Developments and trends, 2024

In 2024, the international community continued to make progress in addressing several emerging challenges related to developments in science and technology and their implications for international peace and security.

On outer space, the Group of Governmental Experts on Further Practical Measures for the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 77/250, successfully concluded its work. At its final substantive session, the Group adopted a report (A/79/364) containing a non-exhaustive set of possible substantial elements that could be considered in further measures and appropriate international negotiations, including in a legally binding instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Group concluded that the report could serve two purposes: first, as a reference document for further measures and appropriate international negotiations on an international legally binding instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, including on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space; and second, as a contribution to future work on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The General Assembly established a new open-ended working group on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects, replacing the two open-ended working groups that had been established in 2023 (decision 79/512). The new working group was scheduled to meet from 2025 to 2028.

In the first year of a new three-year cycle, the United Nations Disarmament Commission began considering an agenda item entitled “Recommendations on common understandings related to emerging technologies in the context of international security” (for more information, see chap. 7).

The Open-ended Working Group on Security of and in the Use of Information and Communications Technologies (2021–2025) held its seventh, eighth and ninth substantive sessions and adopted its third annual progress report by consensus (A/79/214). In the report, States agreed on new language addressing existing and potential threats, as well as on a new set of confidence-building measures. Additionally, they acknowledged a norms implementation checklist drafted by the Chair and set out an overarching framework outlining the scope, structure and modalities for a future permanent mechanism on information and communications technologies security.

At the Summit of the Future, in September 2024, the General Assembly adopted the Pact for the Future as resolution 79/1, with the Global Digital Compact included as an annex. In the Pact, Member States demonstrated their commitment to multilateral disarmament processes and instruments, positioning disarmament issues within the context of broader peace and security efforts. Their Heads of State and Government underscored the potential impact of rising military expenditures on investments in sustainable development and sustaining peace. Member States committed to advancing various disarmament priorities through appropriate processes and forums, including bringing the world closer to the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, addressing existing and emerging threats posed by emerging technologies, and confronting challenges related to the diversion and misuse of small arms and light weapons.

Building on those broad commitments, the Pact outlined specific actions in several key areas. Member States agreed to advance further measures and appropriate international negotiations to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects. They also committed to urgently advancing discussions on lethal autonomous weapons systems through the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. The Pact further emphasized the need to enhance international cooperation and capacity-building efforts to close digital divides, as well as continuing to assess the existing and potential risks associated with military applications of artificial intelligence (AI). Member States asked the Secretary-General to provide ongoing updates on new and emerging technologies.

The Global Digital Compact (annex I) included an objective on enhancing the international governance of AI for the benefit of humanity as one of its key objectives. To advance that goal, the General Assembly decided to establish a multidisciplinary Independent International Scientific Panel on AI, and to initiate a Global Dialogue on AI Governance within the United Nations framework.

On autonomous weapons systems, the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems convened, in accordance with a decision of the 2023 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW/MSP/2023/7, para. 20). Following its mandate and building on previous recommendations and conclusions, the Group worked to consider and formulate a set of elements of an instrument, without prejudging its nature and taking into account the example of existing Protocols within the Convention. In its deliberations, the Group considered draft elements on (a) a working characterization of such systems; (b) the application of international humanitarian law; (c) possible prohibitions and regulations; (d) other measures to ensure compliance with international humanitarian law; and (e) accountability (for more information, see chap. 3).

Responding to General Assembly resolution 78/241, the Secretary-General prepared a report on lethal autonomous weapons systems (A/79/88), incorporating views of 47 States and groups of States, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and 28 civil society entities comprising both individual organizations and informal groupings. The report summarized States’ perspectives on definitions and characterizations; challenges, concerns and potential benefits; deliberations by States; and next steps. In his observations and conclusions, the Secretary-General reiterated his call for the conclusion, by 2026, of a legally binding instrument to prohibit lethal autonomous weapons systems that function without human control or oversight and cannot be used in compliance with international humanitarian law, and to regulate all other types of autonomous weapon systems. He also called on the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons to work diligently to fulfil the mandate of the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems as soon as possible and encouraged the General Assembly to continue its consideration of this matter.

Emerging issues

Following a public disclosure of intelligence information in February, the United States alleged that the Russian Federation was developing an object capable of carrying a nuclear weapon in Earth orbit. Senior Russian officials denied their country was developing a space-based nuclear weapon and reaffirmed the Russian Federation’s commitment to the Outer Space Treaty, including its article IV, in which the States parties “undertake not to place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner”.

On 24 April, the Security Council met to act on a draft resolution on weapons of mass destruction in outer space, introduced by the United States and Japan and co-sponsored by 65 States (S/2024/302). The purpose of the resolution was to reinforce compliance with the Outer Space Treaty, particularly the obligation not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction. The Russian Federation vetoed the resolution, stating that the sponsors had failed to reflect its position. Advocating for the development of legally binding prohibitions on the placement of conventional weapons in outer space and on the use of force from space against Earth or from the Earth against space objects — proposals which Western States opposed on technical and political grounds — China and the Russian Federation jointly proposed an amendment to this effect (S/2024/323), which was defeated by a vote of 7-7-1.

On 20 May, the Security Council reconvened to consider a Russian-sponsored draft text that incorporated language from the previously considered draft amendment into the proposal tabled by Japan and the United States in April (S/2024/383). This resolution was also defeated by a vote of 7-7-1, with voting patterns unchanged from the previous deliberation.

In October, Japan and the United States introduced a new draft resolution in the General Assembly, First Committee, entitled “Weapons of mass destruction in outer space” (A/C.1/79/L.7/Rev.1), identical in substance to the text they had submitted to the Security Council in April. The Committee considered two amendments proposed by the Russian Federation (A/C.1/79/L.78/Rev.1 and A/C.1/79/L.79/Rev.1) and decided not to adopt them by votes of 41-66-49 and 42-65-49, respectively. The First Committee then approved the draft resolution, which the General Assembly subsequently adopted as resolution 79/18.

In a key paragraph of the resolution, the Assembly affirmed “the obligation of all States parties to fully comply with the Outer Space Treaty, including not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner” (operative para. 4). The resolution also urged “Member States, taking into account article IV of the Outer Space Treaty, not to develop nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction specifically designed to be placed in orbit around the Earth, to be installed on celestial bodies, or to be stationed in outer space in any other manner” (operative para. 6).

In 2024, the Group of Governmental Experts on Further Practical Measures for the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space completed its work, adopting by consensus a substantive final report (A/79/364). The General Assembly had established the Group in 2023 by resolution 77/250, mandating it to “consider and make recommendations on substantial elements of an international legally binding instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space”.

In line with the Group’s mandate, its Chair, Bassem Hassan (Egypt), convened an open-ended intersessional informal consultative meeting as an opportunity for all Member States to engage in interactive discussions and share views on a report of the Group’s work provided by the Chair in his own capacity (GE-PAROS/2024/CRP.1). Held at United Nations Headquarters from 29 February to 1 March, the meeting allowed engagement by representatives of intergovernmental organizations and other entities with standing invitations to participate as observers in the General Assembly’s work, as well as United Nations entities and non-governmental organizations.

The meeting featured two main segments, each beginning with a presentation by the Chair on the relevant part of his report. The first segment focused on “General considerations and key conceptual issues”, while the second addressed “Substantial elements of an international legally binding instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, including, inter alia, on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space”. Both segments facilitated interactive discussions and exchange of views. The Chair invited working paper submissions from Member States and civil society representatives, receiving contributions from the Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and Project Ploughshares.^[1]

The Chair of the Group also briefed the Conference on Disarmament on 28 March, under the Presidency of Ali Bahreini (Islamic Republic of Iran), presenting a summary of the report he provided to Member States at the open-ended intersessional informal consultative meeting held in New York (CD/PV.1716).

To support the Group’s work, the Office for Disarmament Affairs and UNIDIR jointly convened a two-day virtual workshop on 22 and 23 May. The workshop explored and elaborated on a working paper that Mr. Hassan had presented to the Group in his own capacity at its first session (GE-PAROS/2023/WP.20). Participants devoted the first day to examining characteristics of threats involving space systems, particularly space-to-Earth and space-to-space vectors, and the second day to exploring possible verification approaches and tools for effectively mitigating threats to space systems.

During the intersessional period, the Group carried out work on elements for its report. On 29 April, the Chair circulated proposed elements for the final report, which were discussed with the Group’s experts at a virtual informal consultation on 8 May, with written comments accepted until 24 May. Based on that feedback, the Chair circulated a revised elements paper on 1 July and convened another round of informal consultations 10 days later. After receiving additional written comments through 19 July, the Chair circulated a zero draft of the report on 30 July.

The Group held its final session in Geneva from 5 to 16 August, with experts from 23 States participating.^[2] The session focused entirely on report preparation, with the Group considering two draft revisions before adopting a substantive final report (A/79/364) by consensus on 16 August.

In the first section of its final report, on “General considerations and key conceptual issues”, the Group set out the outcomes of its work in four areas: (a) the evolving nature of outer space activities, threats and related capabilities; (b) the evolution of United Nations efforts for the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects; (c) the existing normative and legal framework; and (d) approaches to further measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

In the report’s second section, on the “Consideration of substantial elements of an international legally binding instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space”, the Group first presented its general considerations on definitions and verification. It then provided the considerations of the Group on a non-exhaustive set of possible substantial elements that could be taken into account in further measures and appropriate international negotiations, including in a legally binding instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Those elements addressed: (a) principles and objectives; (b) obligations in the areas of the threat or use of force; intentional acts / acts that can damage or destroy space systems; acts that can disrupt or interfere with the safe operation or normal functioning of space objects; protection of space-based services to civilians; placement of weapons in outer space; research, development, testing, stockpiling and deployment of systems designed for the use in intentional acts / acts that damage or destroy space systems, as well as their elimination; national space policies, doctrines and strategies and other measures that could reduce the risk of escalation, conflict and an arms race in outer space; assistance and encouragement in certain acts; and national implementation; (c) transparency and confidence-building measures; (d) consultative mechanisms and settlement of disputes; (e) international cooperation; and (f) other aspects.

At its seventy-ninth session, the General Assembly adopted texts welcoming the Group’s work (resolutions 79/20 and 79/21) and discussions (resolutions 79/18 and 79/22), as well as the consensus adoption of its report (resolution 79/19 and decision 79/512).

In accordance with General Assembly resolutions 78/52 and 78/72, on 30 October, the First and Fourth Committees of the General Assembly convened a joint half-day panel discussion to address possible challenges to space security and sustainability. In accordance with past practice, the Office for Disarmament Affairs and the Office for Outer Space Affairs prepared a draft programme for the joint panel discussion (A/C.1/79/CRP.5; A/C.4/79/CRP.1), which was circulated for information only.

The Chairs of the First and Fourth Committees opened the plenary meeting, which then heard remarks from the Director and Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs and the Director of the Office for Outer Space Affairs. The Committees received briefings from invited panellists, including the Chair of the Group of Governmental Experts on Further Practical Measures for the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space; the Chair of the Disarmament Commission; the current and incoming Chairs of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space; the former Chair of the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee; and a representative of the Permanent Mission of Costa Rica to the United Nations, who contributed to the negotiations on the outer space elements including in the Pact for the Future. Delegations from 12 Member States (speaking both in their national capacities and on behalf of a group)^[3] and one observer organization^[4] delivered statements (for more information, see chap. 7).

Following the meeting, the Co-Chairs circulated an informal summary of the discussion, issued under their authority and reflecting their understanding of the views expressed.

By resolutions 78/20 and 78/238, the General Assembly decided to establish two open-ended working groups, under items respectively addressing “Reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours” and “Further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space”. The working group established pursuant to resolution 78/20 was to meet in 2025 and 2026, while the one established pursuant to resolution 78/238 was to meet from 2024 to 2028.

At the seventy-ninth session of the First Committee, Egypt, on behalf of a group of States,^[5] introduced a draft decision to merge these bodies. The General Assembly adopted it as decision 79/512, establishing a new open-ended working group for 2024–2028 to replace the two previously created groups. Under this decision, the General Assembly tasked the new open-ended working group with submitting recommendations on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects, and further decided that its discussions and recommendations will be informed by all relevant General Assembly resolutions on the topic, including resolutions 78/20 and 78/238.

The malicious use of information and communications technologies (ICTs) by both State and non-State actors remained a pressing concern in 2024. The year saw a steady stream of disruptive incidents, with numerous impacts on infrastructure providing essential public services such as healthcare, banking and government service. Exploitation of software vulnerabilities, including through commercial sale of such information over the Internet, emerged as a common tactic. At the same time, growing attention was paid to financially motivated incidents involving ransomware.

Electoral security posed a significant challenge throughout the year, as elections took place in more than 70 States. Disinformation campaigns designed to influence voters, and uses of deepfakes of political figures were observed in the lead-up to national elections in several States. At the same time, interference in critical infrastructure facilitating electoral processes also posed risks.

At the United Nations, States intensified their discussions on those issues through regular multilateral discussions reflecting growing concern over threats to international peace and security from State use of ICTs.

The Open-ended Working Group on Security of and in the Use of Information and Communications Technologies 2021–2025 adopted its penultimate annual progress report (A/79/214) ahead of its final year of work. Among other outcomes, States consensually agreed on initial elements of a future permanent mechanism to succeed the current group.

In September, the General Assembly convened the high-level Summit of the Future, adopting the Pact for the Future (resolution 79/1), including the Global Digital Compact (annex I). Through the Pact, States committed to seizing opportunities associated with new and emerging technologies, while addressing potential risks from their use. In the Global Digital Compact, Governments committed to upholding international law and human rights online and taking concrete steps to make the digital space safe and secure. A specific commitment in the Pact focused on enhancing international cooperation and capacity-building efforts in order to bridge digital divides, ensuring all States could safely and securely benefit from digital technologies. Relatedly, the Global Digital Compact emphasized closing those divides to accelerate progress under the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

In December, the General Assembly adopted the United Nations Convention against Cybercrime; Strengthening International Cooperation for Combating Certain Crimes Committed by Means of Information and Communications Technology Systems and for the Sharing of Evidence in Electronic Form of Serious Crimes — the first international criminal justice treaty negotiated in over 20 years. The Convention established a new platform for collaboratively exchanging electronic evidence, protecting victims and preventing cybercrime, while ensuring the protection of human rights online.

The Security Council also devoted attention to ICT security matters in 2024, holding several dedicated formal and informal sessions. These included Arria-formula meetings in April on the “Cyberthreat landscape” and in July on “Opportunities and risks of artificial intelligence to international peace and security”, as well as an open debate in June on “Addressing evolving threats in cyberspace”.

The Open-ended Working Group on Security of and in the Use of Information and Communications Technologies 2021–2025 held its seventh, eighth and ninth substantive sessions in March, July and December, respectively, supported by intersessional meetings in May. Burhan Gafoor (Singapore) remained Chair of the Working Group, which met at United Nations Headquarters.

In July, the Open-ended Working Group adopted its third annual progress report by consensus (A/79/214), building on its first (A/77/275) and second (A/78/265). Endorsed by the General Assembly in December by resolution 79/237, the third progress report included new language on existing and potential threats, including threats to undersea cables and orbit communication networks, as well as uses of ransomware and commercially available intrusion capabilities. States agreed to a new set of confidence-building measures and acknowledged a Chair-drafted norms implementation checklist. In an annex to the report, States addressed the scope, structure and modalities of a future permanent mechanism on ICT security.

At the Open-ended Working Group’s seventh substantive session (4–8 March), States held in-depth discussions on all the Group’s sub-agenda items: existing and potential threats in the sphere of ICT security; rules, norms and principles of responsible State behaviour; applicability of international law to uses of ICTs; confidence-building measures; capacity-building; and regular institutional dialogue. The Chair led practical and detailed discussions to identify substantive areas of convergence and facilitate consideration of States’ proposals and position papers.

States expressed concern over the growing complexity of the ICT threat landscape, referencing supply chain vulnerabilities, growing markets for ICT intrusion capabilities, and convergences between threats in this domain and other emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence. They also continued to engage on the potential objectives, scope, structure and modalities of a future permanent security mechanism to succeed the current Working Group upon the conclusion of its mandate in 2025.

Women’s representation in the Open-ended Working Group continued to be strong. Of the 289 interventions made during plenary sessions, 145 (50 per cent) were delivered by women delegates.

The Open-ended Working Group held its eighth substantive session from 8 to 12 July, adopting an annual progress report by consensus for a third consecutive year (A/79/214). In negotiating the document, States engaged in substantive discussions on the evolving threat landscape and the applicability of international law to State use of ICTs. A dedicated stakeholder session held during the week featured contributions from representatives of the private sector, academia and civil society organizations.

The third annual progress report reflected the varied inputs of the eighth substantive session and of prior sessions and outcomes, alongside newly agreed language on key topics.

The report encompassed several priority areas:

• Noting with concern uses of ICTs in current conflicts, as well as heightened risks of the uses of ransomware, commercially available ICT intrusion capabilities and potential challenges posed to international peace and security by the convergence of other emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing
• Reaffirming States’ need to protect, and refrain from interference in, critical infrastructure, including undersea cables and orbit communication networks
• Responding to the growing scale and complexity of threats to international peace and security from this domain by laying out four new global confidence-building measures in the context of ICTs, including technologies related to protecting critical infrastructure
• Strengthening public-private partnerships.

Significantly, the report incorporated an annex in which the Working Group set out initial elements of a single-track, consensus-based permanent mechanism on ICT security to convene beginning in 2026, including guiding principles, functions and scope, structure, modalities and decision-making arrangements of a future permanent mechanism.

The “Voluntary checklist of practical actions for the implementation of voluntary, non-binding norms of responsible State behaviour in the use of ICTs” was included as an annex to the report, which set out actions that could be taken at the national and international levels to support the effective implementation of the voluntary, non-binding norms of responsible State behaviour.

The Open-ended Working Group recorded further progress towards achieving gender parity, thanks in part to support provided through the internationally financed Women in Cyber Fellowship. At the eighth session, women delegates delivered 110 of 225 plenary statements (49 per cent).

From 2 to 6 December, the Open-ended Working Group convened its ninth substantive session, initiating the final cycle of its mandate to conclude in July 2025.

Throughout its third session of 2024, the Working Group exchanged views on the evolving nature of ICT threats, including threats related to critical infrastructure, ransomware and supply chain vulnerabilities.

On the applicability of international law to State use of ICTs, States reaffirmed the applicability of international law, in particular the Charter of the United Nations, and engaged in discussions on the applicability of international humanitarian law, including its foundational principles of humanity, necessity, proportionality and distinction. The Working Group also considered a proposal by a group of States to develop a legally binding instrument on ICT security.

Women delivered 164 of the 328 statements during the Working Group’s substantive deliberations (50 per cent), reflecting ongoing progress towards gender parity.

From 9 to 17 May, the Chair convened a series of intersessional meetings to further support consideration of the Open-ended Working Group’s sub-agenda items.

Those meetings included the formal launch of the Global Intergovernmental Points of Contact Directory and the high-level “Global roundtable on ICT capacity-building”. States addressed the Working Group’s six sub-agenda items in deliberations that featured expert briefers, focusing their final day of discussions on regular institutional dialogue and feedback on an elements paper drafted by the Chair, with a view to identifying areas of convergence ahead of negotiations on the Group’s third annual progress report. Women delivered 52 of the week’s 132 interventions (39 per cent), and 6 of the 15 expert briefers were women.

On 10 May, the Chair convened the “Global roundtable on ICT security capacity-building” (Part 1 and Part 2), in response to a request in the Working Group’s second annual progress report (A/78/265). Over 100 Member States took part, with 53 delegations taking the floor. The participants included seven Ministers who shared views, best practices and recommendations for further action to strengthen cooperation in this area.

The opening segment featured video remarks by the Secretary-General, who highlighted both the urgency of closing digital divides between States and the need for an open, free and secure digital future for all. The event also featured interventions from the Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme, the Secretary-General of the International Telecommunications Union and the Chef de Cabinet of the Office of the President of the General Assembly.

States participated in a signature panel and plenary session on the theme “Building cyber resilience for sustainable development by bridging the global capacity gap”, as well as two breakout groups addressing “Strengthening governance, policies and processes” and “Developing technology, talent and partnerships”. Participants identified barriers to cooperation and mitigation strategies and recommended concrete actions for States, the United Nations system and stakeholders. The meeting was complemented by a “matchmaking session”, where States and stakeholders outlined existing capacity-building programmes and initiatives with the aim of increasing awareness, collaboration and participation.

From 22 to 27 April and from 12 to 17 August, two sessions of the United Nations-Singapore Cyber Fellowship took place at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations–Singapore Cybersecurity Centre of Excellence. The programme was a collaborative effort of the Office for Disarmament Affairs and the Cyber Security Agency of Singapore.

Senior government officials representing a variety of policy, technical and diplomatic backgrounds participated in a week of training panel discussions, workshops and round tables, as well as visits to national critical infrastructure sites, research laboratories and academic institutions. The session culminated in an interactive communications exercise where attendees practised responding to a simulated ICT crisis. The combined sessions were attended by 47 participants, 24 of whom were women delegates (51 per cent).

In 2024, the Office for Disarmament Affairs prepared the seventh edition of the report of the Secretary-General on current developments in science and technology and their potential impact on international security and disarmament efforts (A/79/224). In the report, the Secretary-General addressed scientific and technological developments in the following areas: (a) artificial intelligence and autonomy; (b) uncrewed systems; (c) digital technologies; (d) biology and chemistry; (e) space and aerospace technologies; (f) electromagnetic technologies; and (g) materials technologies. The seventh edition of the report also included a cross-sectional analysis on the convergence of technologies.

In the report’s conclusions, the Secretary-General recommended that United Nations bodies and entities continue to encourage multi-stakeholder and geographically equitable engagement on these matters, including by industry and other private sector actors, through formal and informal platforms. He also urged Member States to act on the recommendations in his policy brief A New Agenda for Peace.

On 22 and 23 October, the International Institute for Strategic Studies held the sixth meeting of its Missile Dialogue Initiative, in Berlin. The initiative, established in 2019 in partnership with Germany, brought together participants to discuss global developments in arms control, challenges of missile proliferation and the future of missile-related confidence- and security-building measures.

In 2024, the international community continued to grapple with the growing proliferation and use of armed uncrewed aerial vehicles.

The systems were the focus of a hybrid event co-convened on 26 January by Cabo Verde, Costa Rica and Portugal, together with the Office for Disarmament Affairs. Member State delegates and experts gathered at United Nations Headquarters to examine technological developments around armed uncrewed aerial vehicles and consider potential multilateral approaches to related threats. Portugal called for increased multilateral exchanges of views on the systems in a statement that 21 States ultimately endorsed.^[6]

In the following months, Portugal supported UNIDIR and the Office for Disarmament Affairs in organizing a series of webinars on uncrewed systems. Held from July to September, the webinars brought together expert briefers, delegates and other stakeholders to explore terms and classifications related to uncrewed systems, benefits and risks stemming from the systems, and potential pathways of action for the multi-stakeholder community. Drawing from the discussions, UNIDIR produced a summary entitled “Armed and dangerous? A brief overview of uncrewed aerial systems – risks, impacts, and avenues for action”.

Cross-cutting issues

The General Assembly again underscored the “symbiotic relationship” between disarmament and development in its annual resolution on the matter (79/43). In that context, the Assembly reiterated its concern about rising global military expenditure diverting resources that could otherwise support development needs.

In his annual report to the General Assembly on the disarmament-development nexus (A/79/124), the Secretary-General highlighted ongoing efforts within the United Nations to further strengthen synergies in that regard. Meanwhile, the Office for Disarmament Affairs and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) continued to collect and analyse data on weapons collected from illicit domains and their status in accordance with indicator 16.4.2. (For more information on data collection for target 16.4 of the Sustainable Development Goals, see chap. 3.)

The Office for Disarmament Affairs, for its part, continued working to integrate small-arms control into development processes and frameworks,^[7] thereby further bolstering interlinkages between disarmament and development at the country level. The Office maintained its financial support for arms control projects in that regard through the United Nations Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation (UNSCAR) and the Saving Lives Entity (SALIENT) funding facility. (For more information on UNSCAR and SALIENT, see chap. 3.)

Led by the Office of Counter-Terrorism, the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact maintained its efforts to enhance coordination and coherence across the United Nations system in support of Member States’ implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. Already one of the largest United Nations coordination frameworks, the Counter-Terrorism Compact welcomed the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) in 2024 as its newest member.

The Counter-Terrorism Compact’s eight working groups convened 40 meetings throughout the year, including regular quarterly meetings, as well as specialized thematic discussions. These gatherings enabled in-depth briefings on key issues, facilitated the exchange of best practices, and supported joint research initiatives, monitoring and evaluation efforts, resource mobilization and capacity-building activities. The working groups discussed critical security challenges, including countering the financing of terrorism, preventing terrorist travel, enhancing maritime and aviation security and protecting vulnerable targets. Additionally, they examined terrorism-related threats associated with small arms and light weapons, uncrewed aircraft systems, and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons, as well as emerging risks from technologies such as artificial intelligence.

The Office of Counter-Terrorism continued to maintain the digital Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Platform, providing a virtual collaboration space for 1,050 focal points representing 46 Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact entities, 137 Member States and 14 regional organizations to share information and coordinate activities.

The Working Group on Emerging Threats and Critical Infrastructure Protection held four quarterly meetings in 2024,^[8] addressing a range of security challenges. Sessions focused on advancing chemical emergency response exercises in Africa, analysing the use of uncrewed aircraft systems by non-State armed groups and strengthening the implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention. The Working Group also tracked global cyber threats and ICT incidents, while assessing vulnerabilities in air and maritime transportation. The discussions benefited from contributions by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the International Maritime Organization, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) and the Office of Counter-Terrorism.

Chaired by INTERPOL with support from three Vice-Chairs — the Office for Disarmament Affairs, the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) and the World Customs Organization (WCO) — the Working Group explored thematic areas, including weapons of mass destruction financing, proliferation risks, regional threats, chemical security and critical infrastructure initiatives. Throughout the year, the Working Group maintained engagement with the Group of Experts of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) (1540 Committee) to identify opportunities to support that resolution’s implementation. The Working Group invited the Group of Experts to all of its meetings, with plans for further dialogue in 2025 through thematic briefings or other collaborative activities.

Meanwhile, the Working Group on Border Management and Law Enforcement relating to Counter-Terrorism advanced its technical guidelines for preventing terrorist acquisition of weapons, with particular emphasis on small arms and light weapons, improvised explosive devices and uncrewed aircraft systems.

Throughout 2024, the Office of Counter-Terrorism continued its wide-ranging outreach and capacity-building initiatives across global, regional and national platforms, strengthening Member States’ capabilities to address terrorist weapon threats. Operating through its Counter-Terrorism Centre and the multi-year programme Countering Terrorist Use of Weapons, the Office engaged more than 650 officials representing over 40 Member States. These efforts addressed diverse security challenges, including weapons of mass destruction, small arms and light weapons, improvised explosive devices and uncrewed aircraft systems, while strengthening cooperative mechanisms to bolster international security frameworks.

In February, the Office organized a workshop in Rabat for Sahel countries to address the converging threats of improvised explosive devices and small arms and light weapons deployed by terrorists in the region. The Office also hosted a high-level briefing in New York on 23 October dedicated to building capacities for eliminating weapon supplies to terrorists in support of Security Council resolution 2370 (2017).

Through its partnership with the United States, the Office convened a series of activities designed to strengthen chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive terrorism response capabilities. Regional workshops and table-top exercises were conducted for Central Asian States in Almaty (4–7 March), South and Southeast Asian countries in Bangkok (9–12 July) and North African nations in Cairo (2–5 December). These initiatives emphasized regional cooperation and practical tools for weapons of mass destruction response, complemented by virtual seminars to introduce methodologies, facilitate their application and assess acquired competencies. Additionally, a dedicated briefing for South and Southeast Asian Member States took place in May at United Nations Headquarters in New York.

Regarding nuclear and radiological security, the Office provided equipment and specialized training for Tajikistan’s border forces in Dushanbe (9–10 October), as part of efforts to enhance security to strengthen border security between Tajikistan and Afghanistan and combat illicit trafficking of radiological and nuclear materials. The training emphasized securing nuclear and radiological materials while enhancing response capabilities.

To advance effective implementation of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the Office collaborated with UNODC to organize two regional workshops and table-top exercises: “Steppe Lotus” in Ulaanbaatar (16–18 April) and “Glowing Tulip 2.0” in The Hague, Kingdom of the Netherlands (23–26 April). These simulations focused on nuclear terrorism investigations and strengthening legal frameworks to combat chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism.

On 7 November, the Office partnered with the United Kingdom and the United States to conduct a table-top exercise in Washington, D.C., uniting key stakeholders to improve national and regional responses to terrorist attacks involving chemical materials.

The Office further developed Iraqi authorities’ capabilities to prevent and respond to biological terrorist threats by conducting the first in a series of train-the-trainer courses in Amman (9–12 December), focusing on countering basic and intermediate biological threats.

Addressing the terrorism-arms-crime nexus, the Office implemented multiple small arms and light weapons initiatives across Central Asia, including operational measures training for Uzbekistan (23–26 January), Tajikistan (29 January–1 February) and Turkmenistan (12–15 February), strengthening efforts to prevent illicit trafficking and terrorist acquisition of these weapons. The Office also enhanced evidence collection capabilities for cases involving small arms and light weapons trafficking or terrorism, conducting training programmes in Uzbekistan (5–8 November) and Kazakhstan (12–15 November).

These initiatives were facilitated through extensive collaboration with regional and international partners — including the African Union Counter Terrorism Centre, the Commonwealth of Independent States Anti-Terrorism Center, the Department of Peace Operations, the Commission of the Economic Community of West African States, the European Union, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), ICAO, INTERPOL, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Mine Action Service, UNODC, the Office for Disarmament Affairs and its United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, and WCO — reinforcing coordinated global responses to evolving terrorist weapon threats.

Throughout 2024, UNODC sustained its efforts to advance adherence to and robust implementation of international legal instruments targeting chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism, operating under its established mandate (78/226). UNODC delivered legislative and technical support through initiatives financed by Canada, the United States and the European Union.

UNODC offered legislative guidance to five Member States, helping them to strengthen their counter-terrorism legislation and regulatory frameworks to align with international standards against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism. This assistance included incorporating into national legislation the obligations from the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

Through its Canada-supported project, UNODC established a virtual speaker series examining the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, addressing critical elements of the Convention and nuclear terrorism challenges. The January session focused on border management within the Convention’s framework, whereas the February event explored international cooperation on nuclear forensics under the agreement.

Additionally, as part of its European Union-backed initiative, UNODC launched a new webinar series on the Convention. The April session featured prosecutorial insights into effective Convention implementation, the June webinar addressed extradition and mutual legal assistance provisions; and subsequent sessions in July, September and November concentrated on nuclear forensics and its significance under the Convention. Led by national and international specialists, these virtual programmes reached over 400 participants worldwide, strengthening their comprehension of this crucial international legal framework.

To underscore the importance of adhering to and effectively implementing the Convention, UNODC convened a high-level side event during IAEA’s International Conference on Nuclear Security on 22 May.

In June, UNODC collaborated with IAEA to bolster the nuclear security legal architecture by co-hosting a second joint IAEA-UNODC seminar promoting the universalization of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

UNODC also worked to enhance criminal justice capabilities among States parties to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, supporting their ability to effectively investigate, prosecute and adjudicate nuclear and radiological crimes through regional criminal investigation and mock trial exercises. These included training for South-Eastern European countries in Tirana (25–27 June) and for Central Asian countries in Tashkent (26–28 November). The Office also conducted national seminars on the Convention as part of its training series for judicial and prosecutorial training centres of States parties including sessions for Nigeria (16–17 July) and the Republic of Moldova (8 November).

To strengthen cooperation and coordination among Member States and international organizations in combating chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism, UNODC collaborated with Mongolia, Viet Nam and the United States, along with the Office of Counter-Terrorism, to organize the Association of Southeast Asian Nations regional forum workshop on strengthening legal frameworks to combat chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism. UNODC also partnered with the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Romania and the United States, as well as the Office of Counter-Terrorism, to conduct a table-top exercise supporting participating States in developing forensic responses to incidents involving nuclear or other radioactive material outside regulatory control, particularly regarding criminalization of events pursuant to the Convention.

To further pursue that Convention’s universalization and robust implementation, UNODC conducted national workshops for officials in Mozambique and Suriname, delivered a national legislative drafting workshop for Ecuador, and contributed to a workshop on strengthening counter-terrorism legislation for Southern African countries. UNODC also undertook country visits to Bulgaria, Ecuador, Nepal, Sao Tome and Principe and Uganda. Through UNODC’s extensive engagement and sustained collaboration with Member States, two additional countries — Palau and Mozambique — joined the Convention in 2024, while Seychelles deposited its ratification instrument on 3 December.

Recognizing the importance of empowering youth and ensuring their active participation in advancing peace and security, UNODC developed an innovative programme designed to cultivate future leaders who would champion the Convention in their home countries. With Canadian support, UNODC held the first Universalization Youth Academy for the Convention in Vienna from 10 to 13 September.

To enhance international cooperation and information exchange for detecting, preventing, suppressing and investigating offences outlined in article 2 of the Convention, UNODC launched a campaign in September encouraging States parties that had not yet designated their competent authorities and liaison points for information transmission and receipt under article 7, paragraph 4, of the Convention. By December, UNODC had received 25 notifications, bringing the number of States parties with designated national contact points to 49.

The Office continued to promote tools and resources supporting the international legal framework against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism. In May, UNODC unveiled a Canadian-funded repository of national legislation for implementing the criminalization provisions of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, as well as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 Amendment. The regularly updated repository functions as a technical reference tool, compiling established practices for criminal justice practitioners to consider during their national implementation processes.

UNODC also raised awareness about its existing technical assistance resources for incorporating requirements of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism into domestic legislation. Those references included the manual Fictional Cases related to Offences under the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, as well as an e-learning module on the Convention’s key provisions. All those materials were accessible on the Office’s continuously updated Convention website (www.unodc.org/icsant), in all six United Nations official languages, with some also available in Portuguese. By the year’s end, the UNODC website housed submissions from 51 States parties detailing their legislation implementing the Convention’s criminalization provisions. The Office also maintained its e-learning module on the international legal framework against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism, which nearly 2,800 practitioners from 132 Member States had completed since its 2019 launch. The module continued to be available in all United Nations official languages and in Portuguese.

The Office participated in various IAEA events in 2024, including a regional workshop on implementing integrated nuclear security sustainability plans, held in Australia in April; the 2024 International Conference on Nuclear Security, held in May; two regional workshops on the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 Amendment, one held in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic in August, and the other in Brazil in October; the tenth Triennial Technical Meeting of States’ Points of Contact for the Incident and Trafficking Database, held in October; a legislative assistance mission to Uganda, held in November; and additional technical meetings and seminars addressing nuclear and radiological security held throughout the year. The Office also made a virtual contribution to an IAEA workshop held for Kenya in November on the topic of international nuclear security legal frameworks.

UNODC maintained extensive cooperation with numerous other organizations and initiatives. It supported events organized by the Office for Disarmament Affairs, including a workshop in Sao Tome and Principe addressing the Biological Weapons Convention and resolution 1540 (2004), as well as two training courses for resolution 1540 (2004) points of contact in the Asia-Pacific region and in Africa. UNODC participated in a national awareness-raising workshop on resolution 1540 (2004) hosted by Indonesia with support from the Office for Disarmament Affairs, and it regularly attended meetings of biological safety and security assistance providers for Africa convened by the Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit. The Office also collaborated closely with the Office for Disarmament Affairs and the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism of the Organization of American States, to support Ecuador in drafting and implementing its national action plan on resolution 1540 (2004). In addition, UNODC took part in the Committee’s third cooperation meeting for implementers of that resolution in Latin America and the Caribbean. In October, it delivered a formal statement during the 1540 Committee’s open briefing for Member States and international, regional and subregional organizations (Part 1 and Part 2).

In March, UNODC contributed to a training workshop on preventing illicit chemical transfers, hosted by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in partnership with INTERPOL and WCO. The Office contributed to INTERPOL’s Global Geiger Conference in May and attended its first Global Biosecurity Conference in June. UNODC also presented at ICAO’s Air Law Treaty Workshop for European States, held in May. In June, UNODC addressed international legal instruments against chemical and biological terrorism at both the Australia Group plenary and the annual meeting of the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group. In October, the Office delivered a virtual presentation on the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism for a training programme in Tajikistan organized by the Office of Counter-Terrorism. UNODC also participated in a panel discussion on parliamentarians’ role in nuclear security during an October meeting of the Standing Committee on Peace and International Security of the Inter-Parliamentary Union. In November, UNODC contributed to UNICRI’s table-top exercise on strengthening chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear investigation, prosecution and adjudication capabilities in the Republic of Moldova. Furthermore, the Office contributed to the inaugural meeting of the Global Forum to Prevent Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism, co-organized by Romania and the United States. Additionally, UNODC engaged with the working groups of the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction; the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact Working Group on Emerging Threats and Critical Infrastructure Protection; the United Nations Biorisk Working Group; the Border Monitoring Working Group; the National Nuclear Security Administration of the United States Department of Energy; and the International Nuclear Law Association.

UNODC also engaged with civil society organizations and supported their initiatives, including workshops by Parliamentarians for Global Action to foster dialogue on effective implementation of relevant international legal instruments on nuclear security in Nepal, Sierra Leone, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zimbabwe. It presented at a webinar on strengthening global nuclear security hosted by the African Center for Science and International Security. It also contributed to the Nuclear Threat Initiative’s Global Dialogue on Nuclear Security Priorities; the World Institute for Nuclear Security’s webinar; and the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation’s high-level workshop on universalizing legal instruments for nuclear security. The Office further engaged with academic institutions, delivering lectures both at the International School of Nuclear Law of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and at the University of Buenos Aires.

The IAEA maintains a central role in strengthening the global nuclear security framework and coordinating international nuclear security activities, while preventing duplication and overlap of efforts. Nuclear security encompasses the prevention and detection of, and response to, criminal or intentional unauthorized acts involving or directed at nuclear material, other radioactive material, associated facilities or associated activities. Responsibility for nuclear security within a State rests entirely with that State, in accordance with its respective national and international obligations.

The IAEA continued to provide assistance, upon request, to States in their domestic efforts to establish and continuously maintain effective and comprehensive nuclear security for all nuclear and other radioactive material. It supported States in establishing effective and sustainable national nuclear security regimes and, where appropriate, in fulfilling their obligations under instruments such as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its Amendment, as well as relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1540 (2004).

Implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004)

In 2024, the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004)^[9] (1540 Committee) was chaired by José De La Gasca from 1 January to 12 November, and by Andrés Montalvo from 13 November to 31 December. In accordance with Security Council resolution 2663 (2022), by which the Council extended the 1540 Committee’s mandate for 10 years, until 30 November 2032, the Committee adopted its twenty-first programme of work on 30 January 2024, covering the period from 1 February 2024 to 31 January 2025 (S/2024/115). The programme of work organized the Committee’s work around four pillars: (a) monitoring and implementation; (b) assistance; (c) cooperation with international, regional and subregional organizations; and (d) transparency and outreach. The Office for Disarmament Affairs, the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, and the 1540 Committee’s Group of Experts continued to support the Committee in implementing its programme of work.

In operative paragraph 4 of resolution 1540 (2004), the Security Council mandated States to submit a first report on the steps they had taken or intended to take to implement the resolution. By the end of 2024, 185 of the 193 Member States had submitted their first report, while eight States had yet to do so.^[10] Moreover, 124 Member States had submitted at least one additional report. As at the end of the year, Member States had submitted a total of 538 first and additional national reports on steps taken to implement resolution 1540 (2004).

In 2024, Saudi Arabia submitted additional information on its implementation efforts to the Committee. The Security Council encouraged States in resolution 1977 (2011) and its successors^[11] to provide additional information on their implementation efforts, including, voluntarily, on their laws and regulations and on States’ effective practices.

On 13 December, Ecuador submitted a voluntary national implementation action plan for resolution 1540 (2004), bringing the year-end total to 48 action plans adopted by 39 States. The Security Council encouraged States by resolution 1977 (2011) and subsequent resolutions to prepare these action plans on a voluntary basis to map out their priorities and plans for implementing key provisions of resolution 1540 (2004). The submission followed a workshop held in Quito on 12 and 13 June to enhance awareness about the resolution’s objectives, review the status of national implementation, identify areas needing improvement and establish priorities and targets for an action plan. The Office for Disarmament Affairs organized that event in partnership with the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism of the Organization of American States.

Meanwhile, the Office for Disarmament Affairs organized national workshops in Botswana, Indonesia, Madagascar, and Sao Tome and Principe in support of their ongoing efforts to achieve the full and effective implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). The aim of the events was to raise awareness in each State of its obligations, while enhancing existing border and export control regulations. In addition, the Philippines and Singapore, with support from the Office for Disarmament Affairs, conducted two peer-review exercises on implementing the resolution and strengthening export controls, held in Manila on 28 and 29 May and in Singapore on 4 and 5 September.

To facilitate dialogue with the 1540 Committee on implementing resolution 1540 (2004), States are encouraged to submit up-to-date information on national points of contact, preferably both in their capitals and at their respective permanent missions in New York. In 2024, responding to renewed calls from the 1540 Committee and regular outreach by the 1540 regional coordinators in Africa and Asia of the Office for Disarmament Affairs, nine Member States designated their 1540 points of contact for the first time. In total, 42 States^[12] named or provided updates regarding their points of contact, bringing the total number of States with designated points of contact for resolution 1540 (2004) to 155.

In its resolution 2325 (2016), the Security Council encouraged the Committee to enhance the capacity of national points of contact for resolution 1540 (2004), particularly by organizing regional training courses to support States in implementing the resolution. In 2024, the Office for Disarmament Affairs organized two such courses in cooperation with the 1540 Committee: one for the Asia-Pacific region, held in Beijing in June and hosted by the Government of China; and another for Africa, held in Addis Ababa in November, in partnership with Mozambique. The training sessions strengthened participants’ understanding of the scope and obligations of resolution 1540 (2004) while providing a platform for participating States to share national experiences, particularly regarding the role of points of contact. International organizations attending the courses also shared effective practices to foster coordinated implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and related multilateral instruments, including strategies for efficiently channelling and coordinating international assistance.

In 2024, Colombia, Iraq, Madagascar and Tajikistan submitted new assistance requests to the 1540 Committee, with the first three also submitting updated versions of requests from 2023. Meanwhile, the Committee adopted a revised assistance mechanism on 25 November 2024, following a review of its assistance mechanism established in 2018. In its resolution 2663 (2022), the Security Council reiterated that many Member States still required assistance in implementing resolution 1540 (2004) and emphasized the importance of improving the 1540 Committee’s matchmaking mechanism to ensure effective, timely and tailored assistance.

In resolution 1540 (2004) and its successors,^[13] the Security Council recognized the need to enhance the coordination of efforts at the national, subregional, regional and international levels to strengthen a global response to the threat from non-State actors. The Council also recognized the vital role of international, regional and subregional organizations, including United Nations bodies, in supporting Member States’ implementation of resolution 1540 (2004).

The Office for Disarmament Affairs sustained its engagement with States and other stakeholders throughout the year. It regularly invited representatives of governments and international, regional and subregional organizations providing 1540-related assistance in Asia and Africa to collaborative engagements to showcase their support efforts and identify new cooperation opportunities.

The 1540 Committee enhanced its cooperation with the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities. In November, the two committees delivered a joint briefing to the Security Council, demonstrating their continued cooperation within their respective mandates (S/PV.9784).

On 9 October, the 1540 Committee held an open briefing (Part 1 and Part 2) to summarize its activities across all aspects of resolution 1540 (2004), with particular attention to assistance-related matters, in line with operative paragraph 26 of resolution 2663 (2022). The session brought together Member States and international, regional and subregional organizations, providing a platform for showcasing assistance offers and enabling national delegations to share insights, lessons learned and best practices.

The 1540 Committee marked the twentieth anniversary of resolution 1540 (2004) through several high-profile initiatives. Ecuador and the Office for Disarmament Affairs co-convened a commemorative side event where speakers provided a comprehensive overview of implementation progress, highlighting the Office’s supportive role while Member States exchanged effective practices and experiences. The Office also released an informational publication for Member States and partner organizations, acknowledging both its own contributions and those of donors in advancing implementation, while encouraging assistance requests from States requiring support.

The Office for Disarmament Affairs expanded its industry and academic outreach initiatives during the year.^[14] Under the “Wiesbaden process” for industry engagement, the Office partnered with Germany to organize a regional conference on 31 July and 1 August to engage and inform industry and the private sector about their obligations under national laws and regulations. Additionally, through the Erlangen Initiative, the Office and Germany co-organized two conferences aimed at raising awareness within the scientific and academic community about the risks associated with the misuse of scientific and technological developments and fostering dialogue between government regulators and academia on effective means to control intangible technology transfers. The first regional conference under the initiative was held for Southeast Asian States in Singapore on 30 October, followed by the second global conference in Nuremberg, Germany, on 20 and 21 November.

Throughout 2024, the 1540 Committee, including through its Chair and Group of Experts, participated in 32 outreach events organized by States, international and regional organizations, and civil society organizations. The activities supported transparency and fostered greater cooperation and awareness among States, parliamentarians, relevant organizations and civil society regarding resolution 1540 (2004) obligations and their implementation.

With support from the Office for Disarmament Affairs, the Committee also enhanced its digital presence by revamping its website with a more user-friendly navigation system and an updated structure reflecting the Committee’s programme of work. With support from the Office for Disarmament Affairs, the website continued to serve as both a public awareness tool and a key information source on resolution 1540 (2004).