We are facing extraordinary challenges to the peace and security of cyberspace. … In moments like these, States must recognize the critical importance of our common norms, rules and principles of responsible State behaviour and redouble efforts to ensure their effective implementation.
In the 2022 sessions of various United Nations bodies, the international community continued to make progress in addressing several emerging challenges related to developments in science and technology and their implications for international peace and security.
On outer space, the Open-ended Working Group on Reducing Space Threats through Norms, Rules and Principles of Responsible Behaviours, established pursuant to resolution 76/231, commenced its work and held its first two substantive sessions. At those sessions, the Working Group took stock of the existing international legal and other normative frameworks concerning threats arising from State behaviours with respect to outer space. It also considered current and future threats by States to space systems, as well as actions, activities and omissions that could be regarded as irresponsible.
Total number of orbiting items by year as reflected in the Online Index of Objects Launched into Outer Space maintained by the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs.
The General Assembly adopted a new resolution (77/41) calling on States to commit not to conduct destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite missile tests, building on an initiative of the United States. By resolution 77/250, the Assembly also decided to re-establish a group of governmental experts on further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space, which will meet in 2023 and 2024 to consider and make recommendations on substantial elements of an international legally binding instrument on that issue. After a two-year hiatus, the United Nations Disarmament Commission was able to convene its substantive session, where it restarted its efforts to prepare recommendations on the practical implementation of transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities (for more information, see chap. 7).
This graph shows the overall increase in global military expenditures from 2000 to 2022, as well as the regional shares in such spending. Military expenditures grew in four of the five geographical regions in 2022. The largest real-term increase was recorded in Europe (+13 per cent), followed by the Middle East (+3.2 per cent), Asia and Oceania (+2.7 per cent) and the Americas (+0.3 per cent). Spending decreased in Africa (-5.3 per cent).
SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Administration Orbital Debris Program Office
The new Open-ended Working Group on Security of and in the Use of Information and Communications Technologies (2021-2025) held its second and third substantive sessions and adopted its first annual progress report. Its work was focused on emerging and potential threats to information and communications technologies security; norms, rules and principles of responsible State behaviour in cyberspace; applicability of international law; confidence-building; capacity-building; and regular, institutional dialogue.
Building on a proposal first introduced by France and Egypt in 2021, the General Assembly adopted a new resolution on a programme of action to advance responsible State behaviour in the use of information and communications technologies in the context of international security. The initiative sought to establish a mechanism to, inter alia, discuss existing and potential threats, build national capacity to implement international commitments, and promote engagement and cooperation with non-State stakeholders.
From 1 to 6 August 2022, the National University of Singapore hosted 22 participants from 18 United Nations Member States for the inaugural United Nations-Singapore Cyber Fellowship. (Photo credit: National University of Singapore)
On autonomous weapons systems, the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems reconvened in accordance with the outcome of the sixth Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons Review Conference. It was able to agree to a report that included substantive conclusions and recommendations, but it was unable to reach a consensus on elements of possible measures or options for a normative and operational framework to address the legal, humanitarian, ethical and political concerns associated with autonomous weapons. Nonetheless, there continued to be increasing convergence, but not consensus, on a so-called dual-track approach comprising prohibitions and regulations (for more information, see chap. 3).
In 2022, the Office for Disarmament Affairs prepared the fifth edition of the report of the Secretary-General on current developments in science and technology and their potential impact on international security and disarmament efforts (A/77/188). In the report, the Secretary-General addressed scientific and technological developments in the following areas: (a) artificial intelligence and autonomous systems; (b) digital technologies; (c) biology and chemistry; (d) space and aerospace technologies; (e) electromagnetic technologies; and (f) materials technologies. The fifth edition of the report also included an analysis of the implications of new technologies for existing legal frameworks related to the use of force.
In the report's conclusions, the Secretary-General recommended that United Nations bodies and entities continue to encourage multi-stakeholder and geographically equitable engagement, including by industry and other private sector actors, through formal and informal platforms. The Secretary-General also continued to call for Member States to integrate reviews of developments in science and technology in their work, including through processes to review the operation of disarmament treaties and within all relevant United Nations disarmament bodies.
The Open-ended Working Group on Reducing Space Threats through Norms, Rules and Principles of Responsible Behaviours, established pursuant to resolution 76/231, commenced its work in 2022. Its mandate was to (a) take stock of the existing international legal and other normative frameworks concerning threats arising from State behaviours with respect to outer space; (b) consider current and future threats by States to space systems, and actions, activities and omissions that could be considered irresponsible; (c) make recommendations on possible norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours relating to threats by States to space systems, including, as appropriate, how they would contribute to the negotiation of legally binding instruments, including on the prevention of an arms race in outer space; and (d) submit a report to the General Assembly at its seventy-eighth session.
The Group held its organizational session on 7 and 9 February. During that session, the Group elected Hellmut Lagos (Chile) as its Chair and adopted the agenda of its substantive sessions (A/AC.294/2022/2). It also affirmed the applicability, mutatis mutandis, of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly to the Group and confirmed that it would take its decisions by consensus. The Group further affirmed that "other international organizations, commercial actors and civil society" would be able to attend the public plenary meetings of the Group as observers and may provide written contributions on matters under consideration by the Group, which would be made available at no cost to the Organization.
States expressed various views over the number of sessions the Group was to hold, in light of the Russian-language version of resolution 76/231 stating that there would only be two sessions, as opposed to the four sessions specified in the other language versions and in the budget documents considered by the General Assembly. Furthermore, a number of delegations deemed that the scheduled date of the first session did not permit sufficient time for preparation. Accordingly, the Group decided that the date of the first session would be held during the time frame originally allocated for its second session and that, to clarify the matter, the Chair would seek guidance from the General Assembly.
In order to address the divergence of views regarding the number of sessions, Chile submitted a draft decision to the General Assembly. By that decision, recorded under the symbol 76/561, the General Assembly specified that the Working Group should hold its first session of five days from 9 to 13 May 2022, its second session of five days from 12 to 16 September 2022, its third session of five days from 30 January to 3 February 2023 and its fourth session of five days from 7 to 11 August 2023, unless the Working Group decided otherwise. Subsequently, the Group decided that its fourth session would be held from 28 August to 1 September 2023.
At its first session, the Group considered the first thematic item on its agenda: to take stock of the existing international legal and other normative frameworks concerning threats arising from State behaviours with respect to outer space. The session included informal panel discussions, with speakers drawn from academia, civil society and industry. As reflected in the programme of work (A/AC.294/2022/INF.1), States took part in a rolling formal general exchange of views during the morning meetings and interactive discussions during the formal afternoon meetings.
The topics of the panels were as follows: (a) existing international law concerning threats arising from State behaviours with respect to outer space; (b) international law relating to the use of force in international affairs in the context of threats arising from State behaviours with respect to outer space; (c) protection of civilians, civilian objects and the natural environment in relation to threats arising from State behaviours with respect to outer space; (d) applicable elements of the legal regimes governing aviation and the sea in the context of threats arising from State behaviours with respect to outer space; and (e) voluntary mechanisms and regimes applicable to outer space in the context of threats arising from State behaviours with respect to outer space.
Regarding the key issues raised, while reaffirming the applicability of existing international law in outer space, it was noted that threats to outer space systems had not been addressed in a comprehensive manner. Many delegations considered that the principle of undertaking outer space activities with due regard for the interest of other States was a key from which to develop new norms and standards of behaviour. Given the unique nature of the space environment, they recognized the need to reach a common understanding of what constituted a use of force and an armed attack in outer space. A number of delegations continued to oppose any discussion on the applicability of international humanitarian law in outer space owing to concerns that such a statement would signal the legitimacy of conducting hostilities in or from outer space. Several delegations also considered that certain elements from aviation and maritime law could be adapted and applied in outer space, especially measures that regulated interactions between military objects and the protection of civilians.
The Chair circulated a summary of the discussions at the first session (A/AC.294/2022/3), prepared under his own responsibility and without prejudice to the position of any State.
At its second session, the Group considered the second thematic item on its agenda: to consider current and future threats by States to space systems, and actions, activities and omissions that could be considered irresponsible. As with the first session, the programme for the week (A/AC.294/2022/INF.2/Rev.1) comprised informal panels, including speakers drawn from academia, civil society and commercial actors, and general exchanges among Member States, organized around five topics.
The topic for the first day provided a general overview and addressed "Nature and uses of the outer space environment and space systems in relation to current and future threats by States to space systems". The topics of the subsequent four days each addressed one of the four "vectors” of threats to space systems: earth-to-space (i.e., direct-ascent anti-satellite missiles); space-to-space (i.e., co-orbital anti-satellite weapons and high-risk dual-use capabilities); space-to-earth (i.e., space-based missile defence interceptors); and earth-to-earth (i.e., cyber, electromagnetic and physical threats to ground segments).
States expressed various views on their threat perceptions. Western States saw the highest priority threat as caused by direct-ascent, earth-to-space missiles, which typically produce large amounts of persistent space debris that can, in turn, threaten many other satellites in nearby orbits. The Russian Federation continued to be primarily concerned with the prospective development by the United States of space-based missile defence infrastructure, including systems that could target long-range missiles in flight or on the launch pad; the United States has indicated that it had no interest in pursuing such systems owing to their lack of feasibility and costs, despite having been mandated by Congress to carry out studies. China stated its primary concern was not any particular capability but rather the strategy, policies and doctrine of the United States, including its declaration of outer space as a warfighting domain and China's perception that the United States was seeking military superiority in that domain.
States also variously expressed concern over uncoordinated close approaches, including the operation of so-called inspector satellites, the need for rules to govern the use of dual-use capabilities such as active debris removal and on-orbit servicing, and the need for protection of critical national security infrastructure such as early-warning satellites, which detect missile launches. In particular, a number of States said that technologies used for debris removal and on-orbit servicing were inherently dual-use, as they entailed autonomous rendezvous and proximity operations and capabilities that could conceivably be used to disrupt, damage or destroy spacecraft.
As with the first session, the Chair circulated a summary of the discussions at the second session (A/AC.294/2022/4), prepared under his own responsibility and without prejudice to the position of any State.
During the session, the Russian Federation announced that it would seek to re-establish the group of governmental experts, which had met from 2018 to 2019 and had failed to prepare recommendations on elements for a legally binding instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.
On 18 April, the Vice-President of the United States, Kamala Harris, announced that the United States had decided to undertake a national commitment not to conduct destructive, direct-ascent anti-satellite missile testing. The United States called on other States to make similar national commitments, and it has expressed support for this to be transformed into a general norm. It also introduced the commitment as an element to be considered as part of the outcome of the Open-ended Working Group on Reducing Space Threats through Norms, Rules and Principles of Responsible Behaviours.
The United States subsequently submitted a new draft resolution to the First Committee entitled "Destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite missile testing". The General Assembly adopted the draft as resolution 77/41 by a vote of 155 in favour and 9 against, with 9 abstentions. By that resolution, the Assembly called upon all States to commit not to conduct destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite missile tests. It considered that such a commitment was an urgent, initial measure aimed at preventing damage to the outer space environment while also contributing to the development of further measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Assembly further called upon all States to continue discussions in the relevant bodies and to establish and develop further practical steps that could be taken to enable risk reduction, prevent conflict from occurring in outer space and prevent an arms race in outer space.
In 2022, the war in Ukraine significantly heightened concerns over the malicious use of information and communications technologies by both State and non-State actors. Observers consistently reported destructive and disruptive incidents involving such technologies, including widespread denial-of-service attacks and other actions against State-run websites, media outlets, networks and critical infrastructure. In addition to State actors, individuals and so-called “hacktivist groups” actively engaged in disruptive cyber activity in connection with the conflict.
Private-sector entities provided various forms of support for so-called "cyber defences" and to combat mis- and disinformation. For example, Microsoft security teams reportedly worked with government officials and private enterprises to identify and remediate threat activity. Google publicized its provision of grants for relief efforts, including advertising grants to help humanitarian and intergovernmental organizations connect people to sources of aid and resettlement information. Early in the conflict, in March, the company SpaceX provided “Starlink” terminals to ensure Internet access via satellite in rural and other disconnected areas in Ukraine.
One of the most significant incidents involving the malicious use of information and communications technology took place at the start of the conflict on 24 February, targeting the United States satellite company Viasat and its operations in Ukraine. The incident resulted in the widespread interruption of satellite communications across Ukraine and other parts of the region. The activity also disabled “very small aperture terminals” in Ukraine and across Europe, including tens of thousands of terminals outside of Ukraine that, inter alia, support wind turbines and provide Internet services to private citizens.
Meanwhile, concerns about protecting humanitarian organizations from malicious cyber activity grew following an incident in January involving the International Committee of the Red Cross, which reported a cyberattack on its servers hosting the personal data of more than 515,000 individuals. The Committee concluded that the attackers used a specific set of advanced hacking tools designed for offensive security. The people affected included missing individuals and their families, detainees and others receiving services from the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement because of armed conflict, natural disasters or migration.
Despite those troubling developments, the year 2022 saw steady progress in intergovernmental discussions on information and communications technologies security. The participants focused on State action to secure a peaceful, secure and stable cyberspace.
The Open-ended Working Group on Security of and in the Use of Information and Communications Technologies 2021-2025 held its second and third sessions in 2022, followed by a series of informal, intersessional meetings.
The Open-ended Working Group on Security of and in the Use of Information and Communications Technologies, mandated from 2021 to 2025 by General Assembly resolution 75/240, continued its substantive work. It held two sessions, in March and July, culminating in the adoption by consensus of its first annual progress report (A/77/275). The Chair of the Working Group, Burhan Gafoor (Singapore), steered highly pragmatic exchanges that yielded an action-oriented progress report, marking an important intermediate step for the intergovernmental body. The progress report covered the first, second and third substantive sessions of the Working Group—held in December 2021, March–April 2022 and July 2022—and identified several areas for focused discussions at the subsequent fourth and fifth sessions, to be held in 2023. States also agreed to establish a global, intergovernmental directory of points of contact. From 5 to 9 December, the Chair of the Open-ended Working Group convened informal, intersessional meetings to maintain the Group's momentum and to build on the successful consensus adoption of the first progress report. On 7 December, the General Assembly adopted decision 77/512, “Open-ended working group on security of and in the use of information and communications technologies 2021–2025 established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 75/240”, tabled by Singapore. By that resolution, the Assembly decided to endorse the annual progress report of the Group and convene intersessional meetings up to five days each in 2023 and 2024 to advance discussions.
Throughout 2022, a broad range of delegations continued to support the potential establishment of a programme of action on responsible State behaviour in cyberspace. Discussions on the initiative continued in the context of the Open-ended Working Group, as well as the seventy-seventh session of the First Committee of the General Assembly. On 5 December, a large majority of States adopted a new General Assembly resolution (77/37) proposed by France, requesting a report of the Secretary-General and regional consultations on the initiative.
The second substantive session of the Open-Ended Working Group took place in person from 28 March to 1 April in New York, convening for 10 formal meetings. The substantive exchanges were held in an informal mode; several delegations, including Australia, Canada, the United States and the European Union, argued that, because the modalities for participation by non-governmental stakeholders remained outstanding, the Working Group was not in a position to adopt the provisional programme of work (A/AC.292/2022/1) and proceed with formal discussions. The first two meetings were dedicated entirely to related discussions on the organization of work.
Despite the informal nature of the discussions for the rest of the week, substantive exchanges were held on all key topics of the mandate of the Working Group: emerging and potential threats to information and communications technology security; norms, rules and principles of responsible State behaviour in cyberspace; applicability of international law; confidence-building; capacity-building; and regular, institutional dialogue.
More than 300 statements were delivered, including 130 by women delegates (approximately 43 per cent, up from 33 per cent at the first session) (see also figure 6.2. in chap. 6). The conflict in Ukraine featured prominently in many States' interventions, with several delegations condemning the malicious use of information and communications technologies, particularly by the Russian Federation, in connection with the conflict.
A deep divergence of views over modalities for the participation of non-governmental stakeholders, including civil society, academia and the private sector, carried over from the first substantive session held in December 2021. Some delegations continued to argue for broad and inclusive stakeholder participation as a non-negotiable condition, while a handful of other delegations supported maintaining the same modalities as the previous Open-ended Working Group (A/75/816, para. 8), whereby groups not accredited by the Economic and Social Council were allowed to participate only if no State objected. A consensus solution, as mandated by General Assembly resolution 75/240, was not identified in the run-up to the second substantive session in March, nor did the informal consultations throughout the week of the session provide for a solution.
The third substantive session of the Open-ended Working Group took place in person from 25 to 29 July in New York. The Working Group held nine formal meetings, culminating in the consensus adoption of its first annual progress report (A/77/275).
To facilitate consensus adoption of the progress report, the Chair committed to preparing a compendium of statements of position to be made available as an official document to accompany the final report (A/AC.292/2022/INF.4). Twenty-two States submitted explanations of position on the progress report.
The third session featured robust participation by delegations, with more than 200 interventions delivered throughout the week, including 120 by women delegates (49 per cent) (see also figure 6.2 in chap. 6). The increase in women's participation represented further progress towards gender parity in the Working Group (up from 43 per cent at the previous session and 33 per cent at the first). Moreover, a number of delegations promoted the role of women in both the negotiating forum and the field of cybersecurity more generally, including through initiatives such as the Women in Cyber Fellowship supported by Australia, Canada, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
The third substantive session was focused entirely on negotiating the text of the progress report, as the Chair had circulated a zero draft followed by a revised version in the two weeks prior to the session. For the first time, following agreement in April via silence procedure on modalities for the participation of non-governmental entities, the Working Group was able to formally adopt its programme of work (A/AC.292/2022/2).[1]
The first annual progress report (A/77/275) covered the first, second and third substantive sessions of the Working Group (December 2021, March-April 2022 and July 2022) and incorporated a significant amount of previously agreed language, drawing from the predecessor Open-ended Working Group's final consensus report (A/75/816). Nevertheless, it identified several areas for focused discussions at the forthcoming fourth and fifth substantive sessions in 2023, including capacity-building, specific principles of international law, public-private partnerships and gender dimensions of information and communications technologies security. States also agreed to establish a global, intergovernmental directory of points of contact, the modalities for which would be further discussed at forthcoming substantive sessions.
In its progress report, the Working Group noted rising concern over the malicious use of information and communications technologies by States and that the use of such technologies in future conflicts was becoming more likely. The Working Group also noted its concern over malicious activity affecting critical information infrastructure, which provided essential services to the public, and the technical infrastructure essential to the general availability and integrity of the Internet and health sector entities.
Meanwhile, the Working Group continued to display a divergence of views on the need to further study the applicability of international humanitarian law to the use of information and communications technologies by States. The majority of delegations supported more focused discussions on international humanitarian law, including the foundational principles of humanity, necessity, proportionality and distinction, while a smaller group continued to oppose such discussions, arguing they would “militarize” that domain.
During the third substantive session, the Working Group held its first dedicated stakeholder segment as part of the programme of work. After a lengthy delay in agreeing to modalities, delegations welcomed the opportunity for formal engagement with stakeholders. With the financial support of Ireland, the Office for Disarmament Affairs sponsored the participation of six accredited stakeholders, of whom four were women. The Chair also convened an informal dialogue with all interested stakeholders, whether formally accredited to the Working Group or not, in the week before the session. More than 150 entities participated in the dialogue, which was held in a hybrid format. The Chair announced his intention to continue to convene such dialogues for each substantive session.
From 5 to 9 December, the Chair convened a number of informal, intersessional meetings in a hybrid format, pursuant to a request contained in the Group's first annual progress report for the Chair to hold a multi-stakeholder meeting dedicated to confidence-building.[2] The Chair also allocated time throughout the week to other sub-agenda items of the Working Group: existing and potential threats to information and communications technologies security; norms, rules and principles of responsible State behaviour; international law; capacity-building; and regular institutional dialogue.
Given the informal nature of the meetings, all interested non-governmental stakeholders were able to participate, including those who had not been granted formal accreditation as a result of objections raised by delegations. As a result, more than 150 individuals registered and participated either in New York or online. To encourage an interactive and informal environment, the Chair allowed stakeholders to make interventions under each agenda item after States had spoken and time permitting.
Before the intersessional meetings, the Chair circulated discussion questions with a focus on the operationalization of a points of contact directory, inviting presentations on the matter from the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and the Office for Disarmament Affairs. To facilitate interactivity, delegations were invited to present concept notes and papers under the various agenda items.
Throughout 2022, a broad group of States continued to support the establishment of a programme of action to advance responsible State behaviour in the use of information and communications technologies in the context of international security. The proposal was first introduced in 2020. Subsequently, a cross-regional group of co-sponsors, principally led by Egypt and France, was formed.
In the framework of the Open-ended Working Group on Security of and in the Use of Information and Communications Technologies 2021-2025, States continued to explore the initiative's viability and complementarity. In its annual progress report, the Working Group acknowledged the proposal and reaffirmed that it should be further elaborated by the Working Group itself. States also agreed to continue to engage with each other at the forthcoming substantive sessions in 2023, including through discussions on the relationship between the programme of action and the Working Group and on its scope, content and structure.
At the seventy-seventh session of the First Committee of the General Assembly, France introduced a new draft resolution entitled "Programme of action to advance responsible State behaviour in the use of information and communications technologies in the context of international security" (A/C.1/77/L.73) that underlined the complementarity of the proposal with the work of the ongoing Open-ended Working Group and characterized it as a permanent, inclusive, action-oriented mechanism that would, inter alia, discuss existing and potential threats, support States' capacities and efforts to implement and advance commitments, promote engagement and cooperation with stakeholders, and periodically review progress made in its implementation.
In December, during the plenary meeting of the General Assembly, a large majority of States voted in favour of the draft, which was adopted as resolution 77/37. By the resolution, the Assembly called on the Secretary-General to submit, at the Assembly's seventy-eighth session, a report based on the views of States on the scope, structure and content of the instrument, as well as the modalities for its establishment. The General Assembly also requested the Office for Disarmament Affairs to collaborate with relevant regional organizations to convene a series of consultations to share views on the initiative.
From 7 to 9 September in Berlin, the International Institute for Strategic Studies held the fourth meeting of its Missile Dialogue Initiative, established in 2019 in partnership with Germany. In light of the deteriorating international security environment and developments in technology, the meeting addressed how the future of arms control could be secured. It also focused on regional security situations as well as the role that confidence-building and risk-reduction measures could play. Furthermore, it examined developments in emerging missile technologies and assessed the adequacy of existing regulatory frameworks to mitigate any risks to international security and stability.
Since its founding, the United Nations has recognized the relationship between disarmament and development, when a call for the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources was included in article 26 of the Organization's Charter. In 2015, States reiterated the link between disarmament and development in adopting the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, especially through its Target 16.4 on significantly reducing illicit arms flows. While the COVID-19 pandemic brought about renewed interest and calls for rebalancing military expenditures in favour of socioeconomic development, that momentum diminished amid consecutive years of rising global military expenditure and geopolitical developments surrounding the situation in Ukraine.
Nevertheless, in 2022, the seventy-seventh session of the General Assembly reiterated the crucial link between disarmament and development in adopting its annual resolution on the matter (77/45). As in previous years, the Assembly used the resolution to highlight the "symbiotic relationship" between disarmament and development and to express concern about the rise of global military expenditure.
Meanwhile, in his annual report to the General Assembly (A/77/114), the Secretary-General emphasized the continued efforts of the United Nations to further strengthen the disarmament-development nexus. Such efforts encompassed the vital role of the Coordinating Action on Small Arms mechanism (CASA), an inter-agency coordination body which continued to exchange views and coordinate actions in support of the implementation of the relevant goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and notably Sustainable Development Goal Indicator 16.4.2. (For more information on the Coordinating Action on Small Arms mechanism, see chap. 3.)
The Office for Disarmament Affairs and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime also continued to collect and analyse data on weapons collected from illicit domains and their status in accordance with Indicator 16.4.2.
Additionally, the Office for Disarmament Affairs maintained its efforts to further strengthen the interlinkages between disarmament and development at the country level by integrating small-arms control into development processes and frameworks. In that regard, the Office continued to provide financial support for arms control projects through the United Nations Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation (UNSCAR) and the Saving Lives Entity (SALIENT) funding facility. (For more information on UNSCAR and SALIENT, see chap. 3.)
The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact (Counter-Terrorism Compact), led by the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism, continued to strengthen the coordination and coherence of activities within the United Nations system to support Member States in implementing the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, as well as relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. In 2022, the Counter-Terrorism Compact welcomed its two newest members: the Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da'esh; and the Financial Action Task Force. The Counter-Terrorism Compact was one of the largest United Nations coordination frameworks as at the end of the year, with 45 United Nations and external entities participating as members or observers.
The eight working groups of the Counter-Terrorism Compact held 35 regular and in-focus meetings throughout the year, facilitating information exchange on initiatives and best practices, joint research and capacity-building.
The online United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Platform, maintained by the Office of Counter-Terrorism, continued to provide a virtual forum where over 942 focal points of 45 Counter-Terrorism Compact entities, 136 Member States and 11 regional organizations collaborate and share information.
The Counter-Terrorism Compact Working Group on Emerging Threats and Critical Infrastructure Protection held four quarterly meetings in support of Member States' efforts to prevent and respond to emerging terrorist threats, including those related to the misuse of chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological materials. Another aim was to enhance the protection of critical infrastructure, including infrastructure housing such materials, against terrorist attacks, with respect for human rights and the rule of law.
Several Working Group members and some external entities briefed each other on their research and analytical findings. The presentations included, but were not limited to, briefings by the Office of Counter-Terrorism on the following topics: global programme on preventing and responding to weapons of mass destruction/chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism — examples on fostering regional cooperation; global programme to counter terrorist threats against vulnerable targets — developing guides on good practices and delivering technical assistance and capacity-building; protection of vulnerable targets against terrorist attacks — the compendium of good practices and its five thematic guides; and current chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high explosive threats against critical infrastructure and capacity-building measures. Moreover, the Working Group Chair and Vice-Chairs continued to engage with the Group of Experts of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) (1540 Committee) and the Office for Disarmament Affairs in order to explore opportunities to support the resolution and its 2022 comprehensive review process.
The Working Group also received regular briefings on technical assistance and capacity-building initiatives implemented by its members. They included briefings on the following: the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) support to interoperability and communication in case of chemical attacks; the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute coordination of an inter-agency network of focal points, as well as capacity-building efforts to prevent trafficking of radiological and nuclear material; the Office of Counter-Terrorism global programmes on the protection of vulnerable targets and on preventing and responding to weapons of mass destruction/chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism; the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate technical guidance for capacity-building in support of the implementation of Security Council resolution 2370 (2017); and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high explosive and vulnerable targets sub-directorate programming.
The Counter-Terrorism Compact Working Group on Border Management and Law Enforcement relating to Counter-Terrorism finalized and launched, in March 2022, the technical guidelines to facilitate the implementation of Security Council resolution 2370 (2017) and related international standards and good practices on preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons.
In the technical guidelines, the authors highlighted measures for preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons, focusing in particular on small arms and light weapons, improvised explosive devices and uncrewed aircraft systems. As a unique product developed under the "One United Nations" approach, the guidelines were expected to serve as a living document and practical tool to support the implementation of resolution 2370 (2017), relevant subsequent resolutions, good practices, and international standards and guidelines.
In April, the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre of the Office of Counter-Terrorism, the Security Council's Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research jointly organized a workshop for Europe to promote the technical guidelines, with expert support provided by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the United Nations Mine Action Service, INTERPOL, the World Customs Organization and the European Commission. The workshop was the first in a series of regional events to promote the technical guidelines, discuss the development of practices to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons, and identify opportunities for strengthening relevant measures at the national and regional levels. Plans were under way to organize similar workshops in 2023 in the Maghreb, Sahel and Caribbean regions. Furthermore, the Working Group planned to remain engaged in keeping the technical guidelines up to date.
In 2022, the Office of Counter-Terrorism delivered outreach and capacity-building activities at the global, regional and national levels, benefiting around 3,600 officials from over 100 Member States. The Office carried out those activities through the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre and its multi-year programme on “Addressing the Terrorist Use of Weapons”, including weapons of mass destruction, small arms and light weapons and improvised explosive devices.
Activities focused on countering nuclear terrorism included a high-level event on the margins of the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (3 August), showing how nuclear security contributes to the overall nuclear non-proliferation regime; a high-level advocacy event with the Parliament of Albania on ratification of the Convention (16 June), promoting adherence to reinforce regional nuclear security; the Mediterranean Trident Tabletop Exercise and workshop on nuclear detection and forensics for the Mediterranean basin and South-Eastern and Eastern Europe (11 November), looking at cooperation and the Convention's implementation; the "Watchful Viking" tabletop exercise and workshop on radiological and nuclear detection and information-sharing (9–11 November), focusing on national and international inter-agency coordination; and training on radiological and nuclear hazards for Türkiye (27 June–1 July), delivered jointly with the World Health Organization. Those activities took place with the support of Finland, Italy, Morocco, Norway, Türkiye, the United States and the European Union.
The Counter-Terrorism Centre also engaged in several activities focused on preventing and responding to biological and chemical terrorism. Together with the United States, it supported Iraq in drafting the Strategy on Multi-Sectorial Coordination on Biological Terrorism Response in Iraq and its respective Action Plan. In cooperation with INTERPOL, the Counter-Terrorism Centre delivered a workshop on risk assessment and investigation of deliberate biological events. In addition, the Counter-Terrorism Centre trained Jordanian officials on biological countermeasures and briefed Tunisian officials on the protection of critical infrastructure and key resources, focusing the latter activity on both chemical and biological threats.
Furthermore, the Counter-Terrorism Centre, together with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), supported Jordan in drafting a National Crisis Response Plan for a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear terrorist attack. They also supported the country in organizing a field exercise to test the aforementioned plan, engaging with more than 2,500 participants. Moreover, the Counter-Terrorism Centre facilitated the training of Jordanian first responders at the NATO Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Centre of Excellence in Czechia.
To address the terrorism-arms-crime nexus, the Counter-Terrorism Centre and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime held a series of trainings, workshops and community of practice meetings on preventing the illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons and their supply to terrorists in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The Counter-Terrorism Centre also held related capacity consultations in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, cooperating with the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate, the Office for Disarmament Affairs and the Office on Drugs and Crime.
The Counter-Terrorism Centre also supported the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact through cooperation with two of its working groups. Together with the Working Group on Emerging Threats and Critical Infrastructure Protection, it engaged with OPCW and the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute to co-organize a meeting of functional focal points in a project on ensuring inter-agency interoperability in response to chemical and biological attacks. Additionally, in cooperation with the Working Group on Border Management and Law Enforcement relating to Counter-Terrorism, the Counter-Terrorism Centre assisted in preparing guidelines to support Member States in their efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons. The Counter-Terrorism Centre launched those guidelines together with the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), and the three entities held a regional workshop for Europe aimed at promoting the guidance among Member States.
The Counter-Terrorism Centre continued coordination and close cooperation with numerous United Nations entities, international organizations and initiatives, including the 1540 Committee, the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), INTERPOL, NATO, OPCW, the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, UNIDIR, the Office for Disarmament Affairs, the Office of Legal Affairs, the World Customs Organization and the World Health Organization, as well as the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, the Nuclear Threat Initiative and the Counter-Terrorism Preparedness Network.
In 2022, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime continued promoting adherence to and effective implementation of international legal instruments against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism in accordance with its relevant mandate (74/175, operative para. 20). The Office carried out that work primarily within the framework of three projects: promoting the universalization and effective implementation of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (funded by the European Union and jointly implemented with the Office of Counter-Terrorism); supporting the universalization of international legal frameworks related to nuclear security, including the aforementioned Convention, as well as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 Amendment (funded by Canada); and building a repository of national legislation for implementing the criminalization provisions of the three Conventions (funded by Canada).
In implementing those projects, the Office carried out several technical assistance activities during the year. In November, it co-organized, together with Italy, Morocco and the United States, and with the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism, a tabletop exercise on the following: responding to radioactive waste smuggling; and applying good practices related to detection strategies, nuclear-related forensics and coordination of subsequent criminal investigations. Later that month, the Office held the first criminal investigation and mock trial on the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, an effort aimed at building the capacity of criminal justice officials to address challenges that may arise when investigating, prosecuting and adjudicating crimes related to the Convention. The Office also supported the Convention's universalization and effective implementation by holding national workshops for officials in Ghana and the Lao People's Democratic Republic, as well as by conducting country visits to Albania, Cambodia, Iceland, Ireland, Malaysia, and the United Republic of Tanzania.
The Office continued to develop and promote tools and resources related to the international legal framework against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism. It developed the Manual on Fictional Cases related to Offences under the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, comprising scenarios focused on that Convention's criminalization requirements that were designed to illustrate the main elements of the offences established by the agreement. In June, the Office launched an e-learning module on the Convention's key provisions, aiming to promote awareness of the need to adhere to the Convention and incorporate its requirements into national legislation. All of those materials appeared on the Office's regularly updated website for the Convention (www.unodc.org/icsant) in all six United Nations official languages, with some also translated into Portuguese. Among other resources, the website contained submissions from 49 States parties to the Convention on their legislation to implement the Convention's criminalization provisions.
The Office continued to offer its e-learning module on the International Legal Framework against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism, available in all United Nations official languages and Portuguese. Since its launch in 2019, the module had been completed by more than 2,300 practitioners from 120 Member States.
The Office also organized a high-level event in December to mark the fifteenth anniversary of the entry into force of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. Co-hosted with Canada and the European Union, the event brought together representatives of more than 50 Member States and other relevant stakeholders, including civil society, to take stock of the status of adherence to the Convention, showcase national experiences and the Office's work and achievements to date, and chart the future of promoting the Convention and strengthening the global nuclear security architecture.
The Office also contributed to several events organized by IAEA during the year. Those activities included two regional workshops on the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 Amendment, held in Viet Nam and Paraguay in October and November, respectively; a national workshop for officials in the United Republic of Tanzania to promote the universalization of the Convention and Amendment; the Conference of the Parties to the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, held in March and April; the “First International Conference on Nuclear Law: The Global Debate”, held in April; the “International Conference on Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources: Accomplishments and Future Endeavours”, held in June; and other technical meetings and seminars related to nuclear and radiological security.
Throughout 2022, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime cooperated regularly with many other organizations and initiatives. In May and June, the Office contributed to the open consultations of the 1540 Committee on the comprehensive review of the status of implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). In November, it participated in the subregional workshop, hosted by OPCW, on the role of implementing legislation on the chemical weapons convention in addressing threats arising from non-State actors. To further promote the international legal framework against chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological terrorism, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime also cooperated with entities that included the Office for Disarmament Affairs, the Office of Counter-Terrorism, the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, INTERPOL, the Nuclear Threat Initiative, the Henry L. Stimson Center, the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-proliferation, Parliamentarians for Global Action, and the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.
The Agency plays a central role in strengthening the nuclear security framework globally and in coordinating international activities in the field of nuclear security while avoiding duplication and overlap of such activities. Nuclear security focuses on preventing, detecting and responding to criminal or intentional unauthorized acts involving or directed at nuclear material, other radioactive material, associated facilities or associated activities. Responsibility for nuclear security within a State rests entirely with that State, in accordance with its respective national and international obligations.
IAEA continued to assist States, upon request, in their national efforts to establish and maintain, at all times, effective and comprehensive security of all nuclear and other radioactive material. Specifically, the Agency assisted States in establishing effective and sustainable national nuclear security regimes and, where appropriate, in fulfilling their obligations, including under the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its Amendment, as well as relevant Security Council resolutions, such as resolution 1540 (2004).
In 2022, the OPCW Executive Council's Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism remained the primary platform for States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention to exchange views on how OPCW could further contribute to global counter-terrorism efforts. The Working Group convened three meetings during the year.
The first meeting, held on 22 February, featured two presentations by the OPCW Technical Secretariat. The first presentation was focused on the Technical Secretariat's main activities with respect to the criminalization of acts prohibited by the Chemical Weapons Convention, measures to prevent the hostile use of toxic chemicals by non-State actors, ensuring effective responses to the hostile use of toxic chemicals, laboratory capacity and the OPCW Scientific Advisory Board, and the future role of the OPCW Centre for Chemistry and Technology. The second presentation was focused on the role of the OPCW Africa Programme and the importance of OPCW capacity-building in countering chemical terrorism in Africa.
The second meeting, held on 27 June, featured an initial exchange on points for consideration in the preparatory process for the fifth special session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (15–19 May 2023). Participants also held presentations and discussions on regional approaches to coordinating against chemical terrorism. In addition, the European Union briefed the Working Group on its approach to counter-terrorism efforts, introducing the objectives of its Action Plan to enhance preparedness against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear security risks (COM(2017) 610). That was followed by a briefing by the secretariat of the Network of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Chemical, Biological, Radiological Defence Experts on the main purposes of the Network, as well as the ASEAN focus on responding to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats in a proactive and coordinated manner.
The third meeting, held on 30 September, was focused on the outcome of a survey distributed to States parties based on a set of points for consideration discussed in the Working Group's second meeting. Intended to gauge the views of States parties on the main elements of the OPCW role in countering chemical terrorism, the survey explored four themes: national implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention; threat and risk assessment; partnerships; and future priorities. The Secretary of the Working Group provided a briefing on the survey's background and methodology, as well as an overview of the 27 responses received from States parties across all regions. In those responses, States parties had indicated strong support for the Technical Secretariat's work in countering chemical terrorism and identified three key priorities: providing tools and guidelines for chemical security; capacity-building for States parties; and education and outreach efforts. The exercise was considered useful by States parties as input to the fifth Review Conference, and the survey results continued to guide the activities of the Working Group.
Meanwhile, to further bolster international cooperation on counter-terrorism matters among relevant organizations, the Technical Secretariat continued leading a project on ensuring effective inter-agency interoperability and coordinated communication in case of chemical or biological attacks. The initiative was jointly developed with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the World Health Organization, INTERPOL, the Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit, and the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute.
The Technical Secretariat also continued to collaborate with the 1540 Committee Group of Experts in strengthening States parties' awareness of their relevant obligations stemming from the Chemical Weapons Convention and from Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). The two entities also cooperated to offer practical assistance in areas where the Chemical Weapons Convention and resolution 1540 (2004) are mutually reinforcing — namely, national legislation, chemical security, and customs and border control.
In addition, the Technical Secretariat participated in the 1540 Committee's open consultations on the comprehensive review of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), held in New York from 31 May to 2 June. In a statement, the Technical Secretariat highlighted OPCW activities aimed at building the capacity of States parties to address the threat of chemical weapons use by non-State actors. It also underscored relevant obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention that correspond with operative paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of resolution 1540 (2004).
On 30 November, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2663 (2022), extending the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) (1540 Committee) until 30 November 2032. Through the new resolution, the Council reiterated its decisions on the requirements of resolution 1540 (2004) and re-emphasized the importance for all States to fully implement that resolution. By resolution 2663 (2022), the Council also endorsed the 2022 comprehensive review of the status of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and took note of its results, as contained in the final report of the 1540 Committee (S/2022/899). The Security Council further decided that the 1540 Committee would conduct comprehensive reviews on the status of implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), both after five years and prior to the renewal of its mandate, and would submit a report to the Security Council upon the conclusion of each review. By resolution 2663 (2022), the next review should be held before December 2027. The Council further directed the Committee to review its internal guidelines on matters regarding its Group of Experts by 30 April 2023.
On 31 December 2022, the 1540 Committee submitted to the Security Council its review of the implementation of the resolution for the year (S/2022/1034). The Committee, chaired by Juan Ramón de la Fuente Ramírez (Mexico), said that it had continued to facilitate and monitor the national-level implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) with administrative and substantive support from the Office for Disarmament Affairs.
The 1540 Committee used the review to address all aspects of its work, which had been facilitated by the Committee's four working groups on the following topics, respectively: monitoring and national implementation; assistance; cooperation with international organizations; and transparency and media outreach. In 2022, the Committee held two formal meetings and two informal meetings, enabling members to discuss the comprehensive review then under way.
Throughout the year, the 1540 Committee continued encouraging States to submit national reports on their implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), as required by resolutions 1540 (2004), 2325 (2016) and 2663 (2022). As of 31 December, 185 of the 193 Member States had submitted at least one national report to the 1540 Committee, while eight States had yet to do so (Chad, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Eswatini, Gambia, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania and Somalia). Furthermore, as in 2016, the Security Council encouraged States by resolution 2663 (2022) to provide additional information on their implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), including through their laws, regulations and effective practices.
By resolution 1540 (2004), the Council encouraged States to develop, on a voluntary basis, national implementation action plans for the resolution's key provisions. During the reporting period, Botswana, Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia submitted such plans to the Committee, bringing the number of States that had provided such plans since 2007 to 37.[3]
Through resolution 2325 (2016), the Security Council recognized the importance of the 1540 Committee continuing to engage actively in dialogue with States on their implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), including through visits to States at their invitation. In 2022, the Committee undertook an in-person visit to Madagascar at its invitation to review its national implementation action plan. In addition, the 1540 Committee accepted invitations to attend two virtual national workshops: one in Ecuador on strengthening the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and another in Botswana on developing the country's national implementation action plan. The Committee organized both of those events in partnership with the Office for Disarmament Affairs.
In resolution 2325 (2016), the Security Council also encouraged States to inform the 1540 Committee of their points of contact for resolution 1540 (2004). In 2022, 30 States named or provided updates regarding their points of contact. As at 31 December, 142 Member States had designated points of contact, up from 136 in 2021.
In September 2022, a workshop for points of contact for resolution 1540 (2004) from ASEAN States took place in Bangkok. It was the tenth regional training course of its kind that the Office for Disarmament Affairs had supported since 2015.
In 2022, Madagascar and Sierra Leone submitted new requests for assistance to the Committee. In carrying forward its clearing-house function, the Committee continued to post on its website summaries of requests for assistance from Member States, as well as offers of assistance from Member States, international, regional and subregional organizations, or other entities. The Committee relayed those responses to the States concerned.
In response to Madagascar's request for assistance, the Office for Disarmament Affairs organized a workshop in November 2022 to review and advance the implementation of the country's national action plan on resolution 1540 (2004).
In February, the Office for Disarmament Affairs held a virtual national workshop on preparing a voluntary national action plan to strengthen the resolution's implementation in Botswana. In December, the Office partnered with its United Nations Regional Centre for Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to hold a national workshop on strengthening the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) in Mongolia. The Office also partnered with the World Customs Organization for a national seminar in Cambodia to increase awareness of the importance of the export control obligations of resolution 1540 (2004). Additionally, the Office provided support to Ecuador for a virtual national workshop on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004).
In 2022, the 1540 Committee continued to enhance its collaboration with relevant international, regional and subregional organizations, including other relevant United Nations bodies. It also continued to explore opportunities to enhance ongoing cooperation with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities. In particular, the two Committees jointly briefed the Security Council in November 2022 (S/PV.9201).
During the year, the Office for Disarmament Affairs continued its efforts to provide regional support for States implementing resolution 1540 (2004) in partnership with relevant regional organizations. In that regard, the Office's regional coordinators for Africa (based in Addis Ababa) and Asia (based in Bangkok) continued to establish a regional network of national points of contact on matters related to resolution 1540 (2004); connect with regional organizations; provide customized support for States in their respective regions; and strengthen coordination with both donors and other international, regional and subregional organizations assisting with issues relevant to resolution 1540 (2004). As of 2022, there were dedicated regional coordinators for the regions of Africa (Office for Disarmament Affairs), the Americas (Organization of American States), Asia (Office for Disarmament Affairs) and Europe and Central Asia (OSCE).
In 2022, the 1540 Committee participated in 29 outreach events to support transparency and help foster greater cooperation and awareness among States, parliamentarians, relevant international, regional and subregional organizations, and civil society (including academia and industry) regarding the obligations set out in resolution 1540 (2004) and their implementation.
Regarding industry, the Committee participated in the twenty-eighth Asian Export Control Seminar organized by the Center for Information on Security Trade Control under the auspices of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan in February 2022. The Committee also participated in the expert roundtable exercise, organized by the Office for Disarmament Affairs, on the implementation of export and border control obligations under Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) within the context of the African Continental Free Trade Area. Those events, among others, provided opportunities to work with and inform industry stakeholders regarding their obligations under national laws.
With support from the Office for Disarmament Affairs, the 1540 Committee continued to maintain its website both as a tool to raise public awareness and as a key source of information related to resolution 1540 (2004) for use by Member States, Committee members, civil society and industry.
[1] After more than one year of negotiations, the Open-ended Working Group agreed in April 2022 to modalities that would allow entities not accredited by the Economic and Social Council to participate on a non-objection basis via silence procedure. A transparency mechanism was introduced whereby any State could request information from the Chair on objections received.
[2] The Working Group requested the Chair to convene, no later than the beginning of the fourth session, an intersessional meeting with States, regional and subregional organizations and interested stakeholders as appropriate, including businesses, non-governmental organizations and academia, to discuss topics that could support and foster confidence-building.
[3] Argentina, Armenia, Belarus, Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Dominican Republic, France, Ghana, Grenada, Kyrgyzstan, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Niger, North Macedonia, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Spain, Suriname, Tajikistan, Togo, Turkmenistan, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay and Uzbekistan.