There is only one solution to the nuclear threat: not to have nuclear weapons at all.

Developments and trends, 2022

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The year 2022 began on a high note when, on 3 January, the nuclear-weapon States[1] of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) issued a joint statement affirming that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The joint statement also reaffirmed those States’ commitments under the Treaty, including those related to nuclear disarmament.

Such optimism was short-lived, however, following the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation on 24 February. The conflict had significant negative ramifications for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The Russian Federation's veiled threats to use nuclear weapons, for example, raised the imminent danger of such use to heights not seen since the cold war. The invasion also undermined non-proliferation through a false narrative that Ukraine could have deterred Russian aggression if it had kept the nuclear weapons stationed on its territory at the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Additionally, it raised the unprecedented issue of the safety and security of nuclear power plants in armed conflict, derailed bilateral arms control and risk reduction dialogue and, ultimately, was responsible for the failure of the tenth Review Conference of the parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, when the Russian Federation broke consensus over language related to Ukraine.

Compounding those negative developments were the continued fracturing of relations between States possessing nuclear weapons. That fracturing was especially apparent between the United States and China, with further allegations about Chinese nuclear expansion. Deteriorating relations were also reflected in the continued growth of global military spending; the acquisition and deployment of sophisticated conventional weapons systems, including at regional flashpoints; and armed clashes between States that possess nuclear weapons.

Meanwhile, proliferation drivers accelerated in regional hotspots as States openly debated the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons or stationing allied weapons on their territory. Concerns regarding nuclear accidents and miscalculation continued to grow amid increasing military activity related to new domains in cyberspace and outer space, as well as new investments in conventional weapons systems with potential strategic capabilities. On the occasion of the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, the Secretary-General said, “We can hear once again the rattling of nuclear sabres. Let me be clear. The era of nuclear blackmail must end. The idea that any country could fight and win a nuclear war is deranged. Any use of a nuclear weapon would incite a humanitarian Armageddon.”

The Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START Treaty), the bilateral arms control agreement between the possessors of the world's two largest nuclear arsenals and the only cap on strategic nuclear forces, was not fully implemented in 2022, largely owing to disagreements over inspections. In August, the Russian Federation advised the United States that it would not allow inspections of its treaty-accountable weapons owing to travel restrictions imposed by the United States on Russian inspectors. A proposed meeting of the Treaty’s Bilateral Consultative Commission in December to resolve the issue was indefinitely postponed by the Russian Federation.

The Russian Federation-United States bilateral Strategic Stability Dialogue, announced in 2021, was effectively in abeyance in 2022. Although the leaders of both countries signalled their willingness to engage in negotiations on a successor framework to the New START Treaty when it expires in 2026,[2] no steps were taken, largely owing to ongoing tension over the conflict in Ukraine. The High Representative for Disarmament Affairs consistently called for the Russian Federation and the United States to commence negotiations on a successor arrangement to the Treaty, noting that “time is running out to negotiate a successor, and that cannot happen without dialogue and engagement”. Separately, the war in Ukraine also froze the P5 Process, the only forum in which China had stated its willingness to participate. The process had previously received support, including as a venue for future efforts designed “to deepen engagement on nuclear doctrines, concepts for strategic risk reduction and nuclear arms control verification”.

The war in Ukraine raised the alarming prospect of an accident at a nuclear energy facility with potentially catastrophic results. The occupation of the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant — the largest nuclear-power-generating station in Europe — and the ongoing conflict around that facility raised concerns and spurred calls for an agreement to prevent an accident. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was active in attempting to avoid such an outcome through its IAEA Support and Assistance Mission to Zaporizhzhya and the stationing of its experts at the plant (GOV/2022/66). Furthermore, the Agency articulated seven indispensable pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security during an armed conflict that should be followed to prevent an accident. The Agency’s Director General also called on all relevant parties to agree on establishing a nuclear safety and security protection zone around the plant. As at 31 December, discussions about such a zone were ongoing.

The nuclear risks generated by the Russian invasion of Ukraine increased fears within the international community about the possible use of nuclear weapons. According to one United States poll, for example, more than half of those surveyed worried that the United States was about to engage in nuclear war. A review of polls conducted within European Union States revealed similar results. Threats to use nuclear weapons received significant condemnation in 2022, including by the Group of 20, which argued that such threats were “inadmissible ”.

The nuclear-weapon States expressed support for a world free of nuclear weapons but also continued to modernize their arsenals in ways intended to qualitatively improve their reliability, accuracy, speed and stealth. While the United States reiterated, in a new Nuclear Posture Review, its commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons and emphasized the importance of arms control, it disappointed disarmament advocates with its effective continuation of a focus on great power competition and arsenal modernization introduced in the preceding review. Many advocates were concerned, in particular, about the decision to maintain the low-yield W76-2 warhead for submarine-launched ballistic missiles and the failure to reduce the salience and role of nuclear weapons in the United States strategy, including through a “sole purpose” doctrine, which had been a campaign priority for President Biden. In the new Nuclear Posture Review, the United States also confirmed that it would modernize all three legs of its nuclear triad and expressed concern that increasing competition with China and the Russian Federation would impact further deliberations on arsenal reductions. Separately, the United States, backed by allies, alleged that China was accelerating expansion of its nuclear arsenal such that it could have around 1,500 nuclear weapons by 2035. China strongly rejected the allegations and pointed to its long-standing policies of no first use and minimum deterrent. However, China also declined to engage in further transparency initiatives related to its nuclear arsenal or in bilateral dialogue on the matter. In April, the Russian Federation tested its new intercontinental ballistic missile, the RS-28 Sarmat. It also deployed the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle to one regiment.

Optimism for a breakthrough in restoring the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action dissipated in 2022. The remaining parties[3] to the Plan of Action and the United States were unable to produce an outcome during their talks in Vienna to facilitate a return to the Plan’s full and effective implementation. Reaching an agreement was reportedly close in March[4] but eluded the parties amid unresolved differences between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States, for example on a prospective binding commitment by the United States not to withdraw.

In 2022, IAEA continued to provide quarterly reports to its Board of Governors and the Security Council on the implementation of nuclear-related commitments of the Islamic Republic of Iran under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, as well as on matters related to verification and monitoring in the country. The Agency noted in those reports that the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to engage in several activities that were inconsistent with the Plan of Action, including breaching the cap on its stockpile of enriched uranium (GOV/2022/62), enriching to levels above 3.67 per cent U-235 at two sites (GOV/INF/2022/24), and operating, manufacturing and developing advanced centrifuges (GOV/INF/2022/10).

The Islamic Republic of Iran also reduced its cooperation with the IAEA verification and monitoring of its nuclear programme. In June, the Islamic Republic of Iran requested the Agency to remove all its equipment previously installed for surveillance and monitoring under the Plan of Action, a total of 27 cameras. The Agency responded that the removal of the monitoring equipment would have detrimental implications for the Agency's ability to provide assurance of the peaceful nature of the country's nuclear programme (GOV/2022/62, paras. 64–65). In that context, in 2022, the Agency continued its efforts to obtain clarification from the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding information related to anthropogenic uranium particles found at an undeclared location in the country in early 2019, as well as possible undeclared nuclear material and nuclear-related activities at three locations that had not been declared (GOV/2021/15). In March, the Agency and the Islamic Republic of Iran agreed on a series of steps to resolve the impasse. However, in his June report to the Agency’s Board of Governors, the Director General stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran had not provided technically credible explanations (GOV/2022/26, para. 36). Subsequently, the Board adopted a resolution expressing “profound concern” that the safeguards issues remained unresolved. The situation remained at an impasse as at 31 December.

Perhaps the most anticipated nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation event of the year was the tenth Review Conference of the parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, postponed multiple times owing to the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic but finally held from 1 to 26 August in New York. The Conference faced a variety of challenges, ranging from the new issues — the provision of nuclear propulsion technology to non-nuclear-weapon States and the safety and security of nuclear power plants, for example — to enduring topics, such as the pace and scale of disarmament, the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear programme and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. States parties engaged in four weeks of active discussion across all three of the Treaty’s “pillars”: nuclear disarmament; nuclear non-proliferation; and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The draft outcome document that emerged from deliberations contained a range of measures to strengthen all aspects of the Treaty, including the implementation of existing commitments (a core priority for non-nuclear-weapon States), risk reduction and, especially, the role of nuclear science and technology in sustainable development. Few States parties were completely satisfied with the ambition of the document, which represented limited progress in many areas. However, they were prepared to join the consensus in adopting the document in order to achieve an outcome and bolster the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the regime it underpins. Unfortunately, on the final day of the Conference, the Russian Federation announced that it could not join the consensus on the draft document, effectively preventing its adoption. The Russian Federation’s last-minute objections to language related to the conflict in Ukraine did not allow time to resolve their concerns. Consequently, the Conference concluded without a final document, although the President of the Conference did submit the draft outcome as a working paper (NPT/CONF.2020/WP.77) under his authority. States parties agreed, however, to establish a working group on further strengthening the review process of the Treaty (NPT/CONF.2020/66 (Part I), para. 23). That working group would meet before the first Preparatory Committee meeting of the 2026 review cycle to recommend measures to the Committee to “improve the effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, accountability, coordination and continuity of the review process of the Treaty”.

A brighter spot for many States, which saw it as a counter to increasingly negative trends in nuclear disarmament, was the successful holding of the first Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Postponed twice owing to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Meeting was held from 21 to 23 June in Vienna. It was notable for its inclusivity, featuring strong roles of observers and civil society, who were present in large delegations. The Meeting emphasized the progressive elements of the Treaty, notably its concerns about victim assistance and environmental remediation and, above all, the understanding of the devastating humanitarian consequence of any use of nuclear weapons.

In the lead-up to the Meeting, States parties held extensive virtual consultations on the key areas of universalization, positive obligations, provision of scientific advice and the creation of a competent international authority to verify disarmament. Despite the limited time during the Meeting, such consultations enabled States parties to produce several progressive yet practical outcome documents: a political declaration; and an action plan and intersessional structure for the Treaty’s future implementation. Although the Meeting was held in a largely constructive manner, it too was not immune from the ramifications of the war in Ukraine, as any references — including oblique ones — had to be deleted from the declaration in order to preserve consensus.

Another positive outcome from 2022 resulted from efforts by the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization to accelerate the universalization of the Treaty. As part of efforts to commemorate the Treaty’s twenty-sixth year since opening for signature, six new States (Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Sao Tome and Principe, Timor-Leste and Tuvalu) ratified the Treaty, effectively bringing it into force for all of Latin America and the Caribbean and South-East Asia.

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