Developments and trends, 2024

In 2024, the Secretary-General continued to emphasize that the use of chemical weapons anywhere by anyone and under any circumstances is intolerable and that impunity for their use is equally unacceptable. The Secretary-General also continued to urge States to reaffirm their commitment to the Chemical Weapons Convention and called for unity in the Security Council to identify and hold accountable those who have dared to use such weapons. The Office for Disarmament Affairs continued to support the Secretary-General’s good offices in furthering the implementation of Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) on the elimination of the chemical weapons programme in the Syrian Arab Republic. The Office also continued to work with members of the Security Council in their efforts to build unity, restore cooperation and ensure adherence to the global norm against chemical weapons.

The year also witnessed a continued international focus on the security implications of emerging technologies in the biological sphere. In adopting the Pact for the Future in September, Member States emphasized the need to address emerging and evolving biological risks through improved anticipation, prevention, coordination and preparedness processes. Furthermore, they committed to identify, examine and develop effective measures, including possible legally binding measures, to strengthen and institutionalize international norms and instruments against the development, production, acquisition, transfer, stockpiling, retention and use of biological agents and toxins as weapons.

It was in this context that the international community pushed ahead with various initiatives aimed at bolstering the Biological Weapons Convention, including through the dedicated Working Group on the strengthening of the Convention. During the fourth and fifth sessions of the Working Group in Geneva, States parties discussed ways to identify, examine and develop specific and effective measures, including possible legally binding measures, and to make recommendations to strengthen and institutionalize the Convention. In line with the Group’s mandate from the ninth Review Conference in 2022, its deliberations addressed the following: (a) international cooperation and assistance under article X; (b) scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention; (c) confidence- building and transparency; (d) compliance and verification; (e) national implementation of the Convention; (f) assistance, response and preparedness under article VII; and (g) organizational, institutional and financial arrangements.

Despite intensive negotiations before and during the Group’s fifth session in December, however, consensus eluded States parties on a recommendation for establishing two new mechanisms within the Convention’s framework, focused respectively on scientific and technological review and on facilitating international cooperation and assistance under article X. One State party objected to a proposal by the Chair to recommend that States parties convene a special conference specifically tasked with formally establishing the mechanisms.

From March to August, the Youth for Biosecurity Fellowship programme hosted its second cohort, comprising 20 young leaders in the biological sciences from 17 States in the global South. The participants took part in a series of tailored, expert-led online learning sessions and collaborative research that culminated in a 10-day study visit to Geneva to observe the fourth session of the Working Group. Building on the momentum of the first edition, the Fellowship received a significant increase in applications, with more than 2,400 applicants from over 100 countries — a rise of more than 200 per cent compared with the previous year.

Chemical weapons

In 2024, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) continued to deliver on its mandate and commitment to supporting the full and effective implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention).

During 2024, the OPCW continued to develop its activities aimed at preventing the re-emergence and proliferation of chemical weapons, following the end of the destruction of declared stockpiles in 2023. In parallel, the organization continued to respond to current and emerging challenges and threats. It met its mandated target of 200 industry inspections in 2024. It also marked the 500th industry inspection in China, the country with the largest chemical industry. The OPCW continued to use its new facility, the Centre for Chemistry and Technology (the ChemTech Centre), in supporting a variety of relevant activities, including enhancing the skills of inspectors and providing training and capacity-building activities for OPCW member States.

The ChemTech Centre also remained the hub for the OPCW’s network of designated laboratories. During 2024, four new laboratories were added to the network, in Algeria, Japan, Poland and Türkiye. At the end of 2024, there was at least one designated laboratory in every region, giving additional assurances of the independence of the OPCW Technical Secretariat’s work.

Keeping abreast of rapid scientific and technological advancements, particularly concerning emerging technologies like artificial intelligence (AI), remains a major priority for the organization. The Technical Secretariat organized or participated in several expert activities culminating in the Global Conference on the Role of Artificial Intelligence in Advancing the Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, co-hosted by the OPCW and Morocco in Rabat in October.

Responding to chemical weapons use and allegations of use remains a key priority. Throughout the year, the organization continued its work to address the Syrian chemical weapons dossier. The OPCW Declaration Assessment Team held three rounds of consultation with the Syrian authorities in 2024. At the end of the year, 19 issues remained unresolved, some of them of serious concern. The fact-finding mission continued its work and issued three further reports detailing its findings. Likewise, the Investigation and Identification Team continued its work, and the OPCW Technical Secretariat issued another report on the result of its investigation of the incident in Marea in September 2015, identifying Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh) as the perpetrator of the use of mustard gas.

Following the fall of the Assad regime in the Syrian Arab Republic on 8 December 2024, upon the request of the OPCW Director General and in consultation with the Chairperson of the Executive Council, the Executive Council of the OPCW held an extraordinary meeting on 12 December (EC-M-66) to discuss the ongoing developments in the country. Briefing the Council on ongoing efforts with respect to the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme, the Director General underlined the urgent need to identify, verify and secure any components of the programme still present in the country and to preserve records and other material related to the programme. He also stressed that all legal obligations binding upon the Syrian Arab Republic under the Chemical Weapons Convention, relevant decisions of the OPCW policymaking organs and Security Council resolutions remain valid, regardless of any change in government. The Director General emphasized that while the new situation in the Syrian Arab Republic presented a unique opportunity to bring the Syrian chemical weapons dossier to a close, achieving the ultimate goal of the complete elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme would require significant resources, effort and cooperation.

On 26 December, the Director General held telephone consultations with the new Syrian caretaker Minister of Foreign Affairs and reiterated Syrian obligations under the Convention irrespective of the change of government, as well as the Technical Secretariat’s readiness to support the country in meeting its obligations. He requested the Syrian caretaker Minister of Foreign Affairs to, among other things, ensure that Syrian caretaker authorities secure chemical weapons-related locations and materials therein. He also requested the caretaker Minister to appoint a team of experts to receive and engage with the Technical Secretariat’s experts. The caretaker Minister expressed the country’s full commitment to cooperating with the Technical Secretariat in dealing with any outstanding issues relating to the chemical weapons programme.

The work of the Technical Secretariat in the Syrian Arab Republic is ongoing with the Syrian transitional government.

In 2024, under subparagraph 38(e) of article VIII of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the OPCW deployed a technical assistance visit team to Ukraine. The team received samples and other evidence from Ukraine during the deployment and was able to verify that the chain of custody for the evidence had been maintained in line with international standards. Two OPCW-designated laboratories confirmed that the grenade and a soil sample contained 2-chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile (CS), a riot control agent. The use of riot control agents in warfare is prohibited under the Convention. The Technical Secretariat issued a report on these findings on 18 November (S/2338/2024).

The year also saw significant progress with respect to the verified destruction of old and abandoned chemical weapons. From 17 to 21 September, the OPCW Director General visited China with the Chairperson of the OPCW Executive Council and a delegation from the States parties for briefings on ongoing efforts on excavation, recovery and destruction of chemical weapons abandoned by Japan on the territory of China.

Additionally, the OPCW continued its work to achieve the universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention, urging the remaining States not parties to the Convention to join without delay or preconditions.

The twenty-ninth session of the Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention took place in The Hague, Kingdom of the Netherlands, from 25 to 29 November. Representatives of 152 States parties, one signatory State and one non-signatory State attended the Conference (C-29/5, paras. 1.2–1.4). Delegates from 118 civil society organizations registered to participate (C-29/DEC.4, annex), along with representatives from the chemical industry and scientific community (C-29/DEC.3, annex). The session was also attended by six international organizations, specialized agencies and other international bodies (C-29/DEC.2, annex).

The twenty-ninth session of the Conference considered questions, matters and issues within the scope of the Chemical Weapons Convention, including disarmament, the prevention of the re-emergence of chemical weapons, assistance and protection, international cooperation, and emerging technologies.

The Conference considered and approved the revised programme and budget of the OPCW for 2025 (C-29/DEC.11), providing the necessary resources for its operations. The Conference also considered and adopted a decision on the OPCW’s participation in the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund, scheduled for implementation beginning on 1 January 2025 (C-29/DEC.9).

Since the destruction of all categories of declared stockpiled chemical weapons was achieved in July 2023, the OPCW has increased its attention on the retention of knowledge in destruction technologies to maintain preparedness for the possible future accession of new States parties.

The year 2024 saw the continued destruction of non-stockpiled weapons. This included abandoned chemical weapons in Haerbaling, Harbin and Wuhan, in China, as well as the excavation of chemical weapons abandoned by Japan in several other locations in China. Furthermore, China, Japan and the Technical Secretariat held their thirty-ninth and fortieth trilateral meetings virtually, focusing on practical and technical aspects of the ongoing destruction projects.

The destruction of old chemical weapons continued in 2024. At the end of the year, 19 States parties had declared 157,747 old chemical weapons, and 122,423 had been verified as destroyed.

During 2024, the Technical Secretariat conducted a workshop on verification practices at chemical weapons production facilities and organized a session on new chemical weapon destruction technologies. It also undertook a field training exercise in relation to verification activities of technical assistance visits, initial visits at chemical weapons storage facilities, and final engineering review and systematic inspection at chemical weapon destruction facilities. These activities captured core knowledge related to methodologies, challenges and lessons learned during destruction and enhanced the Technical Secretariat’s knowledge management repository.

Regarding industry verification activities in 2024, the Technical Secretariat was able to carry out all 200 planned inspections pursuant to article VI of the Chemical Weapons Convention — 11 “Schedule 1” inspections, 42 “Schedule 2” inspections, 10 “Schedule 3” inspections, and 137 inspections of other chemical production facilities.

The OPCW ChemTech Centre, now fully operational, significantly bolsters the organization’s capability to fulfil the objectives of the Convention, enhancing its ability to respond to emerging threats such as chemical terrorism, to prevent the re-emergence of chemical weapons and to keep pace with developments in science and technology. The Centre also serves as a high-quality platform for research, analysis, training and various activities for international cooperation and assistance to strengthen the implementation of the Convention.

The OPCW — in addition to carrying out inspector training, laboratory exercises, proficiency testing and mission-preparedness activities at the ChemTech Centre’s Technology and Training Hub — used the Centre to convene many capacity-building events and topical meetings. Those events included an analytical chemistry course for women chemists, a training course on investigating incidents involving toxic industrial chemicals, a table-top exercise convened under the auspices of the OPCW Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism, and a meeting on the relevance of AI to the Chemical Weapons Convention. In addition, an inter-agency workshop on deployments was organized in cooperation with the Office of Counter-Terrorism, drawing participation from across the United Nations system and beyond.

The OPCW maintains a global network of designated laboratories that must meet its proficiency criteria and be capable of performing off-site analysis of samples collected by the OPCW inspectors. This network is the linchpin of the organization’s verification regime and its capacity to investigate allegations of the use of chemical weapons.

In 2024, 62 laboratories from 40 States parties participated in OPCW confidence-building exercises and proficiency tests for the analysis of chemicals related to the Convention. At the end of 2024, there were 33 designated laboratories from 25 States parties, including four new laboratories added to the network in 2024, in Algeria, Japan, Poland and Türkiye. The presence of at least one designated laboratory in every region gives additional assurances of the independence of the Technical Secretariat’s work (see below for a list of OPCW-designated laboratories).

1. National Institute of Criminalistics and Criminology of the National Gendarmerie (Algeria)
2. Defence Science and Technology Group (Australia)
3. Defensielaboratoria – Laboratoires de la Défense (Belgium)
4. Laboratório de Análises Químicas, Centro Tecnológico do Exército (Brazil)
5. Laboratory of Analytical Chemistry, Research Institute of Chemical Defence (China)
6. Laboratory of Toxicant Analysis, Academy of Military Medical Sciences (China)
7. Finnish Institute for Verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (Finland)
8. DGA Maîtrise NRBC, Département Analyse Chimique (France)
9. Bundeswehr Institute of Pharmacology and Toxicology (Germany)
10. Bundeswehr Research Institute for Protective Technologies and CBRN Protection (Germany)
11. Centre for Analysis of Chemical Toxins, Indian Institute of Chemical Technology (India)
12. VERTOX Laboratory, Defence Research and Development Establishment (India)
13. Defense Chemical Research Laboratory (Islamic Republic of Iran)
14. Chemical School, Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (Japan)
15. TNO Defence, Safety and Security (Kingdom of the Netherlands)
16. Laboratory for Analysis of Chemical Threat Agents, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (Norway)
17. Analytical Laboratory, Defense Science and Technology Organization (Pakistan)
18. Chemical Laboratory of CBRN Area Control Centre (Poland)
19. CBRN Defense Research Institute, Republic of Korea Defense Command (Republic of Korea)

20. Chemical Analysis Laboratory, CBR Directorate, Agency for Defense Development (Republic of Korea)

21. Research and Innovation Center for CBRN Defense and Ecology, Chemical Analysis Laboratory (Romania)

22. Central Chemical Weapons Destruction Analytical Laboratory of the Federal State Unitary Enterprise, “State Scientific Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology” (Russian Federation)

23. Laboratory for the Chemical and Analytical Control of the Military Research Centre (Russian Federation)

24. Laboratory of Chemical Analytical Control and Biotesting, Research Institute of Hygiene, Occupational Pathology and Human Ecology (Russian Federation)

25. Verification Laboratory, Defence Medical and Environmental Research Institute, DSO National Laboratories (Singapore)

26. Laboratorio de Verificación de Armas Químicas, INTA Campus La Marañosa (Spain)

27. Swedish Defence Research Agency, FOI (Sweden)

28. Spiez Laboratory, Swiss NBC Defence Establishment (Switzerland)

29. Chemical Warfare Agents Identification and Verification Laboratory (Türkiye)

30. Defence Science and Technology Laboratory, Porton Down (United Kingdom)

31. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (United States)

32. DEVCOM Chemical Biological Center, Forensic Analytical Laboratory (United States)

33. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (United States)

The OPCW continued to assist States parties in achieving the full and effective implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The Technical Secretariat provided support in the areas of national implementation and assistance and protection against chemical weapons, as well as international cooperation in promoting peaceful uses of chemistry. It conducted 97 online and in-person capacity-building and knowledge-sharing activities, benefiting 2,765 participants. In-person activities were conducted in 41 States parties around the world.

The ChemTech Centre completed its first full year of activities in 2024, following its inauguration in May 2023. During 2024, the Technical Secretariat conducted 24 capacity-building activities at the Centre, with multiple units and branches providing support, benefiting 559 participants from all regions. The Technical Secretariat planned to continue developing and expanding activities at the Centre, including with respect to international cooperation and assistance. The Centre was also positioned to maintain its role as a hub for creating efficiency gains and synergies across the Technical Secretariat, in support of States parties’ capacities and the implementation of the Convention.

Concerning national implementation, the Technical Secretariat continued to assist States parties, conducting 22 events that benefited 846 participants. It trained national authorities and other stakeholders, in particular chemical industry staff, as well as customs officers, on measures to meet the Convention’s national obligations related to declarations and inspections. For instance, two separate events focused on identifying best practices for resolving discrepancies between import and export data for scheduled chemicals: one for East Asian countries and States parties from the Western European and Others Group, and another for Eastern Europe. In addition, customs authorities from Pacific States parties benefited from a subregional conference addressing ways to establish effective customs control over the trade in toxic chemicals. Furthermore, the Technical Secretariat continued to provide targeted legislative support to States parties without comprehensive legislation for implementing the Convention. That assistance included a dedicated workshop for Portuguese-speaking States parties, as well as a subregional forum for Pacific States parties. In 2024, three States parties that had not previously reported any national implementation measures reported adopting Convention-relevant legislative instruments.

Regarding assistance and protection against chemical weapons under article X of the Convention, the Technical Secretariat supported States parties in enhancing their capacity to respond to chemical incidents. It organized a total of 42 capacity-building activities with 1,006 participants across all events. Participants benefited from a broad range of training opportunities aimed at supporting implementation under article X of the Convention. In addition to conducting assistance and protection training cycles and various specialized courses, including under the medical action plan, a revised training cycle — Integrated Advanced Course and Exercise — was launched and piloted in Ecuador. It aimed to reduce duplication in the training cycle and optimize resources, enabling more events to benefit States parties.

Notably, the Technical Secretariat delivered support to Ukraine upon the State party’s request under article X of the Convention. In particular, the Technical Secretariat provided Ukrainian first responders with specialized training on assistance and protection at the ChemTech Centre, as well as online courses on emergency measures for incidents involving toxic chemicals. In addition, it acquired protective, detection and identification equipment for Ukraine and conducted technical assistance visits to deliver the equipment and provide training on their use, as well as technical advice. The delivered equipment consisted of 70 LCD 3.3 and 13 FirstDefender RM Raman spectrometers — detectors funded by contributions from States parties to the Trust Fund for the Implementation of article X.

To support international cooperation in promoting the peaceful uses of chemistry under article XI of the Convention, the OPCW focused on strengthening its existing programmes and activities as it continued to deliver them. It also undertook new initiatives in areas such as promoting integrated chemicals management, enhancing laboratory capabilities and facilitating the promotion and exchange of chemical knowledge. In total, the Technical Secretariat organized 33 capacity-building events in 2024, benefiting 913 experts.

To enhance understanding of the impact of AI technology on the implementation of the Convention and the work of the OPCW, the Technical Secretariat partnered with Morocco to organize the Global Conference on the Role of Artificial Intelligence in Advancing the Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The conference brought together 88 leading experts representing 47 States parties from all regions to discuss both opportunities and risks that such novel technology may pose in the field of chemistry, chemical security and chemical disarmament, as well as its impact on the implementation of the Convention and its verification regime.

The Secretariat also hosted its annual Symposium on Women in Chemistry, under the theme “Empowering women to advance peaceful uses of chemistry”. The twenty-fifth iteration of the Associate Programme — the OPCW’s flagship capacity-building activity — took place in three parts: a training segment in the Kingdom of the Netherlands; a university segment in the United Kingdom; and an industry segment in 15 facilities located in 11 countries across Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean. The programme benefited 29 professionals from 29 States parties.

The OPCW continued to address the specific needs of African member States through the sixth phase of the Programme to Strengthen Cooperation with Africa on the Chemical Weapons Convention (the Africa Programme). In this phase, the Technical Secretariat focused on enhancing the Convention’s national implementation, improving cross-border transfer controls on scheduled chemicals, developing capabilities for assistance and protection related to chemical emergencies, advancing management of chemical safety and security, and upgrading laboratory competencies across the continent. In 2024, the Technical Secretariat organized 67 capacity-building initiatives, including 37 intended specifically for Africa, reaching some 750 participants from 44 African States parties. In two new capacity-building initiatives launched in 2024 specifically for African member States, participants focused on the investigation of chemical emergencies and the maintenance of laboratory equipment.

In a key highlight of the year, in April, a laboratory in Africa obtained OPCW designation status for analysis of authentic environmental samples. This landmark achievement, by the National Institute of Criminalistics and Criminology of the National Gendarmerie, in Algeria, benefited from crucial capacity-building support through established OPCW programmes from two key partners: the Bundeswehr Research Institute for Protective Technologies and CBRN Protection (WIS), in Germany, and the Finnish Institute for Verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (VERIFIN). Following the designation, Africa, for the first time since 2006, has an OPCW-designated laboratory. There are now OPCW-designated laboratories in all regions.

In addition to the Algerian laboratory’s successful designation with support from VERIFIN and WIS, the Technical Secretariat continued facilitating other twinning and assistance projects, including (a) ongoing collaboration between Protechnik Laboratories in South Africa (as the assisted laboratory) and the Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research (as the assisting laboratory); and (b) a new effort launched between the National Laboratory of Scientific and Technical Police of Morocco (assisted laboratory) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in the United States (assisting laboratory).

Additionally, Kenya’s Government Chemist Department and Nigeria’s National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control received further capacity-building support in the framework of a multi-year project funded by the United Kingdom. Its aim was to help laboratories in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean to acquire capacities necessary to pass the proficiency tests needed to gain OPCW designation.

The Technical Secretariat continued to update the African Union Commission on key developments in the Africa Programme and maintained contacts with its Political Affairs, Peace and Security Department to revitalize OPCW-African Union cooperation based on concrete proposals for enhanced collaboration. The Africa Programme Steering Committee, including African member States and regular donors, continued to monitor and support the programme’s implementation in 2024.

In 2024, the OPCW Technical Secretariat continued its mission to verify the elimination of the Syrian Arab Republic’s declared chemical weapons. The OPCW Declaration Assessment Team continued its efforts to clarify all outstanding issues regarding the initial and subsequent declarations submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention, as well as with relevant OPCW decisions and Security Council resolutions.

As previously reported, from 2014 to 2024, the Declaration Assessment Team conducted 28 rounds of consultations with the Syrian National Authority and two limited in-country activities, with a reduced team.

In 2024, the Declaration Assessment Team conducted three rounds of consultations with the Syrian National Authority, in January, May and September, in Damascus.

During the twenty-sixth round of consultations, in January 2024, the Declaration Assessment Team and experts from the Syrian National Authority discussed the results of the analysis of samples collected by the Team between 2019 and 2023 with the focus on unexpected presence of indicators of potentially undeclared activities involving research and development, production, storage, and/or weaponization of unknown quantities of chemical weapons.

The twenty-seventh round of consultations between the Declaration Assessment Team and the Syrian National Authority took place in Damascus in May 2024. Following this round of consultations, and despite additional information provided by the Syrian National Authority upon the Technical Secretariat’s request regarding the results of analysis of the samples collected by the Team between September 2020 and April 2023 at two declared sites, the Team analysed this information and assessed it as insufficient to explain the samples analysis results. Consequently, in July 2024, the Technical Secretariat informed the Syrian Arab Republic that three new outstanding issues were opened with regard to the unexplained results of the analysis of the April 2023 samples. With the newly opened issues, the total number of outstanding issues became 26 (7 of them resolved and 19 unresolved).

The twenty-eighth round of consultations between the Declaration Assessment Team and the Syrian National Authority took place in September 2024 in Damascus. The substance of the 19 outstanding issues reported by the Team remains a serious concern to the Technical Secretariat as it involves large quantities of chemical agents and munitions reportedly destroyed or otherwise consumed before the Syrian Arab Republic acceded to the Convention, the fate of which cannot be fully verified by the Technical Secretariat. It also involves potentially large quantities of chemical warfare agents, the production of which has not been declared to the Technical Secretariat.

Additionally, pursuant to the OPCW Executive Council decision adopted in November 2016 (EC-83/DEC.5), the Technical Secretariat conducted the eleventh round of inspections in November 2024 at the Barzah and Jamrayah facilities of the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre.

Meanwhile, the OPCW fact-finding mission in the Syrian Arab Republic continued its work on allegations assessed as credible and analysis of information collected from its team’s deployments.

In February 2024, the Technical Secretariat issued a report by the fact-finding mission on the alleged use of toxic chemicals as a weapon in Al-Yarmouk, Syrian Arab Republic, on 22 October 2017 (S/2254/2024). Then, in June 2024, the Technical Secretariat issued a second report on the alleged use of toxic chemicals as a weapon in Hama Governorate, Syrian Arab Republic — in Qalib al-Thawr, al-Salamiyah, on 9 August 2017; and in al-Balil, Souran, on 8 November 2017 (S/2295/2024).

In the first report (S/2254/2024, dated 22 February 2024), the fact-finding mission concluded that the information obtained and analysed as a whole, in accordance with its mandate to gather facts regarding incidents of the alleged use of toxic chemicals as a weapon in the Syrian Arab Republic, was not sufficient to provide reasonable grounds for the fact-finding mission to determine that toxic chemicals were used as a weapon in the reported incident that occurred in Al-Yarmouk on 22 October 2017.

In the second report (S/2295/2024, dated 11 June 2024), the fact-finding mission concluded that the information obtained and analysed as a whole, in accordance with its mandate to gather facts relevant to the alleged use of toxic chemicals as a weapon in the Syrian Arab Republic, was not sufficient to provide reasonable grounds for the fact-finding mission to determine that toxic chemicals were used as a weapon in the reported incidents that occurred on 9 August 2017 in Qalib al-Thawr and on 8 November 2017 in al-Balil, Souran.

In 2024, the fact-finding mission carried out seven deployments to collect further information regarding allegations under review, on which States parties were briefed on 29 February, 2 July and 1 October.

In 2024, the Investigation and Identification Team continued its investigations into several incidents where the fact-finding mission had found that chemicals had been used as weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. On 22 February, the fourth report (S/2255/2024) of the Investigation and Identification Team was released, focusing on the use of sulfur mustard in the town of Marea on 1 September 2015. Based on all of the information it had obtained and analysed, the Investigation and Identification Team concluded in the report that there were reasonable grounds to believe that on 1 September 2015, during sustained attacks aimed at capturing the town of Marea in the Syrian Arab Republic, units of Da’esh used sulfur mustard, delivered using one or more artillery guns. Fifty-five casualties were treated by a field hospital in the aftermath of the incident, of which at least 11 individuals who came into contact with the delivered chemical substance experienced symptoms consistent with exposure to sulfur mustard. The Director General briefed OPCW member States on the report on 5 March 2024.

Throughout 2024, the Investigation and Identification Team continued to be denied access to (and direct engagement with) representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic, as well as to relevant locations.

The Investigation and Identification Team also continued to preserve and share information with the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011 (established in 2016 through General Assembly resolution 71/248), in line with paragraph 12 of the Decision by the OPCW Conference of the States Parties dated 27 June 2018 (C-SS-4/DEC.3).

On 12 December 2024, upon request of the OPCW Director General and in consultation with the Chairperson of the Executive Council, the Executive Council of the OPCW held an extraordinary meeting (EC-M-66) to discuss the ongoing developments in the Syrian Arab Republic. The Director General briefed the Executive Council members on developments following the overthrow of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic on 8 December and the next steps with regard to the continued elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme.

In his briefing to the Executive Council, the Director General underlined the urgent need to identify, verify and secure any components of the Syrian chemical weapons programme still present in the country and to preserve records and other material related to the programme. The Director General also stressed that all legal obligations binding upon the Syrian Arab Republic under the Convention, relevant decisions of the OPCW policymaking organs and Security Council resolutions remain valid, regardless of any change in government. He emphasized that while the new situation in the country presented a unique opportunity to bring the Syrian chemical weapons dossier to a close, achieving the ultimate goal of the complete elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme would require significant resources, effort and cooperation.

On 26 December, the Director General held telephone consultations with the new Syrian caretaker Minister of Foreign Affairs, and reiterated Syrian obligations under the Convention irrespective of the change of government, as well as the Technical Secretariat’s readiness to support the Syrian Arab Republic in meeting its obligations. He requested the Syrian caretaker Minister of Foreign Affairs to, among other things, ensure that Syrian caretaker authorities secure chemical weapons-related locations and materials therein. He also requested the caretaker Minister to appoint a team of experts to receive and engage with the Technical Secretariat’s experts. The caretaker Minister expressed the country’s full commitment to cooperating with the Secretariat in dealing with any outstanding issues relating to the chemical weapons programme.

The work of the Technical Secretariat in the Syrian Arab Republic is ongoing with the Syrian transitional government.

The OPCW Technical Secretariat maintained broad engagement with the global scientific community throughout 2024, fostering strong ties with scientists and scientific societies, as well as staying informed of developments in science and technology relevant to the Convention’s implementation.

As part of these efforts, the Scientific Advisory Board convened once in 2024 for its thirty-eighth session, in May. The Scientific Advisory Board also continued the activities of the Temporary Working Group on Chemical Forensics, whose objective is to review the science and technology relevant to chemical forensics and identify remaining gaps and challenges such that the OPCW can make best use of the information chemical forensics can yield. The Working Group met three times during the year: in January, June and September. Following a recommendation by the Scientific Advisory Board at its thirty-eighth session, the Director General established a new temporary working group focused on AI, scheduled to begin work in 2025.

In addition, the OPCW conducted several AI-related initiatives in 2024. In April, the Director General hosted a meeting with scientific experts at the OPCW ChemTech Centre and the OPCW Main Building, in The Hague, Kingdom of the Netherlands, to discuss specific aspects of interest to the organization related to AI. In July, the OPCW launched the AI Research Challenge, a competition funded by the European Union and the United Kingdom that sought proposals for tangible approaches to use AI to enhance the organization’s effectiveness, efficiency and preparedness. In October, Morocco and the OPCW co-hosted the first Global Conference on the Role of Artificial Intelligence in Advancing the Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, in Rabat. Gathering 88 leading experts from 47 States parties across all regions, the Conference facilitated, among other things, a better understanding of AI’s role in the implementation of the Convention and informed policy discussions on AI-related risks in chemical security and disarmament.

The OPCW Technical Secretariat and the chemical industry continued efforts to strengthen their cooperation, in accordance with the relevant recommendations of the third Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention. In 2024, the Chemical Industry Coordination Group held one hybrid meeting on 21 March, at which participants discussed current trends and challenges in the global chemical industry and exchanged information on capacity development activities, focusing on cybersecurity and the promotion of best practices in chemical safety and security.

In 2024, the OPCW Advisory Board on Education and Outreach met for its sixteenth session from 16 to 18 April. The sixteenth session focused on various topics, such as the importance of developing a network with academic institutions worldwide, the need to tap into synergies with international organizations in areas related to education and outreach, and the enhancement of OPCW e-learning offerings. At its seventeenth session, from 11 to 13 June, the Advisory Board emphasized the ChemTech Centre’s role in preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons through contributions to the research, analytical and capacity-building capabilities of the organization. The session also included a visit to the ChemTech Centre, where members of the Advisory Board received updates on related activities, resources and plans. In addition, the Chairperson of the Advisory Board participated on its behalf in a joint side event with the Director of the Biological Security Research Centre (London Metropolitan University), Lijun Shang, on the margins of the twenty-ninth session of the Conference of the States Parties. The joint side event focused on progress in chemical and biological security education.

Biological weapons

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (Biological Weapons Convention) was opened for signature on 10 April 1972 and entered into force on 26 March 1975, becoming the first multilateral treaty banning an entire category of weapons. As at 31 December 2024, the Convention had 187 States parties. Four signatory States had yet to ratify the Convention,^[1] and six States had neither signed nor acceded to it.^[2]

States parties established the Working Group on the Strengthening of the Biological Weapons Convention at the ninth Review Conference in 2022, tasking it with identifying, examining and developing specific and effective measures — including possible legally binding measures — and to make recommendations to strengthen and institutionalize the Convention in all its aspects (BWC/CONF.IX/9, sect. II, paras. 8–16). The Working Group was mandated to address measures on the following: (a) international cooperation and assistance under article X; (b) scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention; (c) confidence-building and transparency; (d) compliance and verification; (e) national implementation of the Convention; (f) assistance, response and preparedness under article VII; and (g) organizational, institutional and financial arrangements.

As agreed by the 2023 Meeting of States Parties, the Working Group convened its fourth session in Geneva from 19 to 23 August. In accordance with the indicative schedule of activities adopted at its first session (BWC/WG/1/2, annex II), the Working Group devoted the fourth session to consideration of three topics: assistance, response and preparedness (three days); scientific and technological developments (one day); and international cooperation and assistance (one day).

The session began with a change in leadership, as the previous Chair, Flávio Soares Damico (Brazil), had resigned following his posting outside of Geneva. Therefore, the Chief of Service for the Geneva branch of the Office for Disarmament Affairs opened the session and presided over the election by acclamation of Frederico S. Duque Estrada Meyer (Brazil) as the new Chair, with Camille Petit (France) and Irakli Jgenti (Georgia) continuing as Vice-Chairs.

A total of 112 States took part in the fourth session, including 111 States parties and one observer State neither a party nor a signatory to the Convention. Eight observer agencies attended the session,^[3] along with three United Nations bodies and 16 non-governmental organizations and research institutes (BWC/WG/4/INF.1).

Following the practice of earlier sessions, the Working Group stimulated its deliberations on assistance, response and preparedness through expert panel sessions featuring representatives of various international organizations. The Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit prepared a background information document on the topic of assistance, response and preparedness (BWC/WG/4/1). In the ensuing interactive discussions, States parties introduced seven working papers (BWC/WG/4/WP.1–7). In preparation for the discussions on assistance, response and preparedness, the Friends of the Chair circulated a non-paper as an aide-memoire to help to inform the deliberations.

Several designated delegates assisted the Chair in his consultations and negotiations related to each of the session’s three topics. These Friends of the Chair were Angel Dalmazzo (Argentina) and Andreas Fink-Jensen (Denmark), who addressed assistance, response and preparedness; Vincent Bodson (Belgium), Ljupčo Gjorgjinski (North Macedonia), Grisselle Rodríguez (Panama), and Peter Ahabwe and Musa Kwehangana (Uganda), who worked on scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention; and Thomas Fetz and Trevor Smith (Canada) and Christian Hope Reyes (Philippines), who focused on international cooperation and assistance under article X.

During the session, those addressing the latter two topics continued to draft recommendations on establishing mechanisms, one on scientific and technological review, the other on facilitating international cooperation and assistance under article X. Having achieved progress during the week, the delegates announced their intention to continue discussions during the intersessional period.

At the end of the fourth session, States parties adopted a procedural report by consensus (BWC/WG/4/2).

The Working Group convened its fifth session in Geneva from 2 to 13 December, as agreed by the 2023 Meeting of States Parties. Despite intensive negotiations on an ambitious proposal by the Chair to accelerate progress towards establishing the new mechanisms for scientific and technological review and for international cooperation and assistance, the Working Group could not reach consensus on a report for the session after one State party objected to convening a special conference before the Group completed all of its mandated work.

A total of 122 States took part in the fifth session, including 119 States parties, two signatory States and one observer State neither a party nor a signatory to the Convention. Six observer agencies and three United Nations bodies attended, along with 34 non-governmental organizations and research institutes (BWC/WG/5/INF.1).

The Chair announced his proposal to accelerate the Working Group’s discussions during an informal retreat that preceded the fifth session, organized by France, Switzerland and the United Kingdom in support of the Chair’s work. At the retreat in Montreux, Switzerland, the Chair proposed that the upcoming session should focus on negotiating draft recommendations to establish the two mechanisms, which would be submitted to a special conference to be convened in 2025. Once established, and for a provisional period until the tenth Review Conference in 2027, both mechanisms would focus on supporting the Working Group’s deliberations on compliance and verification. In his remarks at the retreat, the Chair said, “The time to act is now. Procrastination is the ally of stagnation. The [Biological Weapons Convention] is at a crossroads. It can either solidify its role as the cornerstone of international biosecurity or risk being overshadowed by more agile actors”.

In accordance with the indicative schedule of activities adopted at its first session (BWC/WG/1/2, annex II), the Working Group was due to consider six topics at its fifth session: assistance, response and preparedness (one day); confidence-building and transparency (one day); compliance and verification (three days); organizational, institutional and financial arrangements (one day); international cooperation and assistance mechanism (one day); and science and technology review mechanism (one day). On the last two days of the meeting, the Working Group was also scheduled to give overall consideration to all seven topics under its mandate, as well as the two mechanisms. States parties introduced 21 working papers during the session (BWC/WG/5/WP.1–21).

Beyond the topics listed above, the fifth session devoted significant time to considering the proposal that the Chair had announced at the retreat. A revised draft (BWC/WG/5/CRP.1), which became the subject of intensive negotiations following its introduction on 8 December, called for the Working Group to recommend establishing the two mechanisms on a provisional basis, with their terms of reference and regulations subject to review and potential adjustment at the tenth Review Conference in 2027. During the provisional application period, the Science and Technology Advisory Mechanism would focus exclusively on providing scientific and technological advice to the Working Group on possible compliance and verification measures. For the two mechanisms to be formally established, the Working Group would recommend that States parties request the convening of a special conference.

Despite the intensive negotiations on the Chair’s proposal, consensus could not be reached as, on the penultimate evening of the session, one State party objected to the convening of a special conference before the Working Group had completed all of its work. In his closing remarks on the final day, the Chair said, “This delay is not harmless. It comes at a cost, a huge cost. The biosecurity landscape is evolving rapidly. The [Biological Weapons Convention] risks failing even further behind. A single lapse in vigilance could spark consequences that reverberate across continents and generations. Developing countries, in particular, will bear the brunt of this inertia. And I repeat, developing countries in particular will bear the brunt of this inertia”. Following almost 40 statements in support of the Chair’s proposal, he closed the fifth session on 13 December.

The 2024 Meeting of States Parties took place in Geneva from 16 to 18 December, in accordance with the decision of the ninth Review Conference to hold a three-day Meeting each year, from 2023 to 2026. The Meeting was attended by 126 States parties, one signatory State, three United Nations bodies and 28 non-governmental organizations and research institutes. Furthermore, one State neither a party nor a signatory to the Convention and five specialized agencies and regional intergovernmental organizations applied for observer status in accordance with the rules of procedure (BWC/MSP/2024/INF.1).

The 2024 Meeting of States Parties could not function normally because no regional group was able to nominate a Chair.^[4] Upon convening on 16 December, the Meeting appointed Yuri Sterk (Bulgaria) as its Chair only to facilitate the preparation and adoption of the Meeting’s report, also agreeing that this would not set a precedent for the future. Therefore, the Meeting was not able to adopt its agenda (BWC/MSP/2024/1), its programme of work (BWC/MSP/2024/2) or its rules of procedure (BWC/CONF.IX/2). In addition, several agenda items were not considered, including the general debate, the management of the intersessional programme, budgetary and financial matters, progress with universalization of the Convention, and the annual report of the Implementation Support Unit.

States parties nonetheless agreed that, in 2025, the Working Group on the Strengthening of the Biological Weapons Convention would hold its sixth session from 11 to 22 August and its seventh session from 8 to 12 December. Additionally, they agreed that the 2025 Meeting of States Parties would take place from 15 to 17 December. At the end of the Meeting, States parties adopted a brief report by consensus (BWC/MSP/2024/6).

As part of its mandated activities in 2024, the Implementation Support Unit provided administrative and procedural support for the Meeting of States Parties and the two sessions of the Working Group on the Strengthening of the Biological Weapons Convention, while also assisting in the Convention’s comprehensive implementation (BWC/MSP/2024/4). Voluntary contributions from States parties enabled the Unit to enhance its ability to carry out its mandated tasks, including by employing 10 additional fixed-term staff members and providing further assistance to developing States parties upon their request.^[5]

The assistance provided by the Office for Disarmament Affairs to national contact points for the Convention included organizing three regional training courses: the first in Doha for States from the Middle East and North Africa (16–17 January); the second in Almaty, Kazakhstan, for States from Central Asia and the Caucasus region (12–13 March); and the third in Geneva for European and other States (23–24 April). The Office also hosted national contact points from over 90 States parties for a two-day workshop in Geneva on lessons learned and best practices for national implementation (28–29 November). During the event, it launched a self-paced e-learning course for national contact points and other relevant stakeholders on the contact points’ role and responsibilities, an overview of national implementation measures, and steps to prepare and submit reports on confidence-building measures under the Convention.^[6] Furthermore, a new, dedicated website for national contact points was under development in 2024 and projected to launch in 2025.

Throughout 2024, Mongolia continued a project in cooperation with the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Office for Disarmament Affairs on establishing a national inventory of dangerous pathogens.^[7] In addition, the Office convened the first national awareness-raising events on the Convention for the Plurinational State of Bolivia and El Salvador, held on 28 and 29 May and on 24 and 25 July.^[8]

In 2024, the Implementation Support Unit collected and updated further details on national contact points for the Convention, making them available to all States parties via a restricted section of the Convention’s website. By the end of the year, a total of 156 States parties had nominated a national contact point, as requested by previous Review Conferences, an increase of nine States parties since 2023. Furthermore, the Guide to Implementing the Biological Weapons Convention — launched during the ninth Review Conference in 2022 and subsequently translated into all official United Nations languages — was also translated into Portuguese for Lusophone countries.

The Office for Disarmament Affairs also organized national assistance activities for the Biological Weapons Convention at the request of African States parties. In 2024, the Office supported States in four key areas: (a) general awareness-raising and sensitization; (b) legislative assistance; (c) preparation and submission of reports on confidence-building measures; and (d) general training of stakeholders and national contact points. It facilitated 14 workshops that alternately focused on sensitizing key stakeholders and on preparing and submitting confidence-building measures, respectively held in national capitals of the following States: Zambia (29–30 January); Burundi (20–21 February); Sao Tome and Principe (4–6 March); Guinea (14–15 May); Ghana (29–30 May); Rwanda (18–19 June); Nigeria (19–20 June); Lesotho (10–11 July); Cabo Verde (17–18 September); Côte d’Ivoire (1–2 October); Zimbabwe (2–3 October); Angola (15–17 October); Eswatini (13–14 November); and Morocco (20–21 November), with the final workshop in the series addressing Burkina Faso and Mali, as well as Morocco.^[9]

The workshops aimed to familiarize participants with the Convention and the resulting obligations of States parties, while also focusing on the importance and benefits of comprehensive national implementation. By bringing together a diverse range of national actors, the gatherings represented important first steps towards promoting and strengthening domestic inter-agency and stakeholder coordination. These workshops also included table-top exercises for preparing and submitting reports on confidence-building measures, helping participants to collaboratively strengthen national submission processes. As a result, Angola, Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe submitted their first reports on confidence-building measures in 2024.

After organizing subregional events for stakeholders in Eastern Africa (2022) and Central Africa, Northern Africa and Western Africa (2023), the Office convened a subregional workshop for Southern Africa from 12 to 14 March 2024 in Gaborone. In addressing national implementation needs, priorities and challenges, these workshops laid a foundation for fruitful and collaborative working relationships moving forward.

The Office for Disarmament Affairs also supported two national workshops on legislative implementation. From 16 to 17 July, Morocco hosted a workshop in Rabat to raise awareness among national representatives from Libya about the importance of comprehensive national implementing legislation. From 12 to 14 September, the Office partnered with the European Union Partner-to-Partner Export Control Programme to organize a national legal drafting workshop in Antananarivo. The event brought together national stakeholders to provide tailored assistance in reviewing the initial draft of Madagascar’s national implementing law.

The Implementation Support Unit assisted States parties throughout the year in exchanging reports on national confidence-building measures. It maintained capabilities for electronic reporting, compiled and distributed submissions, provided routine assistance and substantive advice, and followed up with States parties on their submissions. As part of those efforts, the Unit introduced a new electronic reporting platform to ensure continued compliance with United Nations information and communications technology standards.

Development of the new platform offered an opportunity to enhance the application’s design, user-friendliness and functionality, while introducing state-of-the-art security features. The enhanced system enables simplified electronic submission of reports in all six official United Nations languages and provides enhanced search functionality for confidence-building measures and detailed statistics. The platform serves as the repository for all reports submitted since 1987, with some records made publicly accessible and others available only to States parties. The Unit unveiled the new platform’s features at a webinar on 6 May and introduced various capacity-building improvements following its launch.

In 2024, 113 States parties submitted annual reports on confidence-building measures covering relevant activities in 2023 — the most ever submitted in a calendar year, reflecting a participation rate of 60 per cent. In its annual report (BWC/MSP/2024/4), the Implementation Support Unit listed the States parties that had submitted reports on confidence-building measures in 2024 covering the 2023 calendar year (annex III).

Meanwhile, voluntary contributions supported the Implementation Support Unit in providing several States parties, at their request, with assistance related to confidence-building measures. Upon request, the Unit conducted in-person or online training courses for States parties in Africa, Central and Southeast Asia, and Latin America, providing assistance and guidance on preparing and submitting their annual reports.

The Implementation Support Unit continued to maintain the database for assistance requests and offers under article X of the Convention. As at 31 December, the database contained 28 offers of assistance from 12 States parties and one group of States parties and 71 requests for assistance from 30 States parties.

From 4 to 8 March, the Unit co-organized a training course on virus detection and biosecurity in the framework of article X of the Convention, with the International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology, the InterAcademy Partnership and the World Academy of Sciences, in Trieste, Italy. Fourteen technical experts (seven men and seven women) from 14 developing States parties participated in the course, which consisted of both lectures and hands-on practical exercises in the Centre’s laboratories.

A second iteration of the Youth for Biosecurity Fellowship programme took place from March to August, engaging 20 young biosecurity leaders from the global South on global biosecurity issues. The fellows from 17 States parties participated in online learning sessions with leading experts, a collaborative research project and a 10-day immersive study trip to Geneva during the fourth session of the Working Group on the Strengthening of the Biological Weapons Convention, in August. Building on the momentum of the first edition, the programme enjoyed a significant rise in applicants, with more than 2,400 applications submitted from over 100 countries — a threefold increase over the previous year.

The Unit also administered the Convention’s sponsorship programme, designed to support and increase the participation of developing States parties in the meetings of the intersessional programme. In 2024, five States parties (Canada, France, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea and the United Kingdom) and the European Union contributed to the Convention’s sponsorship programme. In addition, the United States supported the programme through bilateral arrangements. Thanks to voluntary contributions to the programme, over 60 national experts from almost as many developing States parties could attend the Working Group’s fourth and fifth sessions and the 2024 Meeting of States Parties.

The Unit also promoted the universalization of the Biological Weapons Convention through its support to States parties, which included coordinating activities by national authorities and informing them of progress on accessions or ratifications. The Unit also informed and advised several signatories and non-States parties about the Convention (see BWC/MSP/2024/3). Meanwhile, the Office for Disarmament Affairs continued to promote the Convention’s universalization through coordinated outreach to the States not yet parties.

From 23 to 25 January, a regional workshop on universalizing the Convention in the Pacific took place in Brisbane, Australia.^[10] The workshop resulted in Tuvalu acceding to the Convention on 28 June and the Federated States of Micronesia acceding on 12 July. On 6 and 7 February, a second universalization event took place in Chad. During the event, representatives from the Office for Disarmament Affairs met with senior decision makers to raise awareness of the Convention, including its importance in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture and its contribution to development.^[11]

Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons

When Member States report the alleged use of chemical or biological weapons to the Secretary-General, he has a mandate to carry out investigations. To fulfil that mandate, the United Nations relies on countries to nominate technical experts to deploy to the field on short notice and expert consultants to provide advice, as well as analytical laboratories to support such investigations. The Office for Disarmament Affairs, as custodian of the Mechanism, maintains a roster of those nominations and organizes a range of in-person and virtual activities.

In 2024, the Office for Disarmament Affairs expanded its in-person training of experts on the Mechanism’s roster, including through two new courses on investigative interview skills and on decontamination skills.

Basic training courses took place in Johannesburg (15–26 July) and Berlin (4–15 November). The course in Johannesburg, organized in cooperation with the National Institute for Communicable Diseases (a division of the National Health Laboratory Service of South Africa), was the third of its kind and trained 17 experts from 15 countries. The course in Berlin, held in partnership with Germany’s Robert Koch Institute, trained 16 experts from 15 countries. Both courses followed the Mechanism’s standard curriculum, covering its background and mandate, as well as key aspects of investigations such as safety and security, sampling, decontamination, planning and report writing. Each course concluded with a short field exercise.

A skill training course on investigative interview skills, held in Geneva from 5 to 9 February in collaboration with the Institute for International Criminal Investigations and the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre, brought together 16 experts from 15 countries for instruction on the theory and practice of investigative interviews, including role-play exercises.

A training course on decontamination skills took place in Lisbon from 21 to 24 May in collaboration with the Portuguese Army’s Military Laboratory Unit for Biological and Chemical Defense (UMLDBQ). Nineteen experts from 15 countries, representing all United Nations regional groups, received training on biological and chemical decontamination principles, decontamination of personnel as distinct from decontamination of samples and equipment, decontamination set-up and waste management, and the integration of decontamination into mission planning.

In a training course on biological crime scene management, held in Brindisi, Italy, from 26 to 30 August, 21 experts from 17 countries learned about personal protective equipment, accessing contaminated scenes, conducting initial scene assessments, strategies for briefing and sampling, and evidence packaging procedures. The programme was made possible through a partnership with the Bioterrorism Prevention Unit of the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) and the National Microbiology Laboratory of the Public Health Agency of Canada.

A training course on sampling and transporting toxic and infectious substances took place in Berlin from 17 to 20 September in cooperation with the Robert Koch Institute and the National Microbiology Laboratory of Canada. Fourteen experts from 12 countries received training on International Air Transport Association (IATA) regulations for shipping toxic and infectious substances, followed by instruction on biological sampling tools and techniques.

The Office for Disarmament Affairs also organized two iterations of the Safe and Secure Approaches in Field Environments training course, in cooperation with the Department of Safety and Security. The first course (5–11 May) trained 14 experts from 13 countries, and the second course (10–16 November) trained 20 experts from 16 countries. Participants received an overview of the United Nations Security Management System and guidance on working in field environments, including medical aspects such as individual first aid and managing injuries in the field.

The Office for Disarmament Affairs continued to organize various additional in-person workshops and virtual activities in support of the Mechanism.

From 19 to 21 March, a workshop on predeployment orientation for potential missions under the Mechanism took place at United Nations Headquarters. The event brought together a select group of qualified experts and expert consultants on the Mechanism’s roster, members of the United Nations Internal Task Force for the Mechanism, and external specialists with extensive field investigation experience. A set of recommendations for preparing experts ahead of potential deployments was developed as part of the event, which the Office co-hosted with the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre.

In April, two virtual onboarding sessions were held for newly nominated experts and laboratory focal points. More than 120 participants from more than 40 countries joined the sessions, which provided an overview of the Mechanism and expectations for rostered experts and laboratories.

The Office also organized an inter-agency workshop in April to consider opportunities for cooperation with four key international organizations: the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the OPCW, the World Health Organization and the World Organisation for Animal Health.

In December, the Mechanism conducted its annual “call-out exercise” — a routine, unannounced activity designed to test the responsiveness and continued availability of experts and laboratories on the roster.

The Office also hosted a virtual round-table discussion in December for all nominated experts and laboratory focal points to reflect on recent activities, share updates and discuss future plans.

Outreach remained a priority in 2024, with ongoing efforts to raise awareness about the Mechanism and to enhance the diversity of its rostered experts and laboratories with respect to subject-matter expertise, geography and gender balance.

The Office for Disarmament Affairs provided updates on the Mechanism’s activities during the February and December meetings of the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.

It also delivered a presentation on the Mechanism at a coordination meeting organized by the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism of the Organization of American States, aimed at identifying areas for collaboration in Latin America and the Caribbean.

In June, the Office delivered a briefing on the Mechanism at the Global Health Security Conference in Sydney, Australia. It also participated in a table-top exercise hosted by the United States and Switzerland, which evaluated the challenges of conducting concurrent national and international investigations of an alleged bioterrorism incident.

From 1 to 3 October, a joint workshop was held in Santiago to strengthen regional support for the global norm against biological weapons. The event focused on the Biological Weapons Convention, Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and the Mechanism, with national stakeholders from the region exchanging best practices for strengthening each instrument.

In October, the fourth annual briefing of all Member States on the Mechanism took place on the margins of the General Assembly, First Committee. Participants received updates about recent activities to strengthen the Mechanism and the critical role of Member States in supporting it.

In December, the Office for Disarmament Affairs distributed the annual note verbale to all Member States, inviting new or updated nominations of experts and laboratories for the Mechanism’s roster.

Also in December, a side event on the Mechanism was held during the Global Workshop for National Points of Contact for the Biological Weapons Convention.

Export controls

The Australia Group is an informal forum of 42 countries and the European Union, which, through the harmonization of national export controls, seeks to ensure that their exports do not contribute to the production or proliferation of chemical or biological weapons. Participants use their national licensing measures to ensure that exports of certain chemicals, biological agents, and dual-use chemical and biological manufacturing facilities and equipment do not contribute to the spread of chemical or biological weapons and that legitimate trade is facilitated. All participants in the Australia Group are States parties to both the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention. Support for these regimes and their aims remains the overriding objective of Australia Group participants. Export licensing measures instituted by individual members also assist in implementing key obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (article I, para. 1 (a) and (d)) and the Biological Weapons Convention (articles I and III), as well as ensuring compliance with Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). Guidelines, common control lists and handbooks, and public statements of the Group are available on its website.

In 2024, the Australia Group met twice to consider current chemical or biological weapons developments, explore the scope for increasing the effectiveness of existing controls and consider updates to its common control lists where necessary.

Its Intersessional Meeting, held in January in Berlin, brought together technical experts from participating countries for in-depth discussions on advancing the Group’s mission. Topics included new and evolving technologies, implementation practices and outreach to aspirant member countries.

The Plenary Meeting, held in Paris in June, provided a platform for participants to exchange views on a range of topics, including shared approaches for keeping pace with rapidly evolving dual-use technologies and their relevance for non-proliferation and export control. Participants agreed to maintain their active outreach to non-members, as well as furthering engagement with industry, academia and international organizations to better understand the impact and pace of scientific and technological developments. The Group also further refined its common control lists.