on nuclear-weapon-free zones, see chap. 4).

Reiterating the importance of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, States parties broadly welcomed the signatures (Tuvalu, 2018; Cuba, 2021) and ratifications of that Treaty (Eswatini and Myanmar, 2016; Thailand, 2018; Zimbabwe, 2019; Comoros and Cuba, 2021; Dominica, Gambia, Timor-Leste and Tuvalu, 2022) since the ninth Review Conference as a sign of its continuing salience in strengthening international security. They discussed the importance of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty entering into force at the earliest possible date, given the need for a permanent, non-discriminatory, verifiable and legally binding commitment to end any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, as a means to constrain the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, which combats nuclear proliferation. While many States parties welcomed the voluntary moratoriums of the nuclear-weapon States on nuclear testing, they stressed that those arrangements were no substitute for a legally binding prohibition.

Furthermore, States parties discussed the importance of effective and credible nuclear disarmament verification in achieving and maintaining a world without nuclear weapons. In that regard, States highlighted the work of the Group of Governmental Experts to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament.

Participants raised the importance of disarmament and non-proliferation education as a useful and effective means to advance the goals of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, as well as the vital role of increasing public awareness of disarmament and non-proliferation.

Meanwhile, in the six private meetings of Subsidiary Body 1, participants considered the importance of strictly applying the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in implementing the Treaty’s disarmament obligations. The Subsidiary Body discussed the need for immediate or further reductions in all types of nuclear weapons, including through bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral negotiations and unilateral initiatives. It also debated the urgency of steps to diminish, with a view to eliminating, the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies, including the adoption of no-first-use doctrines and transparency measures.

Subsidiary Body 1 discussed strengthening assistance for initiatives to develop multilateral disarmament verification and capacity-building in support of nuclear disarmament as an effective step towards the implementation of article VI. It also discussed the issue of irreversible nuclear disarmament, including the need to exchange information on how the principles of irreversibility were applied.

Within the Subsidiary Body, States parties also considered how to accelerate the entry into force of the relevant protocols to treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, as well as the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the world, including the Middle East. It deliberated on how to strengthen measures to prevent the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

In addition, the Subsidiary Body engaged in a debate over the need for measures to reduce the risk of a nuclear weapon being used. Many States parties stressed that geostrategic conditions necessitated urgent measures and, because nuclear risks directly affected all States, there was a shared interest in risk reduction. Others argued that risk reduction measures should be matched with commensurate, concrete measures on the implementation of disarmament commitments. Some also noted that implementing the disarmament obligations in accordance with article VI and existing commitments could contribute to decreasing risks. States parties discussed various kinds of risk reduction measures, including political declarations of restraint; refraining from dangerous rhetoric and from directly and indirectly threatening the use of nuclear weapons; intensifying dialogue on risk perceptions, nuclear doctrines and force postures; pursuing greater transparency on nuclear arsenals; enhancing crisis prevention and management tools; taking steps to better understand and minimize vulnerabilities related to potentially disruptive new technologies and cyber capacities as they pertain to nuclear weapons; and investigating practical steps to close off pathways to inadvertent nuclear use.

A core issue undertaken by Subsidiary Body 1 concerned the necessity of strengthening accountability through enhanced transparency and measurability of the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments. In that regard, its discussions were centred on the importance of nuclear-weapon States reporting on the status of their nuclear forces, their nuclear doctrine and the progress in their implementation of the Treaty.

In the Committee, States parties discussed the vital importance of educating and empowering individuals of all generations, irrespective of their gender, regarding the dangers of nuclear weapons and the imperative to reach a world without nuclear weapons. Many States parties highlighted the need to take concrete measures to raise public awareness, in particular of younger and future generations, as well as of leaders, disarmament experts and diplomats, on all topics relating to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, including through interactions with affected communities. In that context, many States underscored the need to ensure the equal, full and effective participation and leadership of both women and men in the Treaty’s implementation, as well as to enable youth to participate in formal and informal initiatives, and in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation decision-making processes.

Main Committee II

Main Committee II held 11 formal meetings from 8 to 22 August, and Subsidiary Body 2 held four meetings from 9 to 19 August. States parties undertook a range of discussions across the issues outlined in its procedural report (NPT/CONF.2020/MC.II/1). At the eleventh meeting of Main Committee II, held on 22 August, the Chair introduced a draft report reflecting the results of the discussions held in Main Committee II, as well as a second draft report on the results of the discussions held in Subsidiary Body 2. At the same meeting, the Chair concluded that there was no consensus on the substantive parts of those reports and issued a working paper, under her own authority, reflecting the discussion in Main Committee II and Subsidiary Body 2 (NPT/CONF.2020/MC.II/WP.1).

In its deliberations, the Committee discussed the role of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and the vital role it played in promoting international peace and security by preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. As in Main Committee I, the nuclear-weapon States reaffirmed their commitment not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices. Likewise, the non-nuclear-weapon States reaffirmed their commitment not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. It was noted that these commitments were legally binding.

The Committee discussed the need for measures to ensure that the rights of all States parties under the Treaty were fully protected and that responses to concerns over compliance with any obligation under the Treaty by any State party should be pursued by diplomatic means in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and the Charter of the United Nations.

Many States parties emphasized that the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) were a fundamental component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, were essential for peaceful nuclear commerce and cooperation, and that Agency safeguards made a vital contribution to the environment for peaceful nuclear development and international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It was highlighted that safeguards should be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of the Treaty.

The Committee discussed the IAEA role as the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring, in accordance with the Agency’s Statute and its safeguards system, compliance by States parties with the safeguards agreements undertaken in fulfilment of their obligations under the Treaty. Many States parties stressed the importance of not undermining the authority of the Agency in that regard.

Participants emphasized that States parties with concerns regarding non-compliance with safeguards agreements should direct such concerns to IAEA to consider, investigate, draw conclusions and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate. Their discussion also touched on the need to cooperate with the Agency in the timely resolution of such matters. Expressing their concern over cases of non-compliance, a large number of States parties stressed the importance of States ensuring that they remain in or promptly return to compliance with their obligations. In that context, States noted the role of the Security Council and General Assembly in upholding compliance with safeguards agreements.

The Committee debated the distinction between voluntary confidence-building measures and the legal obligations of States. It was highlighted that comprehensive safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/153 (Corrected) had been successful in their main focus of providing assurance regarding declared nuclear material and had also provided a limited level of assurance regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Many States parties also noted that implementing the measures specified in the Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)) provided IAEA with broader information and access so that it could provide increased assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a State as a whole. Other States parties stressed that it was the sovereign decision of any State to conclude an additional protocol, but once in force, the additional protocol was a legal obligation.

States parties welcomed the fact that 179 States parties had in force comprehensive safeguards agreements with IAEA and that six additional States had brought such agreements into force since the 2015 Review Conference. Non-nuclear-weapon States yet to bring comprehensive safeguards agreements into force were urged to do so as soon as possible and without further delay. Participants also welcomed the fact that 138 States parties had brought additional protocols into force, including 14 that had brought them into force since the 2015 Review Conference. Many States parties noted the growing number of States implementing the comprehensive safeguards agreement together with the additional protocol as an integral part of the IAEA strengthened safeguards system.

Committee participants noted that 22 States parties had amended their IAEA small quantities protocols since the 2015 Review Conference and that another six States parties had rescinded their small quantities protocols. The Committee discussed the increasing challenges for the Agency to draw safeguards conclusions for those States with small quantities protocols based on the original standard text. There was broad encouragement for IAEA to further facilitate and assist States parties upon request in concluding, entering into force and implementing comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols, and in amending or rescinding small quantities protocols.

The Committee discussed the role of bilateral and regional safeguards, such as those implemented by the European Atomic Energy Community and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, in further promoting transparency and mutual confidence between States and supporting the non-proliferation objectives of the Treaty.

States parties considered IAEA efforts to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of its safeguards, including by developing and implementing State-level safeguards approaches in line with national legal obligations. They discussed the importance of close consultation and coordination with States, as well as the relevant assurances contained in resolutions of the IAEA General Conference. Many States parties called for the regular assessment and evaluation of the safeguards system. Some States parties noted that strengthening IAEA safeguards should not adversely affect the resources available for technical assistance and cooperation. They discussed the importance of the Agency maintaining high standards of professionalism in ensuring the verification of States’ non-proliferation commitments and of undertaking its responsibilities in an effective, transparent, impartial, technically based, non-discriminatory and objective manner. Additionally, many States parties stressed the need to ensure that the Agency had the necessary political, technical and financial support so that it was able to effectively meet its responsibility to apply safeguards as required by article III of the Treaty.

Many States parties expressed grave concern at the military activities being conducted near or at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, as well as other facilities and locations within Ukraine; the loss of control over such locations by the competent Ukrainian authorities owing to military activities conducted by the Russian Federation; and the profound negative impact of those events on safety, security, including physical protection of nuclear material, and safeguards. It was further noted that the loss of control over nuclear facilities and other locations by the competent authorities of Ukraine prevented those authorities and IAEA from ensuring that safeguards activities could be implemented effectively and safely.

The Committee engaged in a debate over the use of nuclear material in non-proscribed military activities provided for under comprehensive safeguards agreements, particularly naval nuclear propulsion. In that regard, participants discussed possible arrangements for ensuring that nuclear material designated for naval nuclear propulsion would not be used for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Their discussion touched on the consideration of IAEA potential arrangements related to naval nuclear propulsion in consultation with the States concerned, as well as the role of continuing dialogue and transparency on the matter in accordance with the rules of the relevant bodies.

The Committee discussed efforts by IAEA to assist the States parties, upon request, in strengthening their national legal and regulatory frameworks related to safeguards. Those deliberations included the Agency’s assistance in establishing and maintaining State systems to account for and control nuclear material.

Some States parties stressed the importance of maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards. Participants noted steps taken by the IAEA secretariat to protect classified safeguards information, as well as the secretariat’s continued review and update of established procedures for protecting such information.

The Committee discussed how nuclear security, including the physical protection of nuclear material, cybersecurity and the protection of nuclear facilities against such acts as theft and sabotage, can support the objectives of the Treaty. States parties highlighted existing and emerging nuclear security threats, as well as the fact that the responsibility for nuclear security within a State rests entirely with that State. The Committee discussed the need for all States, within their responsibility, to achieve and maintain highly effective nuclear security, including physical protection, of nuclear and other radioactive material during use, storage and transport and of the associated facilities at all stages in their life cycle, as well as protection of sensitive information. Many States parties welcomed the entry into force of the amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, recognizing the importance of its acceptance, approval or ratification by further States and noting the importance of its full implementation and universalization. The exchange also highlighted the central role of IAEA in strengthening the nuclear security framework globally and the need for all States to take part in nuclear security-related activities and initiatives in an inclusive manner.

The Committee discussed the importance of all States parties to improve their national capabilities to prevent, detect and respond to illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials throughout their territories, in accordance with their national legislation and relevant international obligations, and the importance of States parties in a position to do so working to enhance international partnerships and capacity-building in that regard.

Many States parties expressed concerns related to the threat of terrorism and the risk that non-State actors might acquire nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. They recalled the essential role played by the relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1540 (2004), and the obligation of all States to implement binding provisions of those resolutions. They also encouraged all States that had not yet done so to become party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism as soon as possible.

Many States parties recalled that the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, by paragraph 12 of its decision 2, affirmed that new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of full-scope IAEA safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

The Committee discussed export controls, including the need to ensure that nuclear trade for peaceful purposes does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In that context, it was highlighted that, in acting in pursuance of the objectives of the Treaty, all States parties should observe the legitimate right of all States parties, in particular developing States, to full access to nuclear material, equipment and technological information for peaceful purposes. The Committee also discussed the importance of sound national laws and regulations to ensure that States parties implement their commitments with respect to transferring nuclear or nuclear-related dual-use items to any State in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Treaty.

The Committee deliberated on how the further establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear non-proliferation regime and contributes towards realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament. Many expressed support for the internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones and recognized the contributions made by the Antarctic Treaty, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga), the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty), the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) and the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia, as well as the nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia, to nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation.

Many States urged further progress towards ratification by nuclear-weapon States of the relevant protocols to nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties. They highlighted the need for constructive consultations on the outstanding issues related to signing the Protocol to the Bangkok Treaty with a view to signing and ratifying the Protocol as soon as possible. Participants also encouraged nuclear-weapon States to review any reservations or interpretative statements made in connection with the ratification of the protocols to the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. They further called on nuclear-weapon States to ratify relevant protocols to those treaties, thereby bringing into effect the security assurances provided by them.

Within the framework of Subsidiary Body 2, which considered regional issues, the Committee discussed the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, the affirmation of that resolution’s goals and objectives by the previous Review Conferences, and the need to fully implement the measure. Numerous States parties argued that the 1995 resolution remained valid until the goals and objectives were achieved, noting that it was an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Conference and of the basis on which the Treaty was indefinitely extended without a vote. Many States parties recalled that, at the 2010 Review Conference, the five nuclear-weapon States had reaffirmed their commitment to fully implementing the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. Others, meanwhile, urged all States in the region to take relevant steps and confidence-building measures to contribute to the realization of the resolution’s objectives. Participating States also acknowledged developments at the first two sessions of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction, convened in November 2019 and November 2021 at the United Nations in New York.

A large group of States parties reaffirmed their unwavering support for the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, stressing that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea must abide by its international obligations. They condemned the nuclear tests conducted by the country in 2016 and 2017 while stressing that it must not conduct any further nuclear tests. Additionally, many States parties stressed that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea could not have the status of a nuclear-weapon State pursuant to the Treaty and called on it to return without delay to the Treaty and to the application of Agency safeguards on all of its nuclear activities.

States parties also discussed the need for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to take concrete measures as soon as possible to abandon all its nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles and related programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, as well as the importance of resolving that issue through negotiations and diplomacy, and for restraint and meaningful dialogue in order to promote peace and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Main Committee III

Main Committee III held 10 formal meetings from 8 to 19 August. Subsidiary Body 3 held five meetings from 9 to 19 August. After an initial general exchange of views on the agenda items allocated to it, the Committee considered the issues contained in its procedural report (NPT/CONF.2020/MC.III/1). At the tenth meeting of Main Committee III, held on 19 August, the Chair concluded that there was no consensus on the substantive part of the report and issued a working paper, under her own authority, reflecting the discussion in Main Committee III and Subsidiary Body 3 (NPT/CONF.2020/MC.III/WP.1).

The Committee reaffirmed that nothing in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with its articles I, II, III and IV. It also reaffirmed that all States parties to the Treaty should undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in conformity with all the provisions of the Treaty. Many States parties also stressed that those States parties in a position to do so should cooperate in contributing with other States parties or international organizations, such as IAEA, to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, particularly in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

The Committee discussed the important role of the Treaty for peace and development in the twenty-first century, including its achievements in facilitating cooperation on nuclear science, technology and applications for peaceful purposes. It also considered the significant contribution that peaceful uses of nuclear energy could make to meeting the social and economic needs of States parties in helping overcome the technological and economic disparities between developed and developing countries.

Many States parties stressed the essential role of IAEA, including through its Technical Cooperation Programme, in assisting States parties upon request in building human and institutional capacities, including regulatory capabilities, for the safe, secure and peaceful applications of nuclear science and technology.

The Committee discussed the importance of respect for each country’s sovereign choices and decisions relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in line with international obligations, particularly in conformity with articles I, II, III and IV of the Treaty, without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy policies and its nuclear fuel cycle policies. It also discussed the importance of giving preferential treatment to non-nuclear-weapon States, taking into account the needs of developing countries and least developed countries in all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear science, technology and applications. Many States parties highlighted the need to support efforts to ensure the full, equal and meaningful participation of women and to promote an inclusive workforce in the areas of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The Committee discussed the growing role of peaceful uses of nuclear energy in achieving the climate goals of the 2015 Paris Agreement and in “building back better from the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) while advancing the full implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”. With respect to the Sustainable Development Goals, participants noted that nuclear science and technology could contribute in particular to achieving Goal 2 (zero hunger), Goal 3 (good health and well-being), Goal 6 (clean water and sanitation), Goal 7 (affordable and clean energy), Goal 9 (industry, innovation and infrastructure), Goal 13 (climate action), Goal 14 (life below water), Goal 15 (life on land) and Goal 17 (partnerships for the Goals). It also discussed the role that nuclear technologies can contribute to addressing climate change, mitigating and adapting to its consequences, and monitoring its impact.

The Committee recognized the ways in which IAEA activities in the field of technical cooperation and nuclear applications contributed to meeting energy needs, improving human and animal health, combating poverty, protecting the environment, developing agriculture, managing the use of water resources, optimizing industrial processes and preserving cultural heritage, thus helping to improve the quality of life and the well-being of the peoples of the world. In that context, many States parties urged further engagement in education and public communication efforts to raise awareness concerning the diverse applications of nuclear science and technology.

Many States parties highlighted the importance of managing spent fuel and radioactive waste in a safe manner while also recognizing the continuing international efforts to address those issues, including issues related to deep geological disposal and closed nuclear fuel cycles. The Committee discussed providing adequate support for IAEA to provide the assistance needed by Member States upon request, and participants welcomed contributions in support of Agency activities by States parties and groups of States parties.

Another area of focus pertained to the importance of IAEA technical cooperation activities and nuclear knowledge-sharing, as well as the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries and least developed countries for sustaining and further enhancing their scientific and technological capabilities. Many States parties highlighted the importance of ensuring that Agency resources for technical cooperation activities were sufficient, assured and predictable. The Committee discussed how developing countries and least developed countries should be given priority in the allocation of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund. Participants also welcomed the role of the Agency’s Peaceful Uses Initiative in mobilizing extrabudgetary contributions to support technical cooperation as well as projects aimed at promoting broad development goals in States parties.

The Committee discussed the development and promotion of advanced nuclear technologies, both nationally and through cooperation in all relevant international initiatives such as the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles, the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor and the Generation IV International Forum.

The Committee noted the contributions of the IAEA regional and cooperative agreements with its member States in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Asia and the Pacific, as well as for Arab States. Similarly, it acknowledged the contributions of the strategy for the IAEA regional technical cooperation programme in Europe and Central Asia.

The Committee discussed developing multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including the possibilities for creating mechanisms for assuring nuclear fuel supply, as well as possible schemes dealing with the back end of the fuel cycle, without affecting rights under the Treaty and without prejudice to national fuel cycle policies. It considered how to tackle the technical, legal and economic complexities surrounding those issues, including with respect to the requirement of full-scope safeguards. In that context, participants noted the establishment of an IAEA-owned and -operated Low-Enriched Uranium Bank in Kazakhstan.

Participants discussed the role of intergovernmental agreements between States with mature nuclear industries and newcomer States. They addressed the ability of such arrangements to facilitate further cooperation through project-specific agreements between, for instance, regulatory authorities, operators and entities in charge of waste management, training and research and development.

Many States parties emphasized that efforts related to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy would benefit from the involvement of a wider variety of stakeholders, including government and international development agencies, non-governmental organizations, medical and research communities, universities and nuclear regulators and operators. In that regard, States noted the important role that the nuclear industry could play in promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technologies. States also welcomed new initiatives aimed at expanding access to the benefits of peaceful uses of nuclear energy for developing countries and aimed at taking concrete action consistent with article IV of the Treaty through, for example, the Sustained Dialogue on Peaceful Uses.

The Committee stressed the importance of nuclear safety and nuclear security for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. While recognizing that the responsibility for safety and security rested with individual States, States parties reaffirmed the central role of IAEA in developing safety standards and nuclear security guidance and relevant conventions based on best practices in strengthening and coordinating international cooperation on nuclear safety and security. Furthermore, the Committee noted that measures and initiatives aimed at strengthening nuclear safety and security should be in full conformity with relevant articles under the Treaty, including the inalienable right of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

States parties noted that although safety was a national responsibility, international cooperation on all safety-related matters was important, including by taking the appropriate national, regional and international steps to enhance and foster a safety culture. Many participants stressed the importance of facilitating a high level of safety and security in deploying nuclear technologies globally, including by carrying out the development of advanced reactors in a safe, secure and safeguarded manner.

The Committee also discussed the international legal framework in the field of nuclear safety and security. In their exchange, the participants addressed the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the 2005 Amendment thereto, and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

Many States parties noted existing instruments that could provide the basis for a global nuclear liability regime based on the principles of nuclear liability. In that regard, they recalled the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, the Brussels Convention Supplementary to the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, the Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention, the protocols amending these conventions, and the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage.

Recalling the excellent historical safety record of civilian transport of radioactive materials, including maritime transport, a large number of States parties stressed the importance of international cooperation to maintain and enhance the safety of international transfers. They reaffirmed maritime and air navigation rights and freedoms, as provided for in international law and as reflected in relevant international instruments. In that context, the Committee discussed the IAEA standards for the safe transport of radioactive material, as well as the importance of continuing to transport such materials in a manner consistent with international safety, security and environmental protection standards and guidelines.

The Committee debated the importance of nuclear safety and security with regard to peaceful nuclear facilities and materials in all circumstances, including in armed conflict zones, and of the Seven Indispensable Pillars of Nuclear Safety and Security derived from Agency safety standards and nuclear security guidance. Numerous States parties expressed grave concern with respect to the safety and security of nuclear facilities and materials of Ukraine, in particular the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant, as well as to attacks or threats of attack on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes, jeopardizing nuclear safety and security. They encouraged all States parties to support efforts to restore the safety and security of the nuclear facilities and materials of Ukraine. Pursuant to Action 64 of the Action Plan adopted by the 2010 Review Conference, many States parties recalled the need to abide by the decision of the IAEA General Conference of 18 September 2009 entitled “Prohibition of armed attack or threat of attack against nuclear installations, during operation or under construction” (GC(53)/DEC/13).

The Committee affirmed that the provisions of article V of the Treaty regarding the peaceful applications of any nuclear explosions were to be interpreted in the light of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

Many States noted that while the review process for the Treaty had generally served States parties well, there was scope to improve its overall effectiveness, transparency, inclusivity, efficiency and responsiveness. It was noted that, while actions to strengthen the review process were no substitute for making progress on substantive outcomes, the goal of reviewing Treaty working methods should be to facilitate substantive, transparent and inclusive dialogue, thereby contributing to the Treaty’s effective implementation.

The Committee discussed the establishment of a working group on further strengthening the review process of the Treaty, open to all States parties, based on the following arrangements: (a) the working group will meet as close as possible to the beginning of the first meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the Eleventh Review Conference to discuss and make recommendations to the Committee on measures that would improve the effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, accountability, coordination and continuity of the Treaty review process; (b) the working group will operate according to the rules of procedure of the tenth Review Conference which will be applied mutatis mutandis; and (c) the Secretariat will, in consultation with States parties and the Chair-designate of the first meeting of the Preparatory Committee, facilitate a decision on the working group’s venue and duration and provide States parties with an estimate of its costs, which will be covered through a one-time assessed contribution by States parties.

The Committee discussed the importance of the full, equal and meaningful participation of women in decision-making in the review process of the Treaty, including in the bureau, in accordance with Security Council resolution 1325 (2000). It also raised the importance of actively supporting participation by women in their delegations, including through support for sponsorship programmes. It was requested that the Secretariat collect, track and publish data disaggregated by sex and gender statistics.

The Committee agreed that universal adherence to the Treaty was essential and an urgent and continuing priority for the full realization of the Treaty’s objectives. To that end, it called upon India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to the Treaty without further delay and without any conditions as non-nuclear-weapon States. It also encouraged South Sudan to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible and called upon all States parties to exert all efforts to promote universal adherence to the Treaty and not to take any action that could negatively affect prospects for the universality of the Treaty.

The Committee discussed how each State party, in exercising its national sovereignty, had the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decided that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty had jeopardized its supreme interests. It was noted that, pursuant to article X, notice of withdrawal should be given to all other parties to the Treaty and to the Security Council three months in advance and should include a statement of the extraordinary events that the State party regarded as having jeopardized its supreme interests. It further noted that the procedures laid out in article X must be followed fully by any State party invoking its right to withdraw.

Multiple States parties stressed the importance of not reinterpreting any provision of the Treaty and that the right to withdraw should not be limited, restricted or undermined. Other States parties noted the relevance of customary international law in connection with the withdrawal of States from treaties, including those rules reflected in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, under which States parties, in exercising their rights under article X, would remain responsible for any violation of the Treaty committed prior to withdrawal. They emphasized that withdrawal did not change any other existing legal obligations or political commitments between the withdrawing State and any other party, including the obligations that applied to nuclear materials, equipment and scientific and technological information acquired by a State prior to withdrawal, which should remain under safeguards pursuant to relevant agreements to be concluded in connection with the withdrawal from the Treaty.

Adoption of the final document

Despite intensive consultations by the President, the Conference was not able to reach agreement on the substantive part (Part I) of the draft Final Document, as contained in the draft circulated by the President on 25 August, which contained his best assessment of the discussions that took place in the Main Committees and their subsidiary bodies, and the working papers submitted by the Main Committee Chairs. At its thirteenth and final plenary meeting on 26 August, the Conference adopted the procedural part of the draft Final Document on the organization and work of the Conference (NPT/CONF.2020/66 (Part I)).

States parties did, however, agree to establish a working group on further strengthening the review process of the Treaty, open to all States parties. The Conference decided that the working group would meet as close as possible to the beginning of the first meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the eleventh Review Conference to discuss and make recommendations to the Preparatory Committee on measures that would improve the effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, accountability, coordination and continuity of the review process of the Treaty. It also decided that the working group would operate according to the rules of procedure of the tenth Review Conference, which would be applied mutatis mutandis and that the Secretariat would, in consultation with States parties and the Chair-designate of the first meeting of the Preparatory Committee, facilitate a decision on the venue and duration of the working group session, and provide States parties with an estimate of its costs, which would be covered through a one-time assessed contribution by States parties (NPT/CONF.2020/DEC.2).

Issues related to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

Entry into force and universality

In 2022, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty continued to be recognized as an international pillar of non-proliferation and disarmament. Since its opening for signature in New York on 24 September 1996, the Treaty has made a significant contribution to international peace and security by constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons through an unparalleled verification system. The Treaty also plays a crucial role in preventing nuclear proliferation, advancing nuclear disarmament, and promoting environmental and human health protection.

The year 2022 witnessed exceptional growth in adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, with ratifications by six additional countries: Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, the Gambia, Sao Tome and Principe, Timor-Leste and Tuvalu. That reinvigoration of progress towards universalization of the Treaty prompted celebration at the tenth Ministerial Meeting of the Friends of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, held in New York in September. As at 31 December, 186 States had signed the Treaty, and 176 of them had ratified it, demonstrating near-universal international support for the Treaty and its verification regime.

A year of reaffirming and solidifying the nuclear test ban

With the opening for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 1996, the international community declared that the era of unrestrained nuclear testing had come to an end. Since then, the Treaty has created and sustained a norm against nuclear testing so powerful that fewer than one dozen tests have been conducted in 26 years; and only one country has violated it this millennium. In August, at the tenth Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, States parties to that agreement widely reaffirmed their strong support for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and its verification regime.

In 2022, the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and signatory States held a range of events to mark the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Treaty and to reaffirm the importance of the nuclear test ban.

In addition to celebrating and commemorating the Treaty’s opening for signature, the events were intended to highlight the Treaty’s impact to date and to demonstrate its significance as a concrete and practical measure for disarmament and non-proliferation. They also served as a call to action to promote and support efforts to gain additional signatures and ratifications during and beyond the Treaty’s twenty-fifth anniversary year.

International Day against Nuclear Tests

On 7 September, the General Assembly convened a high-level plenary meeting to commemorate and promote the International Day against Nuclear Tests. At the invitation of the President of the Assembly’s seventy-sixth session, the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission, Robert Floyd, delivered a keynote speech in which he urged all States to do their utmost to advance the Treaty’s entry into force and universalization. Participants, recounting the serious impacts of nuclear testing on human health and the environment and on international peace and security, called on the remaining eight Annex 2 States to take the necessary actions to advance the Treaty’s entry into force while highlighting the importance of the agreement and its verification regime.

Friends of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

The tenth Ministerial Meeting of the Friends of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty took place on the margins of the general debate of the seventy-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly on 21 September. Convened by the group’s six member countries — Australia, Canada, Finland, Germany, Japan and the Netherlands — the Meeting was co-chaired by the Prime Minister of Japan, Fumio Kishida, and Australia’s Foreign Minister, Penny Wong. The speakers also included the President of Finland, Sauli Niinistö; the President of Comoros, Azali Assoumani; the Prime Minister of New Zealand, Jacinda Ardern; the Foreign Minister of Canada, Mélanie Joly; the Secretary of State of the Holy See, Pietro Parolin; the Vice Foreign Minister of the Netherlands, Marcel de Vink; the Director General for Asia and the Pacific of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Petra Sigmund; the Director General of South Africa’s Department of International Relations and Cooperation, Zane Dangor; the United Nations Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Izumi Nakamitsu; and the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission, Robert Floyd. Other participants included representatives from the Co-Chairs of the twelfth biennial Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (Article XIV Conference), Italy and South Africa.

During the Ministerial Meeting, Prime Minister Kishida stated that the entry into force of the Treaty would be an important step in advancing the Hiroshima Action Plan, which he had announced at the tenth Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in August. He stressed the importance of the Treaty’s universalization and early entry into force, as well as the strengthening of its verification system. The meeting concluded with the adoption of a joint statement.

Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization

Established in 1996, the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization is an international organization tasked with building up the verification regime of the Treaty in preparation for its entry into force, as well as promoting the universality of the agreement. In 2022, the Preparatory Commission was chaired by Dario Ernesto Chiru Ochoa (Panama).

Robert Floyd became the fourth Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission in 2021. In 2022, his top priorities continued to include promoting signatures and ratifications of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; achieving progress towards the Treaty’s entry into force; improving gender balance in the Provisional Technical Secretariat; stressing the key role of the Treaty and its verification regime in global security; building on the progress of the Preparatory Commission to date, including its sustainment of the International Monitoring System; and enhancing partnerships with all signatory States.

In June, the Executive Secretary launched the National Data Centres for All Initiative, a widely supported effort to ensure that all signatory States — particularly small developing States — benefit to the greatest extent possible from access to International Monitoring System data. As of 2022, 43 out of 186 signatory States had yet to designate their National Data Centres. Countries can receive assistance through the Initiative in establishing such sites, in turn enabling the host governments to use data collected by the International Monitoring System for national purposes. The first six months of the Initiative contributed towards new momentum in establishing National Data Centres as even more States came to understand their benefits.

Status of the progress on the establishment of the verification regime

The International Monitoring System was carefully designed to ensure no nuclear detonations can be conducted anywhere on the planet — in the air, on land, or in the sea — without producing incontestable evidence, available to the global community, through cutting-edge technology surveying the planet continuously for Treaty violations. The fully constructed International Monitoring System will consist of 337 facilities, comprising 321 monitoring stations and 16 laboratories operated by 89 different countries. It uses four state-of-the-art technologies: seismic, infrasound and hydroacoustic stations respectively monitor the land, air and sea for vibrations produced by explosions, while radionuclide stations filter the atmosphere for the distinctive radioactive by-products of nuclear detonations. As of 2022, 304 facilities had been established and were providing data to the International Data Centre.

In 2022, radionuclide station RN2 was established in Argentina, primary seismic station PS35 was certified in the Russian Federation, and RN43 in Mauritania saw the installation and certification of a new noble gas capacity. After major technological upgrades, several stations were revalidated (see table below), including the radionuclide stations RN9 in Australia; the radionuclide laboratories RL5 in Canada, RL8 in France and RL15 in the United Kingdom, primary seismic station PS19 in Germany and PS24 in Kenya, infrasound stations IS5 in Australia and IS47 in South Africa, T-phase hydroacoustic stations HA2 in Canada and HA7 in Portugal, and auxiliary seismic stations AS15 in Canada and AS102 in Switzerland.

Status of the installation and certification programme for International Monitoring System stations, as at 31 December 2022

International Data Centre

The International Data Centre receives and processes data from International Monitoring System stations around the world, distributing it in both raw and analysed formats and in specialized products for the independent review and analysis of signatory States. It ensures the high availability of data collected continuously from around the world.

As an operational component of the Treaty, the International Data Centre benefits from constant upgrades of its capabilities to provide better services to signatory States. As scientific knowledge advances globally, the Centre’s scientific analysis software and support infrastructure receive updates based on guidance from experts for signatory States.

In 2022, the International Data Centre underwent further improvements aimed at strengthening and improving its services to signatory States. The secure web portal, one of the primary services used by experts from signatory States around the world to access International Monitoring System data and International Data Centre products, received significant enhancements that included a modern, intuitive mobile interface, as well as extended content and document search options. With the launch of the National Data Centres for All Initiative to support the establishment of National Data Centres in 43 States, the International Data Centre underwent significant capacity-building to assist those countries. Throughout the year, the International Data Centre continued to support the development of software tools that can be used in National Data Centres and launched several important updates to the National Data Centre-in-a-Box software suite.

On-site inspections

An on-site inspection can take place to establish whether a nuclear explosion has occurred. Such inspections might involve gathering facts to identify a possible violator of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, making them the Treaty’s ultimate verification measure following its entry into force.

In 2022, related progress was focused on implementing the 2022-2023 programme of work for on-site inspections, preparing the inspection exercise plan for 2022–2025 and developing the next training plan for inspectors.

The year saw a welcome resumption of face-to-face activities — including training, expert meetings and workshops — following the relaxation of measures against COVID-19. As the Preparatory Commission continued overseeing the capacity-building training of inspectors, it made final preparations to resume its series of Regional Introductory Courses for on-site inspections. Two courses in the series, one to be held in Thailand and the second in Slovakia, were scheduled to take place in early 2023 with funding from the European Union.

Following the Preparatory Commission's approval of the On-Site Inspection Exercise Programme for 2022-2025, the Provisional Technical Secretariat invited all signatory States to submit an expression of interest in hosting an integrated field exercise in 2025. The last such exercise took place in 2014. As a large and complex undertaking, an integrated field exercise is used to benchmark the current state of development of the on-site inspection regime, as well as to identify areas of improvement to guide the future work of the Preparatory Commission’s On-Site Inspection Division.

The first comprehensive draft list of equipment for use during on-site inspections, published in 2021, was the subject of an in-depth technical discussion with experts for signatory States during the On-Site Inspection Workshop-25, held online in October and in person from 7 to 11 November.

Integrated capacity-building, education and training

The Provisional Technical Secretariat held 30 integrated capacity-building, education and training activities in 2022. A total of 925 participants attended the events, some of which took place in an online or hybrid format. In addition to educating and training experts, the Preparatory Commission distributed and installed eight new sets of capacity-building system equipment, providing recipients with the necessary computer hardware and software to receive and analyse data from the International Monitoring System through the International Data Centre.

Science Diplomacy Symposium

The third Science Diplomacy Symposium of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty took place from 6 to 9 December in a hybrid format. The Symposium raised awareness and understanding of the Treaty’s contribution to international peace and security, the science and technology that underpin its verification regime, and the many civil and scientific benefits that go hand in hand with participation in that regime. The Symposium engaged with 260 participants from all regions of the world, including academics, diplomats, members of civil society and the next generation of non-proliferation and disarmament experts.

The Symposium's high-level sessions included addresses from the Preparatory Commission's Executive Secretary, Robert Floyd; the Foreign Secretary of Sri Lanka, Aruni Wijewardane; the President of the seventy-seventh session of the General Assembly, Csaba Kőrösi; the Secretary-General of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, Martin Chungong; and the United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Izumi Nakamitsu.

Highlights of the Symposium included a focus on the importance of multilingualism in diplomacy, a session conducted in Spanish on civil and scientific applications of International Monitoring System data, and an event at the margins of the Symposium organized by the Preparatory Commission and the European Union on Promoting Gender Equality and Empowerment for Early-Career Women in Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics.

Another popular feature of the Symposium was a visit to the Preparatory Commission's Technology Support and Training Centre in Seibersdorf, Austria. The multipurpose centre is primarily used as a storage and maintenance facility for the equipment of the On-Site Inspection Division. It also offers state-of-the-art training facilities and a media centre for staff of the Preparatory Commission and the Organization’s technical partners. During the week of the Symposium, participants at Seibersdorf took part in a tabletop exercise and had the opportunity to work with equipment used to detect signs of nuclear testing.

Youth Group

In 2022, the Preparatory Commission's Youth Group marked its sixth anniversary. The Youth Group is open to students and young professionals dedicated to promoting the entry into force and universalization of the Treaty, the continued build-up of its verification regime, and verification technologies for international peace and security.

As of 2022, the Youth Group consisted of 1,300 members from over 125 countries, including a considerable number from the remaining eight nuclear technology-holding countries (Annex 2 States) that had yet to sign and ratify the Treaty.

Through the Youth Group, young people had a seat at the table at the tenth Ministerial Meeting of the Friends of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Moreover, 22 Youth Group members travelled to Vienna and attended the Preparatory Commission’s third Science Diplomacy Symposium, where they gained knowledge on Treaty-related topics, participated as speakers on different panels, and seized the opportunity to interact with high-level representatives and experts.

Events tailored to youth participation included the Preparatory Commission's Mentoring Programme, which focused on early-career women in science, technology, engineering and mathematics. They also included the Research Fellowship 2022, undertaken by the Youth Group and Center for Energy and Security Studies to provide a new generation of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament experts with an opportunity to build their professional networks, as well as conduct and publish their research on Treaty-related issues.

Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

Signature and ratification of the Treaty

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, adopted in 2017, includes a comprehensive set of prohibitions on participating in any nuclear-weapon activity. It entered into force on 22 January 2021, following the deposit of the fiftieth instrument of ratification or accession with the Secretary-General on 24 October 2020.

In 2022, nine States ratified the Treaty (Cabo Verde, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guatemala, Malawi and Timor-Leste) and five States signed it (Barbados, Burkina Faso, Equatorial Guinea, Haiti and Sierra Leone). As at 31 December, the number of signatory States was 91, and the number of ratifying States was 68.

On 22 September, a signing and ratification ceremony for the Treaty took place on the margins of the General Debate of the General Assembly. At the ceremony, the Dominican Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo ratified the Treaty. Barbados, Burkina Faso, Equatorial Guinea, Haiti and Sierra Leone signed it. In her statement for the occasion, the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs noted that joining the Treaty sent a powerful signal of a State’s commitment to achieving the shared goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. She also referred to the decisions taken at the first Meeting of States Parties, which “reflect a commitment to implementing the Treaty comprehensively and thoughtfully”.

First Meeting of States Parties

The Secretary-General convened the first Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Vienna from 21 to 23 June. On 23 June, the Meeting adopted its report (TPNW/MSP/2022/6), as well as the declaration entitled “Our commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons” (annex I), the Vienna Action Plan (annex II) and a number of other decisions (annex III).

At the first plenary meeting, Alexander Kmentt (Austria) was elected as President of the Meeting by acclamation. The Meeting then heard a video message from the Secretary-General and addresses from high-level officials before proceeding to a general exchange of views. In total, 42 States parties, 16 observer States, four international organizations, five civil society organizations and a nuclear test survivor spoke during the general exchange of views and the high-level opening segment (TPNW/MSP/2022/6, para. 5).

On 22 and 23 June, the Meeting held a series of thematic discussions on the status and operation of the Treaty and on other matters important for achieving the Treaty’s objective and purpose. During the discussions, the President and the facilitators briefed participants on the outcome of informal consultations held in preparation for the Meeting, and States parties and observers had an opportunity to make comments.[6]

In their declaration entitled “Our commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons”, the States parties reaffirmed their determination to realize the complete elimination of nuclear arms and to chart a path forward for the full and effective implementation of the Treaty. To that end, they reiterated the moral and ethical imperatives that inspired and motivated the Treaty’s creation. Alarmed and dismayed by threats to use nuclear weapons and increasingly strident nuclear rhetoric, they also condemned unequivocally any and all nuclear threats, whether they be explicit or implicit and irrespective of the circumstances. States parties also expressed grave concern at the continued possession of nuclear weapons by nine States and the continued vast spending on nuclear arsenals. They committed to fully discharging their obligations under the Treaty, including the positive obligations, to expand the membership of the Treaty, and to work with States outside the Treaty. Furthermore, States parties recognized the complementarity between the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Prohibition Treaty and pledged to support nuclear disarmament efforts.

The Vienna Action Plan contains 50 actions aimed at facilitating effective and timely implementation of the Treaty and its objectives and goals following the first Meeting of States Parties. The actions address provisions in the Treaty on universalization (article 12) and on the elimination of nuclear weapons (article 4), as well as on victim assistance, environmental remediation and international cooperation and assistance (articles 6 and 7). The Plan also includes actions on institutionalizing scientific and technical advice for the Treaty’s effective implementation, the relationship of the Treaty with the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, and other matters essential for achieving the aims of the Treaty.

Furthermore, as mandated by article 4 of the Treaty, the Meeting set timelines for the destruction of nuclear weapons of any State party that owns, possesses or controls nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as timelines for the removal of nuclear weapons from any State party that has any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in its territory or in any place under its jurisdiction or control that are owned, possessed or controlled by another State (annex III, decision 1). The Meeting established a Scientific Advisory Group of up to 15 members (annex III, decision 2). It also established an intersessional structure for the implementation of the Treaty, composed of a Coordination Committee, informal working groups on universalization; victim assistance, environmental remediation, international cooperation and assistance; and the implementation of article 4, as well as appointing informal facilitators to further explore and articulate the possible areas of tangible cooperation between the Prohibition Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty and a gender focal point (annex III, decisions 3 and 4).

Additionally, the Meeting took a number of organizational decisions. As required by article 8, paragraph 2 of the Treaty, the Meeting adopted its rules of procedure (TPNW/MSP/2022/3). It also took note of an intersessional decision to apply a maximum assessment rate of 22 per cent of the total costs to contributions for the first Meeting, without prejudice to assessed contributions for future Meetings, and to review the question of the maximum assessment rate ahead of the second Meeting (TPNW/MSP/2022/6, para. 26).

The Meeting elected Juan Ramón de la Fuente Ramírez (Mexico) as President of the second Meeting, in accordance with rule 6 (3) of the rules of procedure and took note of the intersessional decision that Kazakhstan would preside over the third Meeting. The Meeting also decided that the second Meeting of States Parties would be held during the period of 27 November to 1 December 2023 at United Nations Headquarters in New York (TPNW/MSP/2022/6, articles 11, 12 and 27).

Intersessional process

Following the mandate of the first Meeting of States Parties, the intersessional process began in the second half of 2022. The first meeting of the Coordination Committee took place on 19 October on the margins of the First Committee of the General Assembly. The informal working groups on victim assistance, environmental remediation, international cooperation and assistance, and the implementation of article 4 also had their first meetings. States parties submitted nominations for membership in the Scientific Advisory Group.

General Assembly

On 7 December, the General Assembly adopted resolution 77/54, entitled “Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons”. In the resolution, the Assembly welcomed the convening of the first Meeting of States Parties and the decisions taken thereat. The General Assembly also welcomed the participation of observers in the Meeting and noted the establishment of an informal intersessional process to further the implementation of the Treaty. It requested the Secretary-General to render the necessary assistance and to provide such services, as might be required, for the second Meeting of States Parties and its informal intersessional process.

Bilateral agreements and other issues

Implementation of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms

On 5 February 2018, the United States and the Russian Federation met the central limits of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START Treaty). Under the Treaty, the parties must possess no more than 700 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers and no more than 1,550 warheads associated with those deployed launchers.

According to data published by the parties pursuant to the biannual exchange of data required by the Treaty, as of 1 September 2022, the parties possessed aggregate total numbers of strategic offensive arms as laid out in the table below.

New START Treaty aggregate numbers of strategic offensive arms

Category of data	United States	Russian Federation
Deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles, deployed submarine-launched ballistic missiles and deployed heavy bombers	659	540
Warheads on deployed itercontinental ballistic missiles, on deployed submarine-launched ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers	1 420	1 549
Deployed and non-deployed launchers of intercontinental ballistic missiles, deployed and non-deployed launchers of submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers	800	759

Source: United States Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, Fact Sheet, September 1, 2022.

The Treaty was to remain in force until 5 February 2021, although it could be extended for a period of up to five years without legislative approval. On 3 February 2021, the United States Department of State and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced the completion of procedures to extend the New START Treaty for the full five years allowable under the Treaty until 5 February 2026. The extension of the Treaty preserved the only remaining bilateral nuclear arms control agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation and ensured verifiable caps on the world’s two largest strategic nuclear arsenals.

In announcing the extension, the United States Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken, pointed to the agreement as evidence of the Biden administration’s pledge to restore the leadership by the United States on arms control, highlighting that extending the New START Treaty made the world safer. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs underscored the “special responsibility” of the United States and the Russian Federation, given their status as the two largest nuclear-armed States, as well as the important predictability and transparency provided by the Treaty.

On 16 June 2021, President Joseph R. Biden of the United States and President Vladimir Putin of the Russian Federation announced at a bilateral summit in Geneva the creation of an integrated bilateral Strategic Stability Dialogue “to lay the groundwork for future arms control and risk reduction measures”. However, following the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation, the United States reportedly suspended the dialogue. That was confirmed by Russian officials in April, who stated that dialogue was “frozen”. Nevertheless, in August, in the context of the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the President of the United States reiterated his country’s commitment to strategic stability and to negotiating a successor framework to the New START Treaty. President Biden stated, “Even at the height of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were able to work together to uphold our shared responsibility to ensure strategic stability … Russia should demonstrate that it is ready to resume work on nuclear arms control with the United States.” In response, a spokesperson for the Russian Federation said negotiations were overdue and if the New START Treaty expired “without being replaced with a solid deal, it will negatively impact global security and stability, primarily in the area of arms control … We have called for an early launch of talks, but until that moment, it has been the U.S. that has shown no interest in substantive contacts on the issue.”

Unfortunately, only one week later, the Russian Federation announced that it would not allow the United States to conduct the on-site inspections required under the New START Treaty. According to a statement from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, conditions proposed for the inspections would result in “unilateral advantages for the United States and effectively deprive the Russian Federation of the right to conduct inspections on American territory”. Efforts to convene the Treaty’s Bilateral Consultative Commission to resolve the impasse proved unsuccessful. In November, the United States announced that a meeting of the Commission scheduled to take place in Egypt on 29 November had been unilaterally postponed by the Russian Federation. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that, “The session of the Bilateral Consultative Commission … will not take place on the dates indicated. The event has been postponed to a later date.” As at 31 December, no new dates had been announced.

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)

In 2022, the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to enhance its nuclear programme in line with a law entitled “Strategic Action Plan to Lift Sanctions and Protect Iranian Nation’s Interests”, passed by the country’s Parliament in December 2020. According to the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Government had taken those actions in response to the unilateral withdrawal of the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in May 2018, with a view to reciprocally reducing its own commitments under the Plan of Action.

The remaining parties[7] to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and the United States were unable to reach an agreement in talks held in Vienna during the year on facilitating a return to the Plan’s full and effective implementation by all relevant parties. The eighth round of talks,[8] which had begun on 27 December 2021, reportedly came close to an agreement in early March 2022. However, reported continued disagreement between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States on certain issues, combined with a 5 March request by the Russian Federation for written guarantees from the United States that the Russian Federation’s rights to trade and economic and military-technical cooperation with the Islamic Republic of Iran would not be harmed by Western sanctions against the Russian Federation over Ukraine, led to a pause in the Vienna talks on 11 March. While the Russian Federation walked back its demand for guarantees shortly thereafter, the disagreements between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States on certain issues persisted.

On 26 July, the European Union, as the coordinator of the Vienna talks, noting that “the space for additional significant compromises has been exhausted”, tabled a new draft proposal “that addresses, in precise detail, the sanctions lifting as well as the nuclear steps needed to restore the JCPOA”. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States reviewed and exchanged comments on the new draft,[9] but the talks did not progress in 2022.

Verification and monitoring

In 2022, IAEA continued to provide quarterly reports to its Board of Governors and the Security Council on the implementation of the nuclear-related commitments undertaken by the Islamic Republic of Iran under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, as well as on matters related to verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015). The Agency noted in those reports that the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to engage in several activities, begun as a series of steps taken in 2019, that were inconsistent with the Plan of Action.

The Agency estimated[10] that, as of 22 October, the Islamic Republic of Iran had stockpiled a total of 3,673.7 kg enriched uranium, including 62.3 kg of uranium enriched up to 60 per cent U-235 and 386.4 kg of uranium enriched up to 20 per cent U-235 (GOV/2022/62, para. 52). Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the Islamic Republic of Iran committed not to exceed 202.8kg of uranium enriched up to 3.67 per cent U-235.

The Islamic Republic of Iran started the production of 60 per cent highly enriched uranium at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant on 22 November by using one set of two interconnected cascades of 166 IR-6 centrifuges (GOV/INF/2022/24). With that development, the Fordow site became the second location in the country to produce 60 per cent highly enriched uranium, after the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant at the Natanz site, where the production of 60 per cent highly enriched uranium began in April 2021.

The Islamic Republic of Iran also continued to expand enrichment capacity at the Fuel Enrichment Plant in Natanz. As of 1 November 2022, the country was operating a total of 45 cascades of IR-1, IR-2m IR-4 and IR-6 centrifuges at the site, while a further 12 cascades of IR-1, IR-2m and IR-4 centrifuges had been completed. That report reflected an expansion of Iranian capacities at the Natanz site since 13 November 2021, when the Islamic Republic of Iran was operating 36 cascades of centrifuges of various types, with three more cascades installed (GOV/2021/51, para. 19). Starting in 2020, the Islamic Republic of Iran informed the Agency of its plans to gradually expand the total number of cascades at the Fuel Enrichment Plant in Natanz to 60, up from the 30 provided for under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (GOV/2022/39, paras. 15–20, and GOV/INF/2022/23).

On 6 March 2022, the Islamic Republic of Iran began converting 2.1kg of uranium hexafluoride enriched to 60 per cent to produce highly enriched uranium targets at the Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant in Esfahan (GOV/INF/2022/8). The Islamic Republic of Iran informed IAEA that those highly enriched uranium targets were subsequently irradiated at the Tehran Research Reactor for the production of Molybdenum-99 for nuclear medicine at the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production facility.

On 13 April 2022, the Islamic Republic of Iran started the operation of a new centrifuge component manufacturing workshop at the Natanz site (GOV/INF/2022/11) to replace the production of centrifuge components workshop in Karaj, which was damaged by an alleged sabotage attack in June 2021 (GOV/INF/2021/10).

Additional Protocol to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement

On 23 February 2021, the Islamic Republic of Iran ceased the implementation of voluntary transparency measures contained in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, including provisions of the Additional Protocol to its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Modified code 3.1 of the subsidiary arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement (GOV/INF/2021/10, para. 44). Shortly prior, on 21 February 2021, in order to enable IAEA to recover continuity of knowledge of the uranium enrichment-related activities by the Islamic Republic of Iran, if and when the country resumed implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and the Agency agreed on a temporary technical understanding to permit the continued operation and servicing of its monitoring equipment, whereby the collected data is to be stored under seal in the Islamic Republic of Iran (GOV/2021/20, para. 11 and annex 1). The monitoring equipment refers to the Agency surveillance cameras beyond those required for verification of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, the On-Line Enrichment Monitoring equipment installed at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant and the Flow-rate Unattended Monitoring equipment installed at the Khondab Heavy Water Production Plant.

After the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution on 8 June 2022 (GOV/2022/34), calling upon the Islamic Republic of Iran to “act on an urgent basis” to “clarify and resolve all outstanding safeguards issues”, the Islamic Republic of Iran requested the Agency on 8 June to remove all of its equipment previously installed for surveillance and monitoring under the Plan of Action. From 9 to 11 June, as per the request, the Agency removed a total of 27 cameras, the On-Line Enrichment Monitoring equipment at the Fuel Enrichment Plant in Natanz and the Flow-rate Unattended Monitoring equipment installed at the Heavy Water Production Plant.

The Agency expressed its grave concern that the removal of those monitoring systems “would have a significant impact on IAEA’s ability to recover and re-establish the necessary continuity of knowledge in the event of a full resumption of implementation by Iran of its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action]”, and “any future baseline for the JCPOA verification and monitoring activities would take a considerable time to establish and would have a degree of uncertainty”. The Agency further noted that the removal of the monitoring equipment had also had detrimental implications for its ability to provide assurances about the peaceful nature of the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran (GOV/2022/62, paras. 64–65).

Implementation of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards

Throughout 2022, IAEA continued to report on the implementation of its 1974 agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran on the application of safeguards in connection with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (the Comprehensive Nuclear Safeguards Agreement) and the additional protocol provisionally applied by the Government pending its entry into force (the Additional Protocol).

In 2022, IAEA continued efforts to obtain clarification from the Islamic Republic of Iran with respect to information related to anthropogenic uranium particles found at an undeclared location in the country in early 2019, as well as possible undeclared nuclear material and nuclear-related activities at three locations that had not been declared (GOV/2021/15). Technical discussions between the Agency and the Islamic Republic of Iran to clarify those outstanding safeguards issues in 2020 and 2021 did not yield results.

On 14 January 2022, IAEA provided the Islamic Republic of Iran with its technical assessment of the issue related to one of the four locations (“Location 2”) and informed the Islamic Republic of Iran that as a result of its verification and assessment, the Agency “had no additional questions on the issue related to Location 2 and, therefore, that this issue could be considered as no longer outstanding at this stage” (GOV/2022/5, para. 7).

On 5 March, the IAEA Director General and the Vice-President of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran agreed on a joint statement for the clarification of the remaining outstanding safeguards issues. The Joint Statement sets out a series of time-bound actions to be taken by the Agency and the Islamic Republic of Iran, and states that the IAEA Director General will report his conclusion by the June 2022 meeting of the Agency’s Board of Governors.

Following the Joint Statement, on 19 March, the Islamic Republic of Iran provided IAEA with written explanations and related supporting documents on issues related to the three locations. On 4 April, the Agency submitted further questions to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Subsequently, the Agency and the Islamic Republic of Iran met in Tehran on 12 April, 7 May and 17 May to address the issues related to the three locations.

As per the Joint Statement, the IAEA Director General provided his conclusion to the June 2022 meeting of the Agency’s Board of Governors. The Director General noted that “Iran has not provided explanations that are technically credible in relation to the Agency’s findings at those locations”, and as such, the Agency could not “confirm the correctness and completeness of Iran’s declarations under its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement” and concluded that “the safeguards issues related to these three locations remain outstanding”. (GOV/2022/26, para. 36).

After receiving the IAEA safeguards report and the conclusion of the Director General contained therein, on 8 June, the Agency’s Board of Governors adopted a resolution on the Islamic Republic of Iran (GOV/2022/34) with a vote of 30 in favour and 2 against (China and Russian Federation), with 3 abstentions (India, Libya and Pakistan). In the resolution, the Board of Governors expressed “profound concern” that the safeguard issues related to three undeclared locations in the Islamic Republic of Iran remain unresolved and called on the country to “act on an urgent basis to fulfil its legal obligations” and further engage with the Agency to clarify and resolve all outstanding issues. It was the first resolution that the Board had issued on Iranian nuclear activities since June 2020, when it similarly called on the Islamic Republic of Iran to cooperate with the Agency regarding those safeguards issues. In response, on the same day, the Islamic Republic of Iran requested the Agency to remove all of its equipment previously installed for surveillance and monitoring under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

Technical discussions between the Agency and the Islamic Republic of Iran continued after the adoption of a resolution. On 26 and 27 September, the International Atomic Energy Agency Director General and the Vice-President of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran held discussions in Vienna on the outstanding safeguards issues. Following another discussion on 7 November in Vienna, an Agency team headed by Deputy Director-General for Safeguards visited Tehran on 18 and 19 December to discuss safeguards issues, as well as future cooperation and joint plans.

Implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)

By its resolution 2231 (2015) on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to report every six months on the resolution’s implementation. In his thirteenth and fourteenth reports (S/2022/490 and S/2022/912), issued on 23 June and 12 December, the Secretary-General continued to focus on the resolution’s provisions concerning restrictions applicable to nuclear- and ballistic missile-related transfers to or from the Islamic Republic of Iran, asset freezes and travel bans.

In the June report, the Secretary-General noted that the Secretariat had examined the debris of ballistic and cruise missiles launched towards the territories of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates since early 2020 and assessed missiles and/or parts thereof to be of Iranian origin. The Secretariat could not determine, however, when those missiles and/or parts had been transferred from the country. In the December report, the Secretariat examined cruise missile parts seized in international waters south of the Islamic Republic of Iran in January and February 2022, observing design characteristics and components that were consistent with those of cruise missiles previously assessed to be of Iranian origin.

The Secretary-General acknowledged that participants in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and the United States had demonstrated a collective determination to resolve political and technical differences since the “diplomatic engagements in and around the Joint Commission” had resumed in November 2021. At the same time, the Secretary-General expressed concern that those engagements had not yet resulted in the return to full and effective implementation of the Plan and resolution 2231 (2015) by the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran. He urged the two countries to resolve the outstanding issues, recognizing that any gains that might be earned by restoring the Plan continued to diminish as delays persisted.

Democratic People's Republic of Korea

In 2022, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea carried out approximately 70 test launches using ballistic missile technology on more than 30 separate occasions, a significant increase in number and frequency from previous years. The launches involved ballistic missiles of various types and ranges; large-calibre multiple launch systems that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea stated were nuclear-capable; so-called hypersonic weapons; and tests of systems the country stated were related to the development of reconnaissance satellites. On one occasion, a ballistic missile overflew Japan for the first time since 2017.

In 2022, the United States and the Republic of Korea resumed and extended joint military exercises on the Korean Peninsula, holding some jointly with Japan. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea linked its intensification of missile launches in 2022 with those joint military exercises.

On 8 September, the Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea enacted an updated national law on its policy on nuclear forces in which it, inter alia, affirmed the mission of its nuclear forces and specified various conditions in which the country could use nuclear weapons.

The IAEA Director General, in a statement on 16 November to his Agency's Board of Governors, reported that the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site remained prepared to support a nuclear test.

The Security Council met 10 times in 2022 in response to the launches conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea using ballistic missile technology. While several Council members expressed serious concern regarding the missile launches, the body took no action amid continued divisions among its members on how to address the situation. On 26 May, the Council considered a resolution proposed by the United States to strengthen the sanctions regime. Thirteen Members of the Council voted in favour. China and the Russian Federation voted against the resolution, vetoing it, and they argued, inter alia, that further sanctions could harm the humanitarian situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (S/PV.9048).

On 8 June, the General Assembly discussed the situation, pursuant to its decision in resolution 76/262 of 26 April, to hold a debate on a situation on which one or more Security Council permanent members had cast a veto in the Council (GA/12423).

In August, 79 States parties to the tenth Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty delivered a joint statement (NPT/CONF.2020/60), in which they urged the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to take concrete steps towards abandoning all nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles and related programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.

In December, the United States proposed that the Council consider a presidential statement on the weapons programmes of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, but discussion on that proposal ended the same month without agreement. In the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Vice Department Director of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea reacted to the proposal by expressing the view that the United Nations had double standards in their reaction to military activities by Member States.

The Workers' Party of Korea held the sixth plenary meeting of its eighth Central Committee from 26 to 31 December. There, Kim Jong Un — General Secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea, Chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army — reiterated the country’s intention to exponentially increase its nuclear weapons arsenal, develop another intercontinental ballistic missile system and test-launch a military satellite.

Nuclear disarmament verification

Group of Governmental Experts to Further Consider Nuclear Disarmament Verification Issues

By its resolution 74/50 of 19 December 2019, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to establish a group of governmental experts of up to 25 participants, chosen on the basis of equitable geographical representation and equitable representation of women and men, to meet in Geneva for four sessions of one week each in 2021 and 2022, to further consider nuclear disarmament verification issues, including, inter alia, the concept of a Group of Scientific and Technical Experts, building on the report of the previous Group (A/74/90).

With decision 76/515 of 6 December 2021, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to hold two additional sessions of the Group of Governmental Experts to Further Consider Nuclear Disarmament Verification Issues in Geneva in 2023, compensating for the postponement of the two sessions previously planned for 2021. Likewise, the Assembly called for one additional informal, intersessional consultative meeting to be held in New York in 2023, compensating for a planned 2021 meeting that had to be postponed owing to the pandemic.

In 2022, the Group met in Geneva for its first and second sessions from 21 to 25 February and from 26 to 30 September, with Jørn Osmundsen (Norway) as the Chair. An informal intersessional consultative meeting was also convened in New York on 29 August.

The Group will continue its work through 2023 with two additional sessions that will continue to take place in Geneva. It is expected to agree on a report that the Secretary-General of the United Nations will transmit to the General Assembly at its seventy-seventh session and to the Conference on Disarmament.

International Atomic Energy Agency verification

Since its founding in 1957, IAEA has served as the focal point for worldwide cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, for promoting global nuclear security and safety and, through its verification activities, for providing assurances that States’ international undertakings to use nuclear material and facilities for peaceful purposes are being honoured. The following is a brief survey of the work of IAEA in 2022 in the areas of nuclear verification, nuclear security, peaceful uses of nuclear energy and nuclear fuel assurances.[11],[12]

Nuclear verification

A major pillar of the IAEA programme involves activities that enable the Agency to provide assurances to the international community regarding the peaceful use of nuclear material and facilities. The IAEA verification programme thus remains at the core of multilateral efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons by verifying that States are complying with their safeguards obligations.[13]

Safeguards conclusions

At the end of each year, IAEA draws safeguards conclusions for each State with a safeguards agreement in force for which safeguards are applied, based upon the evaluation of all safeguards-related information available to it for that year. For a “broader conclusion” to be drawn that “all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities”, a State must have both a comprehensive safeguards agreement[14] and an additional protocol[15] in force, IAEA must have been able to conduct all necessary verification and evaluation activities for the State and have found no indication that, in its judgement, would give rise to a safeguards concern. For States that have a comprehensive safeguards agreement but no additional protocol in force, IAEA draws a safeguards conclusion regarding only the non-diversion of declared nuclear material, as the Agency does not have sufficient tools to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.

For those States for which the broader conclusion has been drawn, IAEA was able to implement integrated safeguards — an optimized combination of measures available under comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols — based on the State-level safeguards approach[16] developed for that State.

In 2022, safeguards were applied for 188 States[17],[18] with safeguards agreements in force with IAEA. Of the 134 States that had both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force, IAEA concluded that all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities in 74 States;[19] IAEA was unable to draw the same conclusion for the other 60 States, as the necessary evaluation regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for each of them remained ongoing. For those 60 States and the 46 States with a comprehensive safeguards agreement but with no additional protocol in force, IAEA concluded only that declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.

Integrated safeguards were implemented for the whole of 2022 for 69 States.[20]

For the three States[21] for which IAEA implemented safeguards pursuant to item-specific safeguards agreements, the Agency concluded that nuclear material, facilities or other items to which safeguards had been applied remained in peaceful activities. Safeguards were also implemented with regard to nuclear material in selected facilities in the five nuclear-weapon States parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty under their respective voluntary offer agreements. For those five States, IAEA concluded that nuclear material in selected facilities to which safeguards had been applied remained in peaceful activities or had been withdrawn from safeguards as provided for in the agreements.

As at 31 December, five States parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty had yet to bring comprehensive safeguards agreements into force pursuant to article III of the Treaty. For those States parties, IAEA could not draw any safeguards conclusions.

Safeguards agreements, additional protocols and small quantities protocols

Safeguards agreements and additional protocols are legal instruments that provide the basis for IAEA verification activities. The entry into force of such instruments, therefore, continues to be crucial to effective and efficient IAEA safeguards.

The Agency continued to implement the Plan of Action to Promote the Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, which was last updated in September. During the year, the Agency organized a national workshop in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (29–30 June) and virtual national events and consultations with Samoa (10 March), Tonga (18 July) and Kyrgyzstan (13 December). During the outreach activities, the Agency encouraged States to conclude additional protocols and amend their small quantities protocols. Moreover, the Agency held consultations with representatives from a number of member and non-member States in Geneva, New York and Vienna at various times throughout the year.

In 2022, comprehensive safeguards agreements with small quantities protocols based on the revised standard text entered into force for Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau and the State of Palestine. Furthermore, additional protocols entered into force for Cabo Verde and Guinea-Bissau.

As concluded by the Board of Governors in 2005, the small quantities protocol based on the original standard text is a weakness in the Agency’s safeguards system. In 2022, the small quantities protocols were amended for the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Namibia, Suriname and Tuvalu. In addition, a non-operative small quantities protocol for Lithuania was rescinded. At the end of 2022, 77 States had operative small quantities protocols in force based on the revised standard text.

Verification activities

Between 16 January 2016 and 23 February 2021, the Agency, in light of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), verified and monitored the implementation of nuclear-related commitments by the Islamic Republic of Iran under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. From 8 May 2019 onwards, however, the Islamic Republic of Iran reduced the implementation of those commitments on a step-by-step basis and, from 23 February 2021 onwards, stopped the implementation of those commitments, including the additional protocol. This seriously affected the Agency’s verification and monitoring in relation to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which was exacerbated in June 2022 by a decision of the Islamic Republic of Iran to remove all of the Agency’s equipment previously installed in the country for surveillance and monitoring activities in relation to the Plan of Action. In 2022, the Director General submitted to the Board of Governors and, in parallel, to the United Nations Security Council four quarterly reports (GOV/2022/4, GOV/2022/24 and Corr.1, GOV/2022/39, and GOV/2022/62), as well as 15 reports providing updates on developments in between the issuance of the quarterly reports, entitled “Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015).”

During 2022, despite the continued efforts of IAEA to engage with the Islamic Republic of Iran to resolve outstanding safeguards issues related to the presence of uranium particles of anthropogenic origin at Iranian locations not declared to the Agency, limited progress was made. Unless and until the Islamic Republic of Iran clarifies these issues, the Agency will not be able to provide assurance about the exclusively peaceful nature of the country’s nuclear programme. The Director General submitted four reports to the Board of Governors entitled “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran” (GOV/2022/5, GOV/2022/26, GOV/2022/42 and GOV/2022/63). The Board of Governors adopted by a vote two resolutions entitled “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran” (GOV/2022/34 and GOV/2022/70).

Meanwhile, in August, the Director General submitted a report to the Board of Governors entitled “Implementation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic” (GOV/2022/41) covering relevant developments since the previous IAEA report, issued in August 2021 (GOV/2021/41). The Director General informed the Board of Governors that no new information had come to the knowledge of IAEA that would have an impact on the Agency’s assessment that it was very likely that a building destroyed at the Dair Alzour site in 2007 was a nuclear reactor that should have been declared to the Agency by the Syrian Arab Republic.[22] In 2022, the Director General, in his letter dated 16 May, expressed his preparedness to discuss Syrian re-engagement with the Agency and continued to urge the country to cooperate fully with the Agency in connection with all unresolved issues. By the end of 2022, the Syrian Arab Republic had yet to reply.

On the basis of the evaluation of information provided by the Syrian Arab Republic and all other safeguards-relevant information available to it, the Agency found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and no indication of undeclared production or processing of nuclear material at declared facilities and locations outside (undeclared) facilities. For 2022, the Agency concluded that declared nuclear material in the Syrian Arab Republic remained in peaceful activities.

In September, the Director General submitted an extensive report to the Board of Governors and General Conference entitled “Application of Safeguards in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” (GOV/2022/40-GC(66)/16), which included new information since the Director General’s report of August 2021 (GOV/2021/40-GC(65)/22) and provided a detailed overview of the country’s nuclear programme since the Director General’s extensive report of September 2011 (GOV/2011/53-GC(55)/24).

Since 1994, IAEA has not been able to conduct all necessary safeguards activities provided for in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Safeguards Agreement of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. From the end of 2002 until July 2007, IAEA was not able — and, since April 2009, has not been able — to implement any verification measures in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Therefore, the Agency could not draw any safeguards conclusion regarding the country.

Although IAEA implemented no field-level verification activities in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in 2022, the Agency continued to monitor developments in the country’s nuclear programme and to evaluate all safeguards-relevant information available to it, including open-source information and satellite imagery.

In addition, the IAEA secretariat continued to maintain the Agency’s enhanced readiness to play its essential role in verifying the nuclear programme of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The secretariat further refined its collection and analysis of safeguards-relevant open-source information on the nuclear programme, increased its collection and analysis of high-resolution commercial satellite imagery, maintained necessary equipment and supplies, prepared Agency inspectors for verification and monitoring activities in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and continued to document the Agency’s knowledge of the country’s nuclear activities. Once a political agreement has been reached among the countries concerned, the Agency is ready to return to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in a timely manner if requested to do so by the country and subject to approval by the Board of Governors.

In 2022, in Ukraine, the Agency continued to undertake a vital verification role to reach independent conclusions that nuclear material under safeguards remained in peaceful use and that safeguarded facilities were not used for the undeclared production or processing of nuclear material. The Agency continued to implement safeguards, including in-field verification activities, in accordance with Ukraine’s comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol. Based on the evaluation of all safeguards and relevant information available to it, the Agency did not find any indication that would give rise to a proliferation concern.

Application of safeguards in the Middle East

As requested in operative paragraph 13 of resolution GC(65)/RES/14 on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East, adopted at the sixty-fifth regular session of the Agency’s General Conference in 2021, the Director General submitted to the IAEA Board of Governors and to the General Conference at its sixty-sixth regular session a report on the implementation of that resolution (GOV/2022/43-GC(66)/12). The report on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East describes, inter alia, the steps undertaken by the Director General in his efforts to further the implementation of his mandates conferred by the IAEA General Conference in resolution GC (65)/RES/14 and in decision GC(44)/DEC/12.

In relation to that, in September 2013, following the discussions of the Board of Governors, the Director General provided to the IAEA member States the “background documentation prepared for the 2012 Conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction”, which described the work that the Agency had undertaken and the experience it had gained with regard to modalities for a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Middle East region.[23] Furthermore, in response to a request conveyed to IAEA by the Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, on behalf of the Secretary-General, pursuant to General Assembly decision 73/546, the IAEA secretariat provided in September 2019 background documentation describing the work previously undertaken by the Agency on modalities of the application of safeguards in the Middle East and its role under nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties and regional arrangements (A/CONF.236/3). It also attended as an observer the first, second and third sessions of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction, held at United Nations Headquarters in 2019, 2021 and 2022, respectively.

Assurances of nuclear fuel supply

In December 2010, the Agency’s Board of Governors approved the establishment of the IAEA Low-Enriched Uranium Bank, a physical stock of up to 60 Type 30B cylinders containing standard commercial low-enriched uranium hexafluoride with enrichment levels of up to 4.95 per cent. The Bank serves as a supply mechanism of last resort in the event that an eligible Member State’s supply of low-enriched uranium is disrupted and cannot be restored by commercial means.

The Low-Enriched Uranium Bank was established and became operational on 17 October 2019. Its physical stock of low-enriched uranium was completed with the receipt of an additional 28 full 30B cylinders of low-enriched uranium on 10 December 2019.

IAEA contracts with KTZ Express, TENEX (Techsnabexport) and CNEIC (China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation) to ensure possible shipments of low-enriched uranium and equipment to and from the Bank through either the Russian Federation or China.

Through its Cylinder Management Programme, IAEA initiated preparative activities in 2022 to recertify the low-enriched-uranium-filled cylinders in 2023 and 2024. The effort was to ensure the long-term safety and security of all IAEA low-enriched uranium cylinders, both in situ at the Low-Enriched Uranium Storage Facility and during subsequent transport, in compliance with the requirements of the revised ISO7195:2020(E) Standard.

Minimization of highly enriched uranium

IAEA continued its activities to minimize the use of highly enriched uranium in the civilian sector around the globe, both directly and through support from member States. The Agency facilitates the conversion of research reactors by supporting the development of low-enriched uranium fuels and improved analytic techniques.

The Agency also continued its direct support of efforts to remove highly enriched uranium fuel from various sites. In 2022, it oversaw preparatory work for a shipment, anticipated to occur between 2023 and 2024, of spent highly enriched fuel from the IVG.1M Reactor in Kazakhstan to the Russian Federation. Furthermore, all major producers of the medical isotope Mo-99 were expected by 2023 to finish converting their manufacturing processes to use low-enriched uranium rather than highly enriched material.

Nuclear security

Nuclear Security Plan

IAEA continued to assist States, at their request, in making their national nuclear security regimes more robust, sustainable and effective and to play a central role in enhancing international cooperation in nuclear security. In implementing the Nuclear Security Plan 2022–2025 (GC(65)/24) and contributing to global efforts to achieve effective nuclear security, IAEA established comprehensive nuclear security guidance and promoted its use through peer reviews and advisory services and capacity-building, including education and training. Furthermore, IAEA worked to assist States in adhering to and implementing relevant international legal instruments, as well as in strengthening international cooperation and coordination of assistance.

International nuclear security framework

The year 2022 saw continued progress towards the universalization of the principal binding international instruments relevant to nuclear security, both of which had been adopted under the auspices of IAEA: the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 Amendment. During the year, the number of States parties to the original Convention remained at 164, and the number of States parties to the Amendment increased to 131. The Amendment entered into force in May 2016, establishing a legal basis for a strengthened framework to protect nuclear facilities and nuclear material for domestic use, storage and transport.

IAEA continued to promote universal adherence to the Convention and its Amendment through various outreach activities, including an international seminar in February, two regional workshops in October and November, and two country-specific workshops in August and October. The Director General convened, as depositary, a Conference of the Parties to the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, pursuant to article 16.1 of the Convention as amended, in Vienna from 28 March to 1 April. As detailed in its outcome document (ACPPNM/RC/2022/4), the Conference reviewed the implementation of the Convention as amended and its adequacy as concerns the preamble, the whole of the operative part and the annexes in the light of the then prevailing situation. Representatives of 106 States parties to the Amendment participated in the event, and representatives of 17 States parties to the Convention but not to the Amendment participated in the Conference as observers. In addition, representatives of seven States not party to the Convention, six intergovernmental organizations (ACPPNM/RC/2022/INF/4) and 11 non-governmental organizations (ACPPNM/RC/2022/INF/5) attended the Conference as observers.

Nuclear security guidance for member States

IAEA established and maintains its Nuclear Security Series of publications as part of its central role in providing nuclear security-related international support and coordination. In 2022, the Agency held two meetings of the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee and released one new publication in its Nuclear Security Series, reaching a total of 43 published volumes. In addition, IAEA issued translations of 31 publications initially released in English in other official languages of the United Nations. As at the end of the year, 32 publications in the Nuclear Security Series were available in languages other than English, including all volumes in its “Implementing Guide”, “Recommendations” and “Fundamentals” sets.

Incident and Trafficking Database

The IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database continued to be an important source of information, assisting the IAEA secretariat, participating States and selected international organizations in strengthening nuclear security. In 2022, States reported 146 incidents involving nuclear or other radioactive material outside of regulatory control; of those incidents, five were either confirmed or likely to involve acts of trafficking,[24] increasing the total number in the Database to 4,075. The Database is a component of the information management systems supporting the implementation of the IAEA Nuclear Security Plan.

Nuclear security human resource development

IAEA continued to provide comprehensive assistance to States on nuclear security human resource development, including through programme development, needs analysis, training events, instructor training, educational programmes and further development of nuclear security support centres. In 2022, the Agency conducted 120 security-related training activities, including 14 webinars, providing training to more than 4,000 participants from 155 States. IAEA also continued the implementation of its e-learning programme, with over 1,800 users from 142 States completing over 3,100 e-learning modules.

In March, IAEA convened a virtual leadership meeting of the International Nuclear Security Education Network. It also facilitated four courses under the “International School on Nuclear Security” series in 2022, utilizing both virtual and hybrid formats to conduct them in Trieste, Italy (19–29 April), São Paulo, Brazil (20–30 June), Vienna, Austria (1–11 August), and Cape Town, South Africa (7–18 November). Notably, the national-level “School” conducted in Brazil, implemented in cooperation with the Government through the Nuclear and Energy Research Institute, was the first to take place in Portuguese. Furthermore, in July, IAEA convened the Annual Meeting of the Nuclear Security Support Centres Network.

Additionally, 24 fellows of the Agency’s Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellowship Programme continued to participate in master’s programmes related to nuclear security. The IAEA-supported fellowships enabled seven students from seven member States to attend those programmes at the University of National and World Economy in Sofia, Bulgaria.

IAEA also continued efforts to establish a new Nuclear Security Training and Demonstration Centre at Seibersdorf. The facility is scheduled to be operational by the end of 2023.

Nuclear security peer reviews and advisory services

IAEA continued to implement peer reviews and advisory services to help States evaluate their nuclear security regimes. It conducted such missions with a focus on national nuclear security regimes, including practical security measures for nuclear and other radioactive material and associated facilities and activities.

In 2022, IAEA carried out several expert missions and workshops to provide guidance to States on drafting regulating principles, reviewing regulatory frameworks and finalizing nuclear security regulations and associated administrative measures. Those activities included one International Physical Protection Advisory Service mission, three International Nuclear Security Advisory Service missions and six Regulatory Infrastructure for Radiation Safety and Nuclear Security (RISS) missions. The RISS mission service was initiated in 2022. The total number of member States with approved Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans remained at 92.

Coordinated Research Projects

The Agency continued to coordinate with educational, nuclear security operational, and research and development institutions to implement Coordinated Research Projects focused on various scientific and technical areas of nuclear security to address evolving threats and technologies, including the establishment and sustainability of national nuclear security regimes. In 2022, IAEA initiated three new security-related Coordinated Research Projects, addressing topics such as using nuclear detection technology; nuclear forensics; and counterfeit, fraudulent and suspect items. Meanwhile, the Agency continued four other Coordinated Research Projects: one related to computer security, two related to radiation detection equipment, and one related to preventing and protecting against insider threats.

Risk reduction

IAEA continued to advise States on formal threat characterization and assessment; the development, use and maintenance of design-basis threats; the conduct and evaluation of exercises; methodologies for nuclear material accounting and control for security purposes; and the evaluation and inspection of physical protection systems. In 2022, the Agency continued to support member States in protecting radioactive material during and after use. IAEA also assisted in completing the removal of 21 high-activity disused radioactive sources from four member States, continued to support the ongoing removal of 35 high-activity disused radioactive sources in six member States, and initiated preparatory work to remove an additional 32 sources from three States. The Agency assisted two member States with physical protection upgrades at nuclear facilities and one member State with a transportation security upgrade. It also assisted 53 member States in drafting nuclear security regulations.

Export controls

Nuclear Suppliers Group

The Nuclear Suppliers Group is made up of nuclear supplier countries seeking to contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons by implementing, on a national basis, export controls for nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use equipment, materials, software and related technology without hindering international cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The Nuclear Suppliers Group held its 2022 plenary meeting in Warsaw from 20 to 24 June, chaired by Tomasz Łękarski (Poland), marking the thirtieth anniversary of the Group’s establishment of the “Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software, and Related Technology”. The plenary also marked 30 years of Japan serving as Point of Contact for the Group through its Permanent Mission to the International Organizations in Vienna, a situation greatly appreciated by participating States. Unfortunately, the Group could not adopt an annual public statement owing to disagreements over language related to the Russian Federation’s invasion of Ukraine.

According to the 2022–2023 Chair, Gustavo Eduardo Ainchil (Argentina), in 2022, the Group maintained its focus on technical issues important to implementing the Nuclear Suppliers Group Control Lists, including through exchanging views and agreeing on a number of proposals to clarify and update the Dual-Use List at the Group’s 2022 plenary meeting. In accordance with established practice, IAEA published Revision 12 of the Nuclear Suppliers Group Part 2 Guidelines on the Agency’s website (INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 2). Furthermore, in July, the Group revised its informational document entitled “The Nuclear Suppliers Group: Its Guidelines, Origins, Structure, and Role” following plenary approval. IAEA also published that document (INFCIRC/539/Rev.8).

The Chair stressed the importance of continued outreach to third countries, as well as industry. To that end, participating Governments contributed towards making the Group’s website available in different languages (Chinese, French, German, Russian and Spanish, together with English), helping to promote outreach to the wider global non-proliferation community. Furthermore, the Group published an explanatory “Frequently Asked Questions“ document on its website.

The Chair highlighted that the valuable technical work of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, as a constructive multilateral approach, remained vital for issues that were the essence of the Group’s responsibility in the overall nuclear non-proliferation architecture, of which the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was and remained the cornerstone.

Missile Technology Control Regime

The armed conflict in Ukraine impacted the activities of the Missile Technology Control Regime in 2022. Grigory Mashkov (Russian Federation) served as Chair of the Regime’s plenary until 17 October, when Benno Laggner (Switzerland) assumed the responsibility for the period 2022–2023. The year saw the curtailment of certain intersessional activities, including the Regime’s only intersessional meeting on policy matters, the Reinforced Point of Contact Meeting.

The Regime held its 2022 plenary meeting in Montreux, Switzerland, from 17 to 22 October. Although the Partner States did not adopt a press release reflecting the outcome of its deliberations, as in previous years, they did adopt a message on the occasion of the thirty-fifth anniversary of the Regime. In the message, the Partner States affirmed that their activities had reduced the availability to proliferators of the equipment, technology and knowledge needed to develop, produce and acquire uncrewed delivery systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction without hindering legitimate trade and cooperation. They regarded the Missile Technology Control Regime as a positive example of mutually beneficial multilateral cooperation for the achievement of a common non-proliferation goal, reflecting that its Guidelines and its annex constitute an international best-practice benchmark for controlling exports of missile-related items and technologies. They also emphasized that the Guidelines were not designed to impede technological advancement, international cooperation and development, including space programmes, as long as such activities could not contribute to the proliferation of delivery systems of weapons of mass destruction.

The Partner States further affirmed that the Regime would continue its outreach to non-member countries in an effort to limit the spread of missile systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, as well as their related technology and equipment. They invited States to declare, on a voluntary basis, adherence to the Regime’s Guidelines and its annex.

The States also adopted an updated version of the Technical Annex, based on the report of the technical experts meeting.

The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation

The year 2022 marked the twentieth anniversary of The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. The twenty-first annual regular meeting of the Subscribing States to the Code took place in Vienna on 30 and 31 May, chaired by Nigeria. The armed conflict in Ukraine also impacted the activities of the Code, and the Subscribing States were unable to agree on issuing a press release reflecting the outcome of their meeting. As no additional States had subscribed since the 2021 annual meeting, the total number of Subscribing States remained at 143.

Political declarations and other initiatives

Stockholm Initiative for Nuclear Disarmament

The Stockholm Initiative for Nuclear Disarmament was launched in 2019 by States parties[25] to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to strengthen disarmament diplomacy within the context of the Treaty, as well as to build bridges between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States.

The States that supported the Stockholm Initiative submitted two working papers to the tenth Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The working paper containing the “Stepping Stones for Advancing Nuclear Disarmament” (NPT/CONF.2020/WP.6), or actions to reinforce the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its implementation, received support from an additional 24 States.[26] The Initiative’s members also submitted to the tenth Review Conference a nuclear risk reduction package (NPT/CONF.2020/WP.9/Rev.1) containing proposals that included draft declaratory language, potential commitments by the nuclear-weapon States and all other States parties to the Treaty and suggested decisions to establish a comprehensive process that would allow for follow-up work within the context of the Treaty. The package received support from an additional 18 States.[27]

Members of the Stockholm Initiative also delivered a statement to the tenth Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In the remarks, the members noted that the “Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races” — by then overshadowed by the Russian Federation’s invasion of Ukraine — had responded to two of the proposed “Stepping Stones for Advancing Nuclear Disarmament”. The members also called for the nuclear-weapon States to contribute to next-generation arms-control arrangements, underlining the expectation that all nuclear-weapon States would commit to a process to take forward work on article VI implementation and risk reduction.

Humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons

During the tenth Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Costa Rica, on behalf of 147 countries, delivered a statement expressing their deep concerns regarding the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons (NPT/CONF.2020/63). In the remarks, those States stressed that the use and testing of nuclear weapons had demonstrated the unacceptable humanitarian and environmental consequences caused by their immense, destructive capability and indiscriminate nature.

They also noted that the three conferences on the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons — held in Norway in March 2013, in Mexico in February 2014, and in Austria in December 2014 — had deepened the collective understanding of the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. The key message from experts and international organizations was that no State or group of States, or the international humanitarian system as a whole, could respond to the immediate humanitarian emergency that a nuclear-weapon detonation would cause, including by providing adequate assistance to victims.

The States welcomed the broad participation in those conferences by a majority of States, the International Committee of the Red Cross and United Nations humanitarian organizations, as well as civil society, as a reflection of global concern. They further stressed the essential nature of that work, noting its impact on all citizens of the world and its consequences for human survival, the environment, socioeconomic development, economies and the health of future generations.

The countries also reiterated their firm belief that awareness of the catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons must underpin all approaches and efforts towards nuclear disarmament, including in the work of the Tenth Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

They highlighted that awareness of the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons was not new and had “motivated humanity’s aspirations for a world free from this threat”.

The States stressed that it was in the interest of the very survival of humanity that nuclear weapons were never used again under any circumstances and that all efforts must be exerted to eliminate nuclear weapons. They also noted the shared responsibility to prevent the use, proliferation and elimination of nuclear weapons.

The countries welcomed the resolve of the international community to address the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. They reminded States parties of their obligation to future generations to work together to rid the world of the threat posed by nuclear weapons.

Affirmations that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought

On 3 January, the leaders of the nuclear-weapon States recognized by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (the P5)[28] issued a joint statement in which they affirmed that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought”. They also affirmed that nuclear weapons should serve defensive purposes, deter aggression and prevent war, and called for the prevention of the further spread of such weapons.

Through his spokesperson, the Secretary-General welcomed the joint statement and noted that he was encouraged by the nuclear-weapon States’ commitment to pursue measures to prevent nuclear war, consistent with his long-standing call for dialogue and cooperation to that end. He restated that the only way to eliminate all nuclear risks was to eliminate all nuclear weapons and reiterated his willingness to work with the nuclear-weapon States and all Member States to achieve that goal.

In the G20 Bali Leaders’ Declaration of 16 November, the Group of 20 States said that “the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is inadmissible”. They also noted that it was essential to uphold international law and the multilateral system that safeguarded peace and stability. That included defending all of the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and adhering to international humanitarian law, including on the protection of civilians and infrastructure in armed conflicts. The Group of 20 States further stressed that the peaceful resolution of conflicts, efforts to address crises, and diplomacy and dialogue were vital.

P5 Process

In their 3 January statement, the P5 also reaffirmed their commitment to preserving and complying with their bilateral and multilateral non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control agreements and commitments, including their obligations under article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The P5 reiterated the validity of their previous statements on de-targeting, reaffirming that none of their nuclear weapons were targeted at each other, nor at any other State. The P5 also underlined the desire to work with all States to create a security environment more conducive to progress on disarmament with the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons with undiminished security for all. To that end, they conveyed their intention to seek bilateral and multilateral approaches to avoid military confrontation, strengthen stability and predictability, increase mutual understanding and confidence, and prevent an arms race.

Various initiatives by the P5 were submitted to the tenth Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, including a working paper on strategic risk reduction (NPT/CONF.2020/WP.33), a working paper on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, science and technology (NPT/CONF.2020/WP.37) and the P5 Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms (NPT/CONF.2020/WP.51). Owing to the Russian Federation’s invasion of Ukraine, no meetings took place under the P5 process in 2022.

---

GO TO ANOTHER CHAPTER