Developments and trends, 2024

Following the pattern of recent years, 2024 continued to see acutely elevated nuclear risk, with geopolitical tensions further dividing States, and progress on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation appearing ever more elusive. References in international discourse to a “nuclear tipping point” captured an atmosphere of mounting distrust, with prior commitments going unfulfilled or facing further backsliding.

In one positive development, Member States formally recommitted in the Pact for the Future (General Assembly resolution 79/1) to “the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons”, demonstrating that the vast majority of the international community still held that aspiration as its guiding vision.

However, the Pact stood as one of the few bright spots in this field. The ongoing war in Ukraine continued to be characterized by nuclear rhetoric and threats. In an apparent response to increased support to Ukraine by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin signed a new nuclear doctrine in November entitled “Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence”. The doctrine signalled that increased NATO State engagement, especially through troop presence, or support for an attack on Russian territory by a non-nuclear-weapon State could trigger a nuclear response. Notably, the doctrine’s section on “principles of nuclear deterrence” excluded a previous provision on “compliance with international obligations in the field of arms control”.

As a direct result of the ongoing war, the P5 Process, intended to bring the five nuclear-weapon States together to discuss their unique responsibilities, did not hold any ministerial-level meetings in 2024. While working-level meetings chaired by the Russian Federation did take place, they produced no concrete outcomes.

The invasion of Ukraine continued to raise concerns about the safety and security of nuclear power plants in armed conflict, particularly the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant, where the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) continued to maintain its presence established in September 2022.

As relationships between nuclear-weapon States deteriorated, fears grew about a return to dangerous cold war practices. Former and current officials in those States issued pronouncements on the need to resume nuclear testing, and the ongoing qualitative nuclear arms race threatened to become quantitative for the first time since the 1980s. The lack of measures to prevent nuclear-weapon use, combined with the erosion of the nuclear arms control regime, stoked fears about accidental use, miscalculation and escalation. Speaking on the 2024 International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons (26 September), the Secretary-General warned that “instead of dialogue and diplomacy being deployed to end the nuclear threat, another nuclear arms race is taking shape, and sabre-rattling is re-emerging as a tactic of coercion”.

The prospect of an unprecedented three-way arms race gained further momentum in 2024. China faced mounting pressure to increase transparency and accountability around its nuclear arsenal amid widespread reports of a rapid quantitative expansion, which China continued to deny. The United States announced it would adapt its approach to arms control and non-proliferation for a new era “marked by evolving proliferation risks and rapid changes in technology”. This policy shift included preparing to compete with two nuclear peers for the first time, while reaffirming a determination to modernize both the country’s nuclear triad^[1] and nuclear command, control and communications systems to “sustain, and if necessary, enhance [its] capabilities and posture”.

Regional tensions in 2024 continued to accelerate proliferation risks. Prospects for reviving the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action became increasingly remote, with the Islamic Republic of Iran further advancing its nuclear programme while continuing not to provide the cooperation required by the IAEA. In November, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution requesting an updated assessment for March 2025 (GOV/2024/68), raising the likelihood of snapback sanctions under Security Council resolution 2231 (2015). Amid widening conflict with Israel, Iranian officials warned that their country could revisit its nuclear weapons policy and, if sanctions were reimposed, withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Nevertheless, talks held between France, Germany and the United Kingdom and the Islamic Republic of Iran in Geneva in November indicated continued interest in diplomatic solutions.

Nuclear risk in North-East Asia continued to rise throughout 2024, with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s ongoing advancement of its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. During the year, the country test-fired 45 ballistic missiles of various ranges in contravention of the relevant Security Council resolutions — an increase since 2023, which had seen fewer than half of the 70 launches conducted in 2022. The missile activities in 2024 included launches of a new solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile, three launches of intermediate-range ballistic missiles tipped with hypersonic glide vehicles and multiple independently targetable warheads, and several short-range ballistic missiles, including some fired in a large salvo. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea also undertook other activities in line with its 2021 five-year military development plan.

The fifth session of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction took place in New York in November, providing a platform for the participating States to reflect on past and future activities of the Conference and its working committee. Those States welcomed the procedural and substantive achievements made to date, acknowledging the success of their approach in making incremental and systematic substantive progress towards the development of a draft legally binding instrument.

All these issues came into sharp focus at the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 NPT Review Conference, held from 22 July to 2 August. Regional conflicts in Gaza, Ukraine and elsewhere were discussed primarily in the context of nuclear coercion and threats. The issue of transparency and accountability of nuclear-weapon States under the Treaty remained a central concern, with non-nuclear-weapon States expressing growing frustration over the lack of tangible progress on nuclear disarmament and mounting scepticism about nuclear-weapon States’ commitment to their disarmament obligations.

States still demonstrated their commitment to working within the Treaty’s framework by putting forward various proposals to make concrete progress, although nuclear-weapon States received them with varying degrees of enthusiasm. The issue of “nuclear sharing” and extended deterrence arrangements gained prominence, exposing divisions among non-nuclear-weapon States. Many challenged the compatibility of such arrangements with the spirit — if not the letter — of the NPT, while criticizing non-nuclear-weapon States benefiting from these arrangements. Yet, despite these tensions, States parties showed continued willingness to explore new ideas for improving the review process.

In addition, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons expanded its membership with ratifications by Indonesia, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone and Solomon Islands. Informal working groups and facilitators advanced States parties’ implementation efforts through the Treaty’s intersessional process, which included the first informal consultations on the security concerns of States parties, coordinated by Austria. The Treaty’s Scientific Advisory Group continued its substantive work throughout 2024, including by establishing a scientific network to support the Treaty, which held an inaugural meeting in December.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty also gained ratifications, with Papua New Guinea becoming the 178th State party in March. As concerns grew about the potential resumption of nuclear testing, States used the International Day Against Nuclear Tests (29 August) to reaffirm their support not only for the Treaty itself but for the broader norm against nuclear testing, emphasizing their determination to preserve that norm. The global focus on environmental and human impacts of past nuclear testing also continued to grow.

The General Assembly demonstrated ongoing commitment to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation by adopting several new mandates. By resolution 79/238, it established an independent Scientific Panel on the Effects of Nuclear War to examine the physical effects and societal consequences of nuclear war at local, regional and planetary scales. The Panel would conduct its work throughout 2025 and 2026, reporting to the General Assembly’s eighty-second session, in 2027. Through resolution 79/241, the Assembly also mandated the first comprehensive study on nuclear-weapon-free zones in nearly 50 years, with findings to be submitted at the body’s eighty-first session, in 2026.

Meanwhile, following the work of the Group of Governmental Experts to further consider nuclear disarmament verification issues, the General Assembly asked the Secretary-General, through resolution 79/240, to seek Member States’ written views on establishing a group of scientific and technical experts on nuclear disarmament verification within the United Nations. The Assembly also agreed to hold a one-day symposium in 2026 on victim assistance and environmental remediation in the context of the second resolution on addressing the legacy of nuclear weapons (resolution 79/60). These new mandates, emerging despite broader challenges to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, demonstrated that progress remained possible, however daunting the prospect.