Developments and trends, 2023

The year 2023 began with experts moving the hands of the “Doomsday Clock” to 90 seconds to midnight, reflecting their view that human civilization was at its closest to a cataclysmic tipping point in the clock’s seven-decade history. That symbolic representation of existential danger stemmed in large part from growing fears about the use of nuclear weapons.

The trend of heightened nuclear risk continued in 2023 owing to six key interlinked trends and occurrences:

• The ongoing war in Ukraine
• The conflict in Gaza
• The increasing tension between nuclear-weapon States, including in the Asia-Pacific, coupled with ongoing qualitative improvements of nuclear arsenals and fears about a return to nuclear arms racing
• The failure to revive the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran
• Further progress by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in improving its nuclear capabilities
• The growing nexus between conventional weapons, new domains and nuclear weapons.

Those trends and occurrences combined not only served to raise nuclear risks—for example, through veiled threats to use nuclear weapons, the possibility of escalation in regional conflicts, and growing opportunity for mistake and miscalculation—but also diminished prospects for strengthening the disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Worse, they contributed to the further erosion of existing instruments and hard-won norms against the use, testing and proliferation of nuclear weapons. In November, the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs reflected on the situation: “We have witnessed nuclear threats in multiple acute crises. The instruments of the cold-war-era arms control regime have either crumbled away or are in acute danger of doing so. We appear to have reached the end of a decades-long trend of declining sizes in nuclear arsenals worldwide. Agreement in disarmament meetings … seems increasingly difficult to find.”

The impact of the Russian invasion of Ukraine continued to be reflected both in fears about the use of a nuclear weapon and in strained relations across the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Russian officials still issued veiled threats regarding the potential use of nuclear weapons, although less frequently than in 2022. The Russian Federation also “suspended” its participation in the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START), including that Treaty’s verification mechanisms, albeit with a stated intention to strictly comply with the Treaty’s quantitative restrictions. The Treaty is the last bilateral arms control agreement on nuclear weapons.

On 25 May, the Russian Federation and Belarus announced that they were formalizing the deployment and storage of Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons in Belarusian territory. In December, Belarus stated that the Russian Federation had completed a shipment of non-strategic nuclear weapons to Belarusian territory. The issue of nuclear sharing and the stationing of nuclear forces outside of national territory continued to be a point of contention in multilateral forums, with critics charging that such arrangements—especially those of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—were inconsistent with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In August, a non-governmental organization highlighted excerpts of United States budget documents that indicated a possible return of United States nuclear weapons to the United Kingdom. Both the United States and the United Kingdom refused to comment on the matter.

Without directly referencing the conflict in Ukraine, the Russian Federation withdrew its ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, significantly damaging prospects for the Treaty’s entry into force and undermining the norm against nuclear testing. The withdrawal further exacerbated concerns raised by civil society about a potential return to nuclear explosive testing in the light of increased activity at test sites in China, the Russian Federation and the United States. Nevertheless, membership numbers of the Treaty continued to rise among non-nuclear-weapon States, with Solomon Islands and Sri Lanka ratifying the agreement and Somalia signing it in 2023.

In her statement to the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (Article XIV Conference), the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs stated: “It is deeply concerning to hear … about potential backtracking on non-testing pledges. A return to nuclear testing would lead us to another age of instability, taking us closer to the edge of catastrophe, damaging human health and our environment in the process ... In today’s climate of growing nuclear danger, I call on all States that have previously declared moratoriums on nuclear testing to reaffirm these moratoriums and to take immediate steps to sign and/or ratify the [Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty].”

The conflict in Ukraine remained a significant point of contention in the NPT review process, especially in relation to the protection of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant and threats to use nuclear weapons. Throughout the year, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) expressed concern regarding the situation at the Zaporizhzhia facility and called for the observance of the Agency’s Seven Pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security in an armed conflict. In November, the Director General of the IAEA advised that six of the Pillars were compromised at the facility either fully or partially, especially those related to staffing at the site, the conduct of regular maintenance activities and special measures taken for securing a stable cooling water supply. More broadly, the conflict continued to exacerbate tensions between States within the disarmament and non-proliferation regime, leading to acrimonious disputes over procedure and affecting efforts to implement relevant treaties and other instruments.

As noted, decreasing trust and resurgent competition between nuclear-weapon States also contributed to the rise in nuclear risk and diminished efforts to pursue nuclear disarmament. The United States and its allies pressed their allegations regarding the rapid expansion by China of its nuclear arsenal and fissile material production capability. In one report, the United States Department of Defense alleged that China possessed 500 operational nuclear warheads. China continued to refute the allegation, asserting that the onus was on both the United States and the Russian Federation to lead in the process of nuclear arms reduction. China also pushed back strongly against calls for it to announce a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes, stating that such moratoriums were unverifiable and unfairly biased towards larger nuclear-weapon States.

Figure 1.1.
Estimated annual reduction in global nuclear warhead stockpiles

As calls for enhanced transparency by China mounted in various multilateral forums, so too did calls within the United States to expand its nuclear stockpile to meet its challenge of two near-peer nuclear-weapon States. The Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, a group of bipartisan experts, stated in a report that the United States needed a nuclear posture capable of simultaneously deterring both China and the Russian Federation. It also called for, inter alia, an increase in the number of available platforms for delivering nuclear weapons. With the ongoing development by the Russian Federation of novel nuclear delivery systems not constrained by any agreement, experts expressed concern that the post-cold-war trend of declining global nuclear weapons numbers was ending, after more than three decades.

Adding further to nuclear risk in the Asia-Pacific region, in 2023 the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea continued its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes by conducting 31 test launches using ballistic missile technology—fewer than in 2022, but with five trials of intercontinental ballistic missiles. The country also successfully put its first military satellite into orbit in November, after two failed attempts, in May and August. In addition, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea amended its Constitution in September to enshrine its nuclear policy, which significantly lowered its threshold for the potential use of nuclear weapons. Leaders from the country also held a summit with Russian counterparts, where they agreed to strengthen their collaboration in military matters. The Security Council convened nine times in response to the repeated violations of its relevant resolutions, but the body remained divided over taking further punitive action.

Anxiety about nuclear weapons was once again prevalent in the Middle East in 2023, with the conflict in Gaza serving to raise the spectre of their use and dampen prospects for either a resolution to the issue of the Iranian nuclear programme or the achievement of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the region. An unofficial comment in which an Israeli cabinet minister suggested Israel could use nuclear weapons in the conflict drew condemnation from States across the region and beyond.

Efforts to revive the JCPOA on the Iranian nuclear programme fell short once again. The remaining JCPOA parties and the United States achieved no gains in a new round of the Vienna Talks, while the Islamic Republic of Iran expanded its nuclear programme in both size and expertise. In June, the media reported on indirect talks between the United States and the Iranian Government aimed at reaching an informal deal that allegedly would have included, inter alia, a commitment from the latter to cease enrichment of uranium to or beyond 60 per cent, in exchange for the release of frozen Iranian assets and an exchange of prisoners. Despite a temporary drop in the country’s enrichment of uranium to 60 per cent, it had reverted to the higher rate of production by the end of December. Throughout 2023, the IAEA reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran had continued to engage in several activities inconsistent with the JCPOA, including enrichment of uranium to 60 per cent, 20 per cent and 5 per cent, and creating a stockpile well above JCPOA limits (GOV/2023/57).^[1] The IAEA also detected highly enriched uranium particles containing up to 83.7 per cent U-235. However, following several meetings, it stated that it “had no further questions on the matter at that stage”.

The year saw several attempts to increase monitoring and verification of the Iranian nuclear programme, as reflected in a joint statement issued in March by the IAEA and the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. Nevertheless, the IAEA reiterated its position that its verification and monitoring had been seriously affected by the cessation of Iranian nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA. Furthermore, the IAEA said that the situation had worsened because of a subsequent Iranian decision to remove all of the Agency’s JCPOA-related surveillance and monitoring equipment.

For its part, the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to refute allegations that it was pursuing a nuclear weapons programme, contending that its activities were consistent with its commitments under the NPT. Meanwhile, several non-governmental organizations calculated that the State had acquired enough fissile material for multiple nuclear weapons. Adding to regional proliferation concerns, in September, Saudi Arabia reaffirmed that should the Islamic Republic of Iran acquire nuclear weapons, it would do so as well.

In 2023, the nuclear-weapon States maintained their rhetorical commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons, including at the first meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT. However, those States continued programmes to qualitatively improve their nuclear arsenals, including through the development of new delivery systems. China, the Russian Federation and the United States progressed in the modernization of all three legs of their nuclear triads.

Figure 1.2.
Worldwide locations of nuclear weapons

Meanwhile, the United States announced plans to deploy its B61-12 nuclear gravity bomb to European allies in 2024. The variant is considered an upgrade, as its new tail fin allows for greater accuracy. The United States also announced the development of the B61-13 gravity bomb—intended to be used against “harder and large-area military targets” and to allay concerns about the retirement of the B83-1 and the W87-1—which would be the first completely new nuclear warhead manufactured by the United States in over three decades. Although the President of the United States did not request any funding for a nuclear-armed, submarine-launched cruise missile in 2024, the United States Congress allocated funding for the proposed weapon in the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act.

Non-governmental sources assessed that China continued to develop three new missile silo fields for intercontinental ballistic missiles and was developing new variants and other advanced strategic delivery systems. China reportedly further expanded its dual-capable intermediate-range ballistic missile force, refitting its Type 094 ballistic missile submarines with the longer-range JL‑3 submarine-launched ballistic missile, while also reassigning an operational nuclear mission to its bombers and developing an air-launched ballistic missile that might have nuclear capability.

The Russian Federation progressed with the replacement of legacy nuclear and dual-capable missile systems with newer variants and reportedly deployed a new Yars intercontinental ballistic missile at the Kozelsk base in the Kaluga region, south-west of Moscow, capable of carrying multiple thermonuclear warheads.

The Russian Federation also conducted further deployments, production and testing of novel delivery vehicles, including the Avangard hypersonic weapon and the Poseidon autonomous underwater vehicle. According to non-governmental sources, the country also engaged in the upgrading and replacement of non-strategic nuclear weapons systems.

In addition, the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 NPT Review Conference took place from 31 July to 11 August. Having skipped the one-year break that traditionally separates review cycles of the Treaty, the States parties revived contentious debates from the 2022 Review Conference on matters that included nuclear propulsion, nuclear sharing, the JCPOA, transparency around fissile material production and other activities, the protection of nuclear power plants in zones of armed conflict and the fulfilment of article VI of the NPT. Divisions over those issues were exacerbated by parallel geostrategic developments, such as the war in Ukraine and tensions in the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific regions.

Despite an enduring articulated commitment by almost all the NPT States parties and to keeping it fit for purpose, the session was marked by procedural disputes, rancorous debate and frequent uses of the right of reply. As had become customary, the Preparatory Committee could not reach a consensus agreement on a summary of proceedings. The process reached a new low point when one State party refused to support the consensus adoption of a procedural report if the Committee Chair even submitted a draft summary of the proceedings as a working paper, something seen as pro forma in the past.

Despite the divisions affecting the Preparatory Committee, a working group established to discuss and make recommendations to the Preparatory Committee on measures that would improve the effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, accountability, coordination and continuity of the review process of the Treaty had met the week prior (24–28 July), and engaged in positive and constructive dialogue. In particular, the working group productively considered measures to strengthen accountability for the implementation of existing commitments through enhanced and interactive reporting, including in-person, during the review cycle. Although States parties could not agree on consensus recommendations or next steps, there was general agreement that they had made good progress that should be built upon.

The second Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons was another bright spot in 2023. Although the Treaty remained in its nascency with a relatively small membership, the meeting highlighted work by States parties to find practical, ethical and scientific approaches to achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. The participants made progress in efforts to assist victims of nuclear weapons use and testing, to lay the groundwork for a competent international authority that could verify nuclear disarmament, and to ensure the inclusion of diverse stakeholders in the Treaty’s implementation. States parties adopted a declaration that unequivocally rejected the logic of nuclear deterrence and decried any and all threats to use nuclear weapons (TPNW/MSP/2023/14, annex I). In her remarks during the meeting, the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs reflected, “Important work has been done to implement the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. This is especially welcome considering the stagnant progress or backsliding that we are currently witnessing in other parts of the disarmament and non-proliferation architecture.”

Although entrenched divisions around nuclear weapons featured prominently in the deliberations of the First Committee of the General Assembly, the body’s session in 2023 included two notable highlights. The first was the adoption by a large majority of General Assembly resolution 78/240, entitled “Addressing the legacy of nuclear weapons: providing victim assistance and environmental remediation to Member States affected by the use or testing of nuclear weapons". By that resolution, the General Assembly recognized the responsibility of Member States that had used or tested nuclear weapons to address the harm caused to victims. States also encouraged further international cooperation and discussions to assist victims and to assess and remediate environments contaminated by the use and testing of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

Regarding the second highlight, as part of efforts to revive prospects for a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, the General Assembly included in its annual resolution on the matter, resolution 78/28, a call for the Secretary-General and the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs to facilitate engagement between States that possess or produce fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices on transparency and confidence-building measures with a view to launching negotiations.

Issues related to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The NPT is a landmark international treaty whose objectives are to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and further the goal of nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament.

The Preparatory Committee for the 2026 NPT Review Conference held its first session in Vienna from 31 July to 11 August, with Jarmo Viinanen (Finland) serving as Chair. Representatives from 113 States parties, 10 international organizations and 71 non-governmental organizations participated in the session (for the list of participants, see NPT/CONF.2026/PC.I/INF/7). The Committee adopted a procedural report (NPT/CONF.2026/PC.I/6).

The High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, in her opening statement to the Preparatory Committee, expressed concern about the current geostrategic environment, the erosion of the arms control regime and the consistently poor implementation of existing commitments, particularly in relation to the fulfilment of article VI of the Treaty. She stressed the need for States parties to strengthen the Treaty during the new review cycle by, among other things, (a) enhancing accountability for the implementation of existing commitments, especially disarmament commitments; (b) reinforcing the norms against the use, testing and proliferation of nuclear weapons; (c) creating opportunities for dialogue between nuclear-weapon States in ways that reduce nuclear risk and find common understandings concerning new and emerging challenges, especially the nexus between technology and nuclear weapons; (d) strengthening the non-proliferation regime, including by considering assistance needed by the IAEA to fulfil its mandate; and (e) assisting in the resolution of regional proliferation crises and discussing what more could be done to strengthen regional solutions to nuclear weapons, including through nuclear-weapon-free zones. The High Representative also reiterated the need for States parties to use the Treaty as a platform for fulfilling the Sustainable Development Goals and other development initiatives, as well as for addressing global concerns such as pandemic prevention and climate change.

The Preparatory Committee set aside five meetings for a general debate on issues related to all aspects of its work. It heard 91 statements by States parties and 15 statements by non-governmental organizations.

Similar to the tenth Review Conference held just one year earlier, the Preparatory Committee occasionally saw heated rhetoric and recriminations between States parties on geopolitical matters, particularly the ongoing war in Ukraine, the crises in the Middle East and growing tensions in the Asia-Pacific region. National positions under the Treaty’s three “pillars”—disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy—revealed familiar fissures between States. Many States parties expressed frustration regarding the implementation of past commitments, particularly on nuclear disarmament and the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, as well as the perceived imbalance of obligations between the two categories of States parties. Unsurprisingly, the war in Ukraine, the AUKUS partnership, the issue of nuclear sharing and the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran proved to be the most contentious fault lines for the Committee.

Nevertheless, the States parties to the Treaty reaffirmed its central role as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the foundation of the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. In that regard, they emphasized the Treaty’s vital contribution to international peace, security and stability, and stressed the fundamental importance of its full and effective implementation. They also emphasized the importance of ensuring the balanced implementation of the Treaty’s three pillars, while noting their mutually reinforcing nature.

States parties recalled the necessity of implementing decisions 1 and 2 of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, as well as the resolution on the Middle East adopted at that meeting (NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I), annex); the final document adopted at the 2000 Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II)); and the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted at the 2010 Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)).

Following the general exchange of views, the Committee organized its meetings into three clusters, according equal time to each of the Treaty’s three pillars: (a) non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament and international peace and security; (b) non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones; and (c) the inalienable right of all NPT States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of the Treaty. The clusters addressed three specific issue areas, respectively: (a) nuclear disarmament and security assurances; (b) regional issues, including with respect to the Middle East and the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East; and (c) peaceful uses of nuclear energy and other provisions of the Treaty. Discussions also took place on the strengthened review process.

States parties reaffirmed their commitment to the full and effective implementation of article VI of the Treaty. They recalled the unequivocal undertaking made by the nuclear-weapon States in 2000, and reaffirmed in 2010, to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, and deep concern was expressed about the lack of progress in the implementation of disarmament commitments, including that unequivocal undertaking. Delegations recalled the disarmament measures adopted by the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences and, emphasizing that past commitments remained valid until fully implemented, called upon States parties to redouble their efforts in that regard. It was stressed that efforts were needed to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures, and States with the largest nuclear arsenals were encouraged to lead those efforts. States parties also emphasized the importance of applying the principles of transparency, verifiability and irreversibility in relation to the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations.

In addition, the Preparatory Committee discussed the deteriorating international security environment, with numerous States parties arguing that the situation added urgency to the need for nuclear disarmament.

Separate concerns surfaced around the increased role of nuclear weapons in national and regional military doctrines. In that connection, nuclear-weapon States and all other States that continued to maintain a role for nuclear weapons in their military doctrines faced new calls to take measures to diminish and eliminate that role. Many States parties communicated unease about the alleged expansion of the nuclear stockpiles of some nuclear-weapon States and the possibility of a new arms race. Participants also signalled reservations about the continued qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, their delivery systems and related infrastructure, as well as plans to further invest in upgrading, refurbishing or extending the service life of nuclear weapons and related facilities and in developing new nuclear weapons and delivery systems. In that regard, it was stated that the indefinite extension of the Treaty at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference did not imply the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons.

Numerous States voiced apprehension regarding the practice of stationing nuclear weapons in the territory of non-nuclear-weapon States. Furthermore, States parties condemned threats of use of nuclear weapons and noted the prohibition on the threat or use of force contained in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations.

The Committee discussed the risk of the use of nuclear weapons, whether intentionally or by miscalculation, miscommunication, misperception or accident. Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States, in cooperation with non-nuclear-weapon States, were called upon to take steps to prevent any use of nuclear weapons. In particular, the nuclear-weapon States were urged to rapidly reduce the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems in line with previously agreed commitments. Numerous States raised the point that risk reduction, however, was not a replacement for disarmament measures.

Many States parties recalled the joint statement of 3 January 2022 by the leaders of the five nuclear-weapon States, in which they had affirmed that a nuclear war could not be won and must never be fought and had expressed their commitment to the obligations under the Treaty, including article VI.

The Committee also heard many calls from States parties for a return to the full implementation of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START), as well as expressions of regret regarding the termination of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. The Russian Federation and the United States were encouraged to resume negotiations to achieve further reductions in their nuclear arsenals, including non-strategic nuclear weapons, and other nuclear-weapon States were encouraged to join such negotiations.

Participants discussed the need for improved transparency and accountability in implementing nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments. In that regard, States parties welcomed the constructive discussion on transparency, accountability and reporting conducted during the meeting of the Working Group on further strengthening the NPT review process, including the proposals on regular, standardized reporting by the nuclear-weapon States and on the allocation of time throughout the review cycle for a focused discussion of such reporting. Discussants linked reporting and transparency to the principles of verifiability and accountability, as well as to confidence-building between States parties. Furthermore, it was suggested that establishing benchmarks and timelines could help to measure progress and improve accountability in the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments. Participants also suggested specific items on which nuclear-weapon States should report. ^[2]

Meanwhile, a notable number of States parties reiterated their concern over the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons. They reaffirmed the need for all States to comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law, at all times. Some stressed that both the humanitarian consequences and the need to prevent nuclear-weapon use should underpin nuclear disarmament efforts. States parties also heard calls to consider providing assistance to States affected by the use and testing of nuclear weapons. Such assistance could include sharing technical and scientific information and providing financial support for the purposes of victim assistance and environmental remediation.

NPT States parties that were also parties or signatories to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons drew attention to the entry into force of the latter agreement in 2021, as well as the convening of its first Meeting of States Parties in Vienna from 21 to 23 June 2022. They stressed that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons represented an effective measure under article VI of the NPT, thus complementing the NPT.

Many States parties reiterated the need for the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as a core element of the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Furthermore, States parties discussed the continued inability of the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations on either one of the two key issues: a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices; or legally binding arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by all nuclear-weapon States.

Many States parties emphasized that IAEA safeguards were a fundamental component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, were essential for peaceful nuclear commerce and cooperation, and made a vital contribution to the environment for peaceful nuclear development and international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Preparatory Committee discussed the role of the IAEA as the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring compliance with safeguards agreements. Many States stressed that nothing should undermine the authority or independence of the Agency in that regard.

Participants emphasized that States parties with concerns regarding non-compliance with safeguards agreements should direct such concerns to the IAEA to consider, investigate, draw conclusions and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate. Expressing their concern over cases of non-compliance, many delegations stressed the importance of ensuring that States remain in or promptly return to compliance with their obligations. In that context, they noted the role of the Security Council and the General Assembly in upholding compliance with safeguards agreements.

Delegations recalled the importance of applying IAEA safeguards pursuant to comprehensive safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/153 (Corrected) and welcomed that 182 States parties had comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency in force. The Committee encouraged States without such agreements to bring them into force as soon as possible.

Many States parties noted that, although comprehensive safeguards agreements provided assurances regarding declared nuclear material, implementing the model additional protocol (INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)) equipped the IAEA with broader information and access to provide increased assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a State with a comprehensive safeguards agreement. Many States stressed that the additional protocol, together with the comprehensive safeguards agreement, would represent an enhanced verification standard and an integral part of the safeguards system. They welcomed the growing number of States parties that had brought additional protocols into force, which totalled 140, even as the Committee emphasized that it was the sovereign decision of any State to conclude an additional protocol. In addition, the Committee discussed how it was becoming increasingly challenging for the IAEA to draw a soundly based safeguards conclusion for States with small quantities protocols based on the original standard text. In that connection, many States parties called upon such States to amend their original small quantities protocols or rescind them as a matter of priority.

The Committee discussed the safety of nuclear power plants and other facilities or locations subject to IAEA safeguards in zones of armed conflict, particularly in the context of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, in Ukraine. Many States parties expressed concern about the implications of the loss of control by the competent authorities over such locations because of military activities, including negative impacts on safety, security—including physical protection of nuclear material—and safeguards.

The Committee continued to debate the topic of naval nuclear propulsion and the implications of such activities for safeguards and non-proliferation under the Treaty. Several States parties took note of discussions by the IAEA Board of Governors concerning safeguards arrangements related to naval nuclear propulsion and emphasized the need for full compliance with the Treaty and the relevant safeguards agreements.

Several States parties welcomed IAEA efforts to assist in strengthening national legal and regulatory frameworks related to safeguards, including through support for Governments to establish and maintain State systems of accounting for and controlling nuclear material.

The Committee discussed the importance of effective nuclear security, covering physical protection, cybersecurity and computer security for all nuclear and other radioactive materials and facilities, including those materials used for military purposes and related sites. Delegations emphasized the need for all States to achieve and maintain the highest standards of nuclear security.

Many States parties expressed concern over the existing and constantly evolving and emerging threat of terrorism, including the risk that non-State actors might acquire nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. They recalled the essential role played by the relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1540 (2004), and the obligation of all States to implement binding provisions of those resolutions. They also encouraged all States that had not yet done so to become party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, as soon as possible.

Delegations discussed the need to ensure that exports of nuclear-related dual-use items do not support the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. States parties recalled the legitimate right of all States parties, in particular developing States, to full access to nuclear material, equipment and technological information for peaceful purposes.

The Committee also considered how the further establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones, based on arrangements freely arrived at by the States of the region concerned, enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear non-proliferation regime and contributes towards realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament. Many expressed support for the internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones and acknowledged the contributions to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation represented by the Antarctic Treaty, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Rarotonga Treaty), the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty), the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) and the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia, as well as the nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia.

Many States urged further progress towards ratification by nuclear-weapon States of the relevant protocols to nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties. Several States parties welcomed the reaffirmations by the member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and by the nuclear-weapon States of their readiness to engage in constructive consultations on the outstanding issues relating to signing and ratifying the Protocol to the Bangkok Treaty. The nuclear-weapon States heard calls to review any reservations or interpretative statements made in connection with the ratification of such protocols and to engage in relevant dialogue with members of the zones.

The Committee discussed the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference (NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I), annex), recalling the affirmation of its goals and objectives by subsequent review conferences and highlighting the need to implement the resolution. Many States parties argued that the 1995 resolution remained valid until its goals and objectives were achieved, noting that it was an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Conference and of the basis on which the NPT was indefinitely extended without a vote. States also acknowledged the relevant developments at the first three sessions of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction, convened in November 2019, November 2021 and November 2022 at United Nations Headquarters, in New York.

States parties strongly supported the JCPOA as an achievement of multilateralism endorsed by Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) and as an indispensable mechanism in upholding the non-proliferation regime and promoting peace and stability in the Middle East. Expressing regret over the withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA and its continued erosion, participants called for an immediate return to full implementation of the agreement by all relevant parties.

Participants also discussed the lack of progress in resolving the long-outstanding safeguards issues concerning the Syrian Arab Republic. The country was asked to cooperate fully with the IAEA to resolve all outstanding safeguards issues.

A large group of States parties reaffirmed their unwavering support for the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. They condemned the nuclear tests conducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in 2016 and 2017, while stressing that it must not conduct any further nuclear tests. Additionally, many States parties stressed that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea could not have the status of a nuclear-weapon State pursuant to the Treaty, and called on it to return, without delay, to the Treaty and to the application of IAEA safeguards on all of its nuclear activities. In that connection, 74 States parties released a joint statement on “addressing the North Korean nuclear challenge” (NPT/CONF/2026/PC.I/WP.36).

Furthermore, the Committee discussed how each State party, in exercising its national sovereignty, had the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decided that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty had jeopardized its supreme interests. It reaffirmed that, pursuant to article X, a notice of withdrawal should be given to all other parties to the Treaty and to the Security Council three months in advance and should include a statement of the extraordinary events that the State party regarded as having jeopardized its supreme interests. States parties emphasized that withdrawal did not change any other existing legal obligations or political commitments between the withdrawing State and any other State party, including obligations that applied to nuclear materials and equipment or to scientific and technological information acquired by a State prior to withdrawal, which should remain under safeguards.

The Committee reaffirmed that nothing in the NPT should be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II, III and IV. It also reaffirmed that all NPT States parties should undertake to facilitate and had the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in conformity with all the provisions of the Treaty. Many States parties also stressed that those in a position to do so should cooperate in contributing with other States parties or international organizations, such as the IAEA, to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, particularly in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

Delegations discussed the contribution of nuclear science and technology in meeting global challenges and socioeconomic development needs and emphasized the important role of nuclear science and technology in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals and the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change.

States parties reiterated that each of them had the right to define its national energy policy. Some noted that States parties wishing to pursue nuclear power could consider nuclear technologies and innovations—including advanced reactors, small and modular reactors, as well as large-capacity power reactors and fast-neutron reactors—and the role such technology could potentially play in facilitating energy security, decarbonization and transitioning to a low-carbon economy. States parties reiterated that, when developing nuclear energy, including nuclear power, the use of nuclear energy must be accompanied by commitments to and the ongoing implementation of IAEA safeguards, as well as appropriate and effective levels of safety and security, consistent with States parties’ national legislation and respective international obligations.

The Committee discussed the importance of nuclear safety and nuclear security for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. While recognizing that the responsibility for safety and security rested with individual States, States parties reaffirmed the role of the IAEA in developing safety standards and nuclear security guidance and relevant conventions, based on best practices, in strengthening and coordinating international cooperation on nuclear safety and security.

Many States parties stressed the essential role of the IAEA, including through its Technical Cooperation Programme, in assisting States parties, upon request, in building human and institutional capacities, including regulatory capabilities, for the safe, secure and peaceful applications of nuclear science and technology. Many States parties added that those activities contributed to meeting energy needs, improving human and animal health, combating poverty, protecting the environment, developing agriculture, managing the use of water resources, optimizing industrial processes and preserving cultural heritage, thus helping to improve the quality of life and the well-being of humankind.

The discussion also covered the importance of IAEA technical cooperation activities and nuclear knowledge-sharing, as well as the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries and least developed countries. Many States parties recognized the need to ensure that the IAEA had adequate and necessary support to enable it to provide, upon request, the assistance needed by member States. The Committee discussed how developing countries and least developed countries should be given priority in allocations from the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund. Participants also welcomed the role of the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative in mobilizing extrabudgetary contributions.

States parties discussed how regional and cooperative agreements for the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including under the auspices of the IAEA, could be an effective means in facilitating technical and technology transfers.

Additionally, delegations stressed the importance of transporting radioactive materials consistent with relevant international standards of safety, security and environmental protection. They encouraged continued efforts to improve communication between shipping and coastal States to build confidence and address concerns regarding transport safety, security and emergency preparedness.

The Committee also considered the IAEA Comprehensive Report on the Safety Review of the ALPS-treated Water at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. In that regard, numerous States parties emphasized the importance of the impartial, independent and objective safety review of the IAEA based on relevant safety standards during all phases.

A significant number of States parties emphasized the importance of nuclear safety and security regarding peaceful nuclear facilities and materials in all circumstances, including in armed conflict zones. They noted the IAEA Director General’s seven indispensable pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security during an armed conflict, which were derived from IAEA safety standards and nuclear security guidance. Gravely concerned for the safety and security of Ukraine’s nuclear facilities and materials, particularly the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, participants voiced strong support for the efforts of the IAEA and its Director General regarding the safety and security of those Ukrainian assets, and for the five concrete principles of the IAEA to help to ensure nuclear safety and security at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.

Many States parties welcomed the robust discussion of the Working Group on further strengthening the NPT review process. Many delegations took note of the working paper submitted by the Working Group’s Chair containing recommendations to the Preparatory Committee to improve the effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, accountability, coordination and continuity of the NPT review process. While States parties agreed to further consider proposals to improve the review process, many States expressed regret that the Working Group was not able to agree to continue its work. Participants also expressed divergent views on the possibility of continuing the Working Group’s work during the meetings of the Preparatory Committee.

States parties exchanged views on several specific proposals to improve the effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, accountability, coordination and continuity of the review process. Furthermore, they discussed ways to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the Main Committees and subsidiary bodies of the Review Conference, including by eliminating overlaps between them. Improved time management was also raised as a possible means of improving the efficiency of the review process. Many States parties expressed support for measures to increase accountability for commitments through transparency, reporting and dedicated time to discuss national reports. Several States parties called for the use of a rolling text to improve continuity between the sessions of the Preparatory Committee. There were also calls for the early nomination of presidents of review conferences and chairs of preparatory committees, as well as for continuing to convene informal bureaux during each review cycle comprising the chairs of the Preparatory Committee sessions and presidents-designate of the review conferences to enhance the continuity of and coordination within the review process.

Pursuant to his mandate, the Chair presented delegations with a factual summary of States parties’ deliberations. Owing to objections raised regarding the inclusion of a reference to the factual Chair’s summary in the procedural report of the first session of the Committee, the Chair decided not to issue the draft factual summary as a working paper under his own authority.

The Chair submitted a document containing their reflections on potential areas for focused discussion at the second session of the Preparatory Committee, in 2024 (NPT/CONF.2026/PC.I/WP.38). While it had been usual practice for the reflection papers of chairs of the Preparatory Committee to be submitted as an official document of the Committee, that year the reflection paper of the Chair of the Preparatory Committee’s first session was instead submitted as a working paper.

The Working Group on further strengthening the NPT review process was established by the tenth NPT Review Conference to discuss and make recommendations to the Preparatory Committee relating to measures that would improve the effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, accountability, coordination and continuity of the NPT review process (NPT/CONF.2020/DEC.2).

The Working Group met in Vienna from 24 to 28 July, with 101 States parties participating in its work (for the list of participants, see NPT/CONF.2026/WG.I/INF/6), and elected Jarmo Viinanen (Finland) as its Chair. He also served as Chair of the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 NPT Review Conference, which took place the subsequent week.

At its first meeting, the Working Group decided to hold its deliberations in private unless otherwise decided by States parties in accordance with the rules of procedure. It also decided to allow representatives of regional organizations to participate in its meetings, submit working papers and make statements. The Group allocated a two-hour period during one meeting to substantive presentations by non-governmental organizations, and that segment was held in public. Three regional organizations were represented as observers at the Working Group,^[3] and representatives of six non-governmental organizations attended its public meeting (see NPT/CONF.2026/WG.I/INF/5).

In the lead-up to and during the Working Group’s session, States submitted working papers in which they proposed measures to improve the effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, accountability, coordination and continuity of the review process. The suggested measures to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the review process included the following: imposing time limits for statements; clarifying the mandates of the Main Committees and subsidiary bodies and reducing redundancies between them; circulating the draft outcome document of review conferences in advance; and acting early to establish subsidiary bodies, nominate chairs and designate topics for discussion. Furthermore, many participants submitted working papers in which they supported the concept of “rolling texts” that would inform the discussions of successive preparatory committees and review conferences.

States also presented proposals aimed at improving the transparency and accountability of the review process. For example, participants urged States parties, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, to fully implement Actions 20 and 21 of the 2010 NPT Action Plan (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), annex), including with regard to a standard reporting form. Proposals were made concerning items to include in such a form, and participants suggested holding dedicated discussions on national reports—particularly those by the nuclear-weapon States—during the formal meetings of the Treaty.

Finally, the working papers submitted by States included potential measures to improve the continuity and coordination of the review process. The ideas included earlier designation of the chairs of preparatory committees and the presidents of review conferences, as well as their respective officers; regional outreach such as workshops and consultations; funding assistance for developing States; and the establishment of an implementation support unit or Treaty support unit, or the formalization of the Office for Disarmament Affairs as the permanent secretariat of the NPT review process.

During the meeting of the Working Group, States parties exchanged views on the various proposals contained in the working papers and presented additional proposals on measures to improve the effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, accountability, coordination and continuity of the review process.

In line with the decision establishing the Working Group, the Chair presented a series of recommendations for the Group’s adoption. However, States did not reach a consensus either to adopt the recommendations or to continue the deliberations of the Working Group. Under his own authority, the Chair of the Working Group submitted to the Preparatory Committee a working paper containing his recommendations for improving the effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, accountability, coordination and continuity of the NPT review process (NPT/CONF.2026/PC.I/WP.34).

Nuclear testing and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

In 2023, there were both notable advancements and negative developments in the global commitment against nuclear explosive testing. The advancements were underscored through two significant ratifications of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, by Solomon Islands on 20 January and Sri Lanka on 25 July, further extending the Treaty’s global reach. Somalia’s signature on 8 September further underscored the Treaty’s broad global support.

On 29 August, during the General Assembly’s annual commemoration of the International Day against Nuclear Tests, many States echoed the urgency of advancing the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and highlighted the humanitarian consequences of nuclear testing. Pressing for the Treaty’s entry into force, a significant number of delegations stressed the existential threat posed by nuclear weapons and their proliferation. Delegates also called on the nuclear-weapon States to uphold their responsibilities towards States and peoples affected by nuclear testing. Such statements reflected a global consensus on the urgency of eliminating nuclear tests and the critical role of the Treaty in achieving that goal. In her statement, the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs emphasized the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as a key element in the global disarmament and non-proliferation regime. She stressed that although the Treaty was not in force, it had established a global standard against nuclear testing. At the same time, she underscored the urgency of its entry into force.

On 22 September, the biennial Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (Article XIV Conference) took place at United Nations Headquarters, in New York. In the Final Declaration of the Conference (CTBT-Art.XIV/2023/6, annex), the States parties and other signatory States emphasized the urgent need for the Treaty’s entry into force and voiced “deep concern” over the delay in its implementation for the 27 years since it was opened for signature. Furthermore, they highlighted the Treaty as a crucial instrument for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and welcomed progress towards its universalization. The States strongly urged the remaining Annex 2 States to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty without delay and called on all States “to refrain from nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, the development and use of new nuclear weapon technologies and any action that would undermine the object and purpose and the implementation of the provisions of the [Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty]”. Representatives from 88 ratifying and signatory States, along with one observer State, attended the Conference. Additionally, two international organizations and seven non-governmental organizations participated in the Conference (for the list of participants, see CTBT-Art.XIV/2023/INF.6).

In her address to the Conference, the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs underscored the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as a fundamental element in the pursuit of a nuclear-weapon-free future. She highlighted the considerable progress achieved since the Treaty’s inception, reflected in the widespread support for the agreement and the establishment of a global verification system. However, she again expressed concern that the Treaty had not yet entered into force owing to the pending ratifications of remaining Annex 2 States. Emphasizing the danger of retreating from non-testing commitments, she urged States under nuclear testing moratoriums to reaffirm them. Additionally, she called for proactive efforts towards ratifying the Treaty, citing the need to “champion progress over regression”.

Despite collective efforts towards banning nuclear testing, the latter part of the year saw a series of negative developments on the matter of nuclear tests. In September, satellite imagery provided by a non-governmental organization revealed that China, the Russian Federation and the United States had expanded their nuclear test site facilities from 2018 to 2023. That expansion included new construction and tunnelling at the Lop Nur site in China, the Novaya Zemlya site in the Russian Federation and the Nevada National Security Site in the United States. In the context of escalating nuclear tensions exacerbated by the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, the activities at the test sites raised concerns about a possible weakening of the global norm against nuclear tests.

On 2 November, the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, signed a law revoking his country’s ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, marking a significant setback in advancing the Treaty’s universalization. The development followed unanimous approval of the legislation by both the State Duma and the Federation Council. Russian officials stated that the decision was tied to the policies of the United States towards the Russian Federation, reflecting President Putin’s previously stated intention to “mirror” the position of the United States, which had signed but not ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

In response, the Secretary-General expressed deep regret over the withdrawal, noting that it marked a departure from the Russian Federation’s previous leadership in seeking to bring the Treaty into force.

With the Russian de-ratification, the number of Annex 2 States whose ratifications are needed for the Treaty’s entry into force increased to nine, the number of ratifying States fell to 177, and the count of signatories remained at 187.

Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, adopted in 2017, includes a comprehensive set of prohibitions on participating in any nuclear-weapon activity. The Treaty entered into force on 22 January 2021, following the deposit of the fiftieth instrument of ratification or accession with the Secretary-General on 24 October 2020.

In 2023, one State acceded to the Treaty (Sri Lanka), and two States signed it (Bahamas and Djibouti). As at 31 December, the Treaty had 69 States parties and 93 signatory States.

The first Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons decided in 2022 to establish a scientific advisory group to facilitate decision-making on the basis of the most up-to-date scientific knowledge available to States parties (TPNW/MSP/2022/6, annex III, decision 2). On 8 February 2023, the President of the second Meeting of States Parties, following consultations with States parties, appointed 15 members of the newly established Scientific Advisory Group. The Group held its first meeting on 1 March. At that meeting, it elected its Co-Chairs, Patricia Lewis and Zia Mian. The Group would go on to hold a total of nine online meetings and one hybrid meeting in the lead-up to the second Meeting of States Parties.

The Group submitted to the second Meeting of States Parties a report on its annual activities (TPNW/MSP/2023/6) and a report on the status and developments regarding nuclear weapons, nuclear-weapon risks, the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament and related issues (TPNW/MSP/2023/8, also available as an enhanced publication). The Co-Chairs presented those reports at the second Meeting of States Parties.

In her address to the second Meeting of States Parties, the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs noted that the Group was unique among multilateral disarmament treaties and that its establishment was a sign of States parties’ commitment to ensuring that their actions were founded on facts and rooted on impartial and expert scientific advice.

The intersessional process initiated by the first Meeting of States Parties continued in the lead-up to the second Meeting. The Co-Chairs of the informal working groups, the informal facilitators and the gender focal point submitted reports to the second Meeting of States Parties detailing the progress achieved.^[4] In addition, the Coordinating Committee held a number of hybrid meetings and a virtual meeting to coordinate the intersessional process and prepare for the second Meeting of States Parties. The Coordinating Committee comprises the Presidents of the first, second and third Meeting of States Parties, the working group Co-Chairs, the informal facilitators of work to promote the complementarity of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons with other treaties, and the gender focal point.^[5]

The Secretary-General convened the second Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons at United Nations Headquarters, in New York, from 27 November to 1 December. On 1 December, the Meeting adopted its report (TPNW/MSP/2023/14), as well as a declaration entitled “Our commitment to upholding the prohibition of nuclear weapons and averting their catastrophic consequences” (annex I) and a number of decisions (annex II).

Juan Ramón de la Fuente (Mexico) served as President of the Meeting. Its opening plenary included an address delivered by the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs on behalf of the Secretary-General, as well as statements from high-level officials. A general exchange of views took place at its fourth, fifth and sixth plenary meetings. In total, 48 States parties, 18 observer States, three international organizations, 13 civil society organizations and a nuclear test survivor spoke during the high-level opening segment and the general exchange of views.

At its second and third plenary meetings, on 27 and 28 November, the Meeting held a thematic discussion on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. It consisted of two panel discussions, followed by questions and comments from States parties and observers. At its sixth to ninth plenary meetings, from 29 November to 1 December, the Meeting considered the Treaty’s status and operation and other matters important for achieving its objectives and purpose. The President, the Co-Chairs of the informal working groups, the informal facilitators and the gender focal point introduced their reports and working papers, and they briefed participants on the work done during the intersessional period. Afterwards, States parties and observers had an opportunity to make comments (for more information, see TPNW/MSP/2023/14, paras. 19, 20 and 22).

In the declaration entitled “Our commitment to upholding the prohibition of nuclear weapons and averting their catastrophic consequences” (TPNW/MSP/2023/14, annex I), States parties noted that nuclear risks were being exacerbated by the continued and increasing salience of and emphasis on nuclear weapons in military postures and doctrines. The authors reaffirmed their grave concern about the catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons, which underpinned the moral and ethical imperatives for nuclear disarmament. They said that they firmly deplored and remained deeply alarmed by threats to use nuclear weapons, as well as increasingly strident nuclear rhetoric. The States parties expressed their unyielding commitment to delegitimizing, stigmatizing and totally eliminating nuclear weapons. They also reaffirmed the complementarity between the NPT and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and pledged to work relentlessly to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons.

The Meeting adopted a number of decisions, extending the intersessional structure established by the first Meeting of States Parties to the period between the second and third Meetings (decision 1) and giving presidents of future Meetings the option to convene thematic debates at the Meetings (decision 2). The Meeting also adopted, on a provisional basis, for voluntary use by States parties, the reporting guidelines and the reporting format for articles 6 and 7 of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (decision 3), contained in document TPNW/MSP/2023/3. The Meeting decided to hold focused discussions in its informal working group on victim assistance, environmental remediation, and cooperation and assistance regarding an international trust fund for victim assistance and environmental remediation (decision 4). The Meeting also established a consultative process between the second and third Meetings of States Parties to promote and articulate the legitimate security concerns and threat and risk perceptions enshrined in the Treaty that resulted from the existence of nuclear weapons and the concept of nuclear deterrence, as well as to challenge the security paradigm based on nuclear deterrence (decision 5).

The Meeting elected Akan Rakhmetullin (Kazakhstan) as President of the third Meeting of States Parties in accordance with rule 6(3) of its rules of procedure. It decided that the third Meeting of States Parties would be held within the week of 3–7 March 2025 at United Nations Headquarters, in New York (TPNW/MSP/2023/14, para. 24).

Bilateral agreements and other issues

On 5 February 2018, the United States and the Russian Federation met the central limits of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START). Under the Treaty, the parties must possess no more than 700 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers, and no more than 1,550 warheads associated with those deployed launchers.

In an address to the Russian Federal Assembly on 21 February, President Putin announced that the Russian Federation was “suspending its participation” in the Treaty, citing the conflict in Ukraine and hostile Western actions against the Russian Federation. He clarified that the Russian Federation was not withdrawing from the Treaty. In a subsequent statement, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted that the Russian Federation intended to strictly comply with the quantitative restrictions on strategic offensive arms within the Treaty’s life cycle, and that it would continue to exchange notifications with the United States on launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. It added that the decision to suspend New START could be reversed if the United States demonstrated the political will and took efforts towards general de-escalation. There is no provision for suspension in the Treaty.

The two parties to New START did not participate in the biannual data exchange on Treaty-accountable items. However, on 12 May, the United States voluntarily released to the public aggregate data of its nuclear forces covered by the Treaty as at 1 March.

As of 1 June, the United States announced “countermeasures” to the Russian suspension that included withholding notifications required under the Treaty, such as updates on the status or location of missiles, launchers and other Treaty-accountable items—an obligation that the Russian Federation had allegedly ceased to fulfil since 28 February. However, the United States reported that it continued to notify the Russian Federation about launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles^[6] and of exercises.^[7] Furthermore, the United States announced that it would refrain from facilitating New START inspection activities on its territory by revoking existing visas and that it would not provide telemetric information on the launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The United States also expressed its desire and readiness to reverse those measures and fully implement the Treaty upon the Russian Federation’s return to full implementation of the Treaty.

The parties convened no meetings of the Bilateral Consultative Commission in 2023. If New START, as the last remaining bilateral strategic nuclear arms control agreement, expires on 4 February 2026 without a successor arrangement in place, there will be no limitations on strategic nuclear arsenals for the first time in five decades.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea continued its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes in 2023, conducting a total of 31 launches using ballistic missile technology in contravention of the relevant Security Council resolutions.^[8] Although the country carried out fewer launches than in 2022, when it recorded its highest number in a single year,^[9] its activity in 2023 included launches of five intercontinental ballistic missiles. Moreover, three of those launches used the Hwasong-18, the country’s first solid-fuelled intercontinental ballistic missile. As solid-propellant missiles do not need to undergo lengthy fuelling prior to launch, they can be prepared more quickly than liquid-propellant missiles and are thus harder to detect in advance.

The country also successfully put its first military satellite into orbit in November,^[10] following two failed attempts in May and August. Meanwhile, it maintained steady progress in implementing the five-year military development plan unveiled at its eighth Party Congress, in January 2021.

On 18 February, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea launched a Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile from Pyongyang International Airport. It reportedly flew for a total of 66 minutes, reaching an altitude of around 5,768 km.

Then, on 16 March, the country launched a Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile from the same location. Over 69 minutes, the missile flew a distance of 1,000 km and had a maximum altitude of 6,045 km.

On 13 April, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea reportedly test-fired an intercontinental ballistic missile—called the Hwasong-18—to confirm “the performance of the high-thrust solid-fuel engines for multi-stage missiles”.

On 12 July, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea conducted the second test launch of a Hwasong-18 intercontinental ballistic missile from the Pyongyang area. The missile reportedly flew for around 1,000 km and achieved an altitude of 6,000 km; the reported flight duration of around 74 minutes was the longest of any ballistic missile launched by the country.

Later, on 18 December, the Government again launched a Hwasong-18 intercontinental ballistic missile from the Pyongyang area. It flew for a period of 73 minutes.

In addition, the Government launched a number of shorter-range ballistic missiles in 2023. In that connection, in November, the nation announced its first successful test of solid-fuel motors intended for use in intermediate-range ballistic missiles.

On 31 May, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea attempted to launch what it described as a military reconnaissance satellite, called Malligyong-1, mounted on a “new-type carrier rocket”, Chollima-1, from the Sohae Satellite Launching Station, located on the country’s western coast. The nation said that the rocket crashed after losing thrust following the separation of its first and second stages.

On 24 August, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea attempted a second time to launch a military reconnaissance satellite from the Sohae Satellite Launching Station. The launch failed again owing to “an error in the emergency blasting system during the third-stage flight”, according to the Government.

On 21 November, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea made its third attempt at launching a military satellite. The country’s National Aerospace Technology Administration announced that the rocket travelled along its predetermined flight path, as expected, and placed the reconnaissance satellite in orbit approximately 10 minutes after launch. It noted that the satellite would become operational on 1 December and had already successfully transmitted photographic images, adding that the Government planned to launch “several reconnaissance satellites in a short span of time”.

The country also conducted several tests of other weapons systems during the year. Those included tests of Haeil-class unmanned underwater vehicle systems carried out from 21 to 23 March, from 25 to 27 March and from 4 to 7 April. The nation also claimed in April to have sent a nuclear-capable drone on its longest mission, stating that it travelled 1,000 km and remained underwater for 70 hours before successfully detonating a “trial warhead” on a target. Additionally, on 23 February, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea reported launching four Hwasal-2 strategic cruise missiles from its eastern coast; the four missiles reportedly flew a distance of around 2,000 km each. On 12 March, the country said that it had tested two “strategic cruise missiles” from a submarine off the east coast of the country. It reported that the missiles flew in figure-eight patterns, covering a distance of around 1,500 km over approximately 125 minutes.

Furthermore, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea conducted several launches of cruise missiles in 2023. Although cruise missiles are not covered by relevant resolutions of the Security Council, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had linked its development of cruise missiles to its nuclear weapons programme by referring to the weapons as “strategic”—a term it generally uses to signify a capability to deliver a nuclear payload.

On 28 March, the Korean Central News Agency, the state news agency of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, reported that Kim Jong Un—General Secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea, Chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army—was guiding the work of mounting nuclear warheads to ballistic missiles and of operating new tactical nuclear weapons. The leader reportedly also called on his country to expand its production of nuclear material in order to manufacture more weapons.

The IAEA Director General reported on 6 March that the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site “remains prepared to support a nuclear test”. The IAEA also observed construction activities at the Yongbyon nuclear complex, as well as indications that the 5-megawatt nuclear reactor was operating. In November, in his opening statement to the IAEA Board of Governors, the Director General stated that the IAEA had observed increased levels of activity since mid-October at and near the Light Water Reactor at Yongbyon, as well as a strong water outflow from its cooling system. Owing to its lack of access to the facility, however, the IAEA could neither confirm the reactor’s operational status nor assess its safety. The Director General called on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to comply fully with its obligations under Security Council resolutions, cooperate promptly with the Agency in the full and effective implementation of its NPT Safeguards Agreement, and resolve all outstanding issues.

On 26 April, the President of the United States, Joseph Biden, and the President of the Republic of Korea, Yoon Suk Yeol, met in Washington, D.C., to mark the seventieth anniversary of the alliance between their countries. On that occasion, the two leaders announced an agreement to strengthen bilateral cooperation on extended deterrence. In the agreement, called the Washington Declaration, their Governments outlined a plan for renewed bilateral nuclear cooperation, including through the establishment of a Nuclear Consultative Group to provide a platform for discussing issues of nuclear and strategic planning and execution. Both States also agreed to enhance the regular visibility of strategic assets to the Korean peninsula, including United States nuclear ballistic missile submarines, as well as take other measures to plan for and respond to regional threats.

Meanwhile, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation significantly strengthened their bilateral ties, marked by high-level diplomatic exchanges, increased economic cooperation and a shared stance on key regional security issues.

In July, the Russian Minister of Defence, Sergei Shoigu, led a high-level delegation to Pyongyang to attend celebrations for the Korean War armistice anniversary, on 26 July—the first high-level visit to the country by foreign dignitaries since the start of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic in 2020. A delegation from China also attended the celebrations. The Defence Minister met with Chairman Kim during the trip.

In September, Chairman Kim and President Putin met at Vostochny Cosmodrome in the Russian Federation on the topic of expanding bilateral relations, including through strengthened military collaboration. While no official statement was released at the end of their meeting, reports emerged after the visit that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had transferred a large quantity of ammunition and artillery shells to the Russian Federation—an action widely believed to be linked to the Russian war in Ukraine. It was also alleged that short-range ballistic missiles from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea were used to attack Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia region from a launch point in the Russian Federation on 30 December.

During the ninth session of its Supreme People’s Assembly in September, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea amended its Constitution, further enshrining its policy on nuclear forces. This move followed the Supreme People’s Assembly’s adoption of the law “on the [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s] policy on the nuclear forces” in 2022. Moreover, global concerns grew regarding the country’s alleged illegal cyber activities, which could be linked to the financing of its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes.

For their part, the Republic of Korea and the United States resumed large-scale joint military exercises on the Korean peninsula, as well as trilateral naval exercises conducted in the region with Japan. In November, the Republic of Korea partially suspended its Comprehensive Military Agreement with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in response to the latter’s military satellite launch. Subsequently, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea announced that it had completely scrapped the Agreement and would “forward deploy more powerful weapons and newer military equipment to the [border] area”.

The Security Council met nine times in 2023 in response to the various launches by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea using ballistic missile technology (see S/PV.9232, S/PV.9246, S/PV.9260, S/PV.9272, S/PV.9294, S/PV.9308, S/PV.9322, S/PV.9345 and S/PV.9357). The Council remained divided, however, with many members strongly condemning the country’s actions, and two of them placed the blame for the rise in tensions on the United States and its allies.

In July, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea attended a meeting of the Security Council for the first time since 2017 to defend its intercontinental ballistic missile test as a legitimate exercise of self-defence. It attended all of the Council’s subsequent meetings on the topic for the remainder of the year.

In the last week of December, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea held the ninth plenum of the eighth Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea. As the meeting concluded, the nation’s leader ordered his country’s military, munitions industry and nuclear weapons sector to accelerate war preparations to counter what he called unprecedented confrontational moves by the United States and its regional allies. The Government added that it would continue in 2024 to implement its five-year military plan, including through increased nuclear weapons production and three additional launches of military reconnaissance satellites.

The Islamic Republic of Iran continued to enhance its nuclear programme throughout 2023, significantly surpassing limits outlined in the JCPOA. The Government asserted that it had been progressively stepping away from its JCPOA undertakings since July 2020, following the United States’ unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA in May 2018.

From September 2022 to the end of 2023, there were limited developments concerning the talks between the remaining JCPOA parties^[11] and the United States on achieving a return to the JCPOA’s full and effective implementation by all relevant parties. In June, the media reported on indirect talks between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran aimed at reaching an informal deal. The reported provisions included limiting Iranian uranium enrichment to 60 per cent in exchange for the release of frozen Iranian assets and a prisoner exchange between the two countries.

Around the same time, the IAEA reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran had slowed its production of uranium enriched to 60 per cent by approximately two thirds since June and had mixed some of that uranium stock with low-enriched uranium (see GOV/2023/39). However, by the end of December, the country had returned to the previous production rate, likely as a result of the deterioration in its relationship with the United States following the start of the war in Gaza.

On 18 October, the JCPOA “Transition Day”, further restrictions on the Islamic Republic of Iran under Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) were lifted, including those related to Iranian ballistic missile and drone activities. Although the European Union was required under the JCPOA to lift its sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran on the same day,^[12] the bloc announced that it would retain non-proliferation sanctions, as well as arms and missile embargoes, owing to Iranian non-compliance with the JCPOA.

In 2023, the IAEA continued to report to its Board of Governors and the Security Council on the implementation of nuclear-related commitments by the Islamic Republic of Iran under the JCPOA, as well as on matters related to verification and monitoring in the country in view of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015). The IAEA reported that the Iranian Government continued to engage in several activities inconsistent with the JCPOA, such as accumulating uranium enriched to 60 per cent U-235, as well as to 20 per cent U-235 and to 5 per cent U-235, at its three fuel enrichment facilities.^[13] According to the IAEA’s final report of the year on the matter (GOV/2023/57), as at 28 October, the Islamic Republic of Iran had stockpiled an estimated^[14] total of 4,130.7 kg of uranium enriched to various levels, including 128.3 kg of uranium enriched to 60 per cent U-235 and 567.1 kg of uranium enriched to 20 per cent U-235, both in the form of uranium hexafluoride (UF-6). In the previous year, from October 2022, the country had increased its total stockpile of enriched uranium by 457.7 kg (a 12.4 per cent increase), which included 66 kg of uranium enriched to 60 per cent U-235 (a 105.9 per cent increase) and 180.7 kg of uranium enriched to 20 per cent U-235 (a 46.8 per cent increase). Under the JCPOA, the Islamic Republic of Iran committed not to accumulate more than 202.8 kg of uranium enriched to 3.67 per cent U-235.

On 22 January, the IAEA detected highly enriched uranium particles containing up to 83.7 per cent U-235 in samples taken at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant. Notably, that finding occurred one day after the Agency discovered an undeclared change in the configuration of centrifuge cascades at the plant, which the Islamic Republic of Iran had been using to enrich uranium to 60 per cent U-235. The IAEA held several meetings with the Government to clarify the matter, with Iranian officials initially attributing the traces found at the Fordow Plant to “unintended fluctuations”. After evaluating information provided by the Islamic Republic of Iran, the IAEA assessed that the information provided “was not inconsistent with the Islamic Republic of Iran’s explanation”, and thus said that it “had no further questions on the matter at that stage”. Furthermore, in its report to the Board of Governors and the Security Council dated 31 May (GOV/2023/24), the IAEA assessed that there had been no accumulation or collection of uranium enriched to 83.7 per cent.

As of June, the Islamic Republic of Iran had slowed its pace of accumulation of uranium enriched to 60 per cent U-235. In its report to the Board of Governors and the Security Council dated 4 September (GOV/2023/39), the IAEA reported that from early June, the Islamic Republic of Iran had reduced by two thirds the production rate of uranium enriched to that level, from approximately 9 kg per month to 3 kg per month. The Agency also noted that, while the Islamic Republic of Iran had produced 13.9 kg of uranium enriched to 60 per cent in that period, it had blended down 6.4 kg of the material by mixing it with uranium enriched to 5 per cent.

Prior to that IAEA report, media had reported on indirect talks between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran aimed at reaching the informal deal described previously. Consequently, observers speculated that the Iranian Government had reduced its rate of enrichment as part of an informal arrangement with the United States. Furthermore, on 18 September, five United States citizens imprisoned in the Islamic Republic of Iran were allowed to return to the United States in exchange for the release of five Iranian citizens jailed in the United States. In addition, approximately $6 billion in Iranian assets that had been frozen in the Republic of Korea were reportedly transferred to an account in Qatar for purchasing humanitarian goods such as medicine and food.

After a period of reduced production, however, on 26 December, the IAEA reported a notable shift in the Islamic Republic of Iran’s enrichment of uranium to 60 per cent (GOV/INF/2023/18); the country had resumed production at a rate of approximately 9 kg per month, the level observed before June. The war in Gaza, in combination with the Iranian Government’s alleged support for Hamas, had led to a considerable deterioration in the relationship between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States since October, likely bringing an end to the arrangement.

Meanwhile, the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to expand its enrichment capacity at its Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz. As at 28 October, the country was operating a total of 51 cascades of IR-1, IR-2m, IR-4 and IR-6 centrifuges there, and it had finished constructing an additional 15 cascades of IR-2m and IR-4 centrifuges (GOV/2023/57, B.4.1). About one year earlier, on 1 November 2022, the Islamic Republic of Iran had been operating 45 cascades of centrifuges of various types (GOV/2022/62, para. 21). The country had informed the IAEA of its plan to expand the number of cascades at the Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz to 72, from the 30 provided for in the JCPOA (GOV/INF/2022/24, paras. 2 and 3; GOV/2023/24, para. 22). In addition, the Government had advised the IAEA of its intention to commission Building 1000 at Natanz with a capacity of eight enrichment units, each of which could hold 18 cascades. However, at the end of 2023, the Islamic Republic of Iran had yet to provide the IAEA with details of centrifuge types or numbers of cascades to be installed in the new area.

Separately, the number of operating cascades in the country’s Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant did not increase in 2023, instead remaining at eight (six cascades of IR-1 centrifuges and two cascades of IR-6 centrifuges), despite a previously shared Iranian plan to increase the number of cascades at the site to 16 (GOV/2023/8, para. 27).

Throughout the year, the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to not implement voluntary transparency measures contained in the JCPOA. The affected measures included provisions of the additional protocol to the country’s comprehensive safeguards agreement, as well as modified code 3.1 of the subsidiary arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement, which the Government had ceased to implement in February 2021. Furthermore, the Islamic Republic of Iran had decided in June 2022 to remove all IAEA surveillance and monitoring equipment related to the JCPOA. Following the issuance on 4 March 2023 of a joint statement by the IAEA and the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, on 2 and 3 May, the Agency installed surveillance cameras at centrifuge components manufacturing workshops in Esfahan, but without access to the data recorded by those cameras. As the cameras required servicing every three months for proper functioning, the Government allowed the IAEA to service the equipment on 2 September and 30 December. The Islamic Republic of Iran did not agree to the Agency’s request to install cameras at another location in the country where centrifuge components were manufactured. In late April and early May, the IAEA installed enrichment monitoring devices at the Fordow Plant and the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant to measure the levels of U-235 contained in the highly enriched uranium produced at the facilities.

The IAEA reiterated that its verification and monitoring activities related to the JCPOA had been seriously affected by the cessation of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s implementation of nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA, and that the situation had been exacerbated by the subsequent decision to remove all of the IAEA’s related surveillance and monitoring equipment. Since February 2021, the IAEA had not been able to perform verification and monitoring activities in relation to the production and inventory of centrifuges, rotors and bellows, heavy water and uranium ore concentrate. Even in the event of a full resumption of implementation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of its JCPOA nuclear-related commitments, the IAEA would not be able to re-establish continuity of knowledge in those areas; instead, the IAEA would have to establish a new baseline.

In a letter to the IAEA Director General dated 16 September, the Islamic Republic of Iran informed the Agency that it had decided to withdraw the designation of several experienced IAEA inspectors to work in the Islamic Republic of Iran. That move followed the country’s recent withdrawal of the designation of another experienced IAEA inspector. While the IAEA noted that the measure was formally permitted by the country’s NPT Safeguards Agreement, it was exercised by the Islamic Republic of Iran in a manner that directly and seriously affected the IAEA’s ability to conduct its verification activities effectively in Iran. On 4 October, Mohammad Eslami, the Vice-President of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, reportedly stated that “the dismissed inspectors were from three European countries that regularly demonstrated harsh political behaviours”, appearing to indicate that the Islamic Republic of Iran withdrew their designations in retaliation to remarks made by IAEA member States. The IAEA stressed that such linking was extreme, unjustified and unprecedented, and that it made the Agency’s independent technical work subject to political pressure. The IAEA and the Islamic Republic of Iran met and exchanged letters in an effort to resolve the matter.

In 2023, the IAEA continued to report on the implementation of its 1974 agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran on the application of safeguards in connection with the NPT and the additional protocol provisionally applied by the Government pending its entry into force. Since 2019, the IAEA had been undertaking efforts to obtain clarifications from the Islamic Republic of Iran concerning information related to anthropogenic uranium particles and possible undeclared nuclear material and nuclear-related activities at four locations that had not been declared.^[15]

On 4 March 2023, the IAEA Director General visited Tehran, where he met with Ebrahim Raisi, the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran; Vice-President Eslami; and Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, the Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The sides discussed matters related to Iranian cooperation with the IAEA, in particular the need to effectively implement the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the country. Following an exchange between the Director General and Vice-President Eslami, the discussants issued a joint statement addressing the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement, the outstanding safeguards issues and further verification measures.

In March, through a meeting between senior IAEA officials and Iranian officials in Tehran and a letter addressed to the IAEA, the Islamic Republic of Iran provided a possible explanation for the presence of depleted uranium particles at one location called “Marivan”. Specifically, the Government reaffirmed its position that an organization from another Member State had operated a mine in the area in the 1960s and 1970s, including an on-site chemical laboratory that was the possible source of the contamination of depleted uranium particles with U-236. In a letter dated 27 April, the IAEA informed the Islamic Republic of Iran that the information provided offered a possible explanation for the presence of depleted uranium particles at the site. Therefore, the Agency said that it had “no additional questions” and the matter was “no longer outstanding at this stage” (GOV/23/26, paras. 17 and 18).

The IAEA reported that, in April, the Islamic Republic of Iran had provided the Agency with revised nuclear material accountancy reports for its Uranium Conversion Facility. The revised data came in response to a discrepancy between the amount of nuclear material that the IAEA verified to have come from the dissolution of natural uranium at the site and the amount that the Iranian Government had declared. However, the IAEA assessed that the revised reports neither addressed the discrepancy nor satisfied the requirements for measuring nuclear material stipulated under article 55 of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement. The Agency considered that the Iranian corrections were not based on scientific grounds and, therefore, concluded that they were not acceptable (GOV/23/26, paras. 12–14). Subsequent exchanges between the IAEA and the Government on the matter in July and August did not resolve the issue (GOV/2023/43, paras. 31–36).

On 18 October, the JCPOA “Transition Day”, further United Nations restrictions placed on the Islamic Republic of Iran under Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) were lifted, such as those related to Iranian ballistic missile activities and drones, according to paragraphs 3 and 4 of annex B to the resolution. Although the European Union was required to lift its sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran on the same day,^[16] the bloc stated that it would retain non-proliferation sanctions on the country as a result of its non-compliance with the JCPOA.

On 14 September, in advance of the Transition Day, France, Germany and the United Kingdom issued a joint statement on their intention to maintain nuclear-related measures on the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as arms and missile embargoes, owing to its refusal to return to commitments under the JCPOA. The three States added that their decision was fully compliant with the JCPOA and amounted neither to imposing additional sanctions nor to triggering the JCPOA’s “snap back” mechanism.

On 18 October, 46 endorsing States of the Proliferation Security Initiative issued a joint statement in which they pledged to continue “to counter destabilizing Iranian missile- and [uncrewed aerial vehicle]-related activities”.

Meanwhile, as per Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), the Secretary-General submitted two reports to the Council in 2023 on the implementation of the JCPOA. In those reports (S/2023/473 and S/2023/975)—issued on 29 June and 15 December, respectively—the Secretary-General provided his fifteenth and sixteenth assessments on provisions of the resolution concerning restrictions applicable to nuclear- and ballistic missile-related transfers, as well as asset freezes and travel bans.

In the two reports, the Secretary-General underlined his view that the JCPOA remained “the best available option for ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme”. With regard to restrictions on paragraph 4-related transfers to or from the Islamic Republic of Iran, he stated in his December report that, after examining the debris of a cruise missile used in an attack by the Houthis on the Dabbah oil terminal in November 2022, the Secretariat assessed that the missile used in the offensive was of Iranian origin and may have been transferred from the Islamic Republic of Iran in a manner inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015). Regarding the alleged transfer of uncrewed aerial vehicles from the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Russian Federation, the Secretary-General stated in his June report that the Secretariat continued to examine the relevant available information.

International Atomic Energy Agency verification

Since its founding in 1957, the IAEA has served as the focal point for worldwide cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, for promoting global nuclear security and safety and, through its verification activities, for providing assurances that States’ international undertakings to use nuclear material and facilities for peaceful purposes are being honoured. The following is a brief survey of the work of the IAEA in 2023 in the area of nuclear verification, nuclear security, peaceful uses of nuclear energy and nuclear fuel assurances.

A major pillar of the IAEA’s programme involves the implementation of safeguards activities that enable the IAEA to provide assurances to the international community regarding the peaceful use of nuclear material and facilities. The IAEA’s verification programme thus remains at the core of multilateral efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons by verifying that States are complying with their safeguards obligations.^[17]

At the end of each year, the IAEA draws safeguards conclusions for each State with a safeguards agreement in force for which safeguards are applied, based upon the evaluation of all safeguards-related information available to it for that year. For a “broader conclusion” to be drawn that “all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities”, a State must have both a comprehensive safeguards agreement^[18] and an additional protocol^[19] in force, and the IAEA must have been able to conduct all necessary verification and evaluation activities for the State and have found no indication that, in its judgment, would give rise to a safeguards concern. For States that have a comprehensive safeguards agreement but no additional protocol in force, the IAEA draws a safeguards conclusion regarding only the non-diversion of declared nuclear material, as the IAEA does not have sufficient tools to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in such States.

With regard to States for which the broader conclusion has been drawn, the IAEA was able to implement integrated safeguards—an optimized combination of measures available under comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols—based on the State-level safeguards approach^[20] developed for that State.

In 2023, safeguards were applied for 189 States^[21],^[22] with safeguards agreements in force with the IAEA. Of the 136 States that had both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force, the IAEA concluded that all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities in 74 States;^[22] for 62 States, as the necessary evaluation regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for each of these States remained ongoing, the IAEA was unable to draw the same conclusion. For those 62 States and the 45 States with a comprehensive safeguards agreement but no additional protocol in force, the IAEA concluded only that declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.

Integrated safeguards were implemented for the whole, or part, of 2023 for 70 States.^[22]

With regard to the three States for which the IAEA implemented safeguards pursuant to item-specific safeguards agreements,^[23] the IAEA concluded that nuclear material, facilities or other items to which safeguards had been applied remained in peaceful activities. Safeguards were also implemented with regard to nuclear material in selected facilities in the five nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT under their respective voluntary offer agreements. For those five States, the IAEA concluded that nuclear material in selected facilities to which safeguards had been applied remained in peaceful activities or had been withdrawn from safeguards as provided for in the agreements.

As of 31 December, four non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT had yet to bring comprehensive safeguards agreements into force pursuant to article III of the Treaty. For those States parties, the IAEA could not draw any safeguards conclusions.

Safeguards agreements and additional protocols are legal instruments that provide the basis for IAEA verification activities. The entry into force of such instruments, therefore, continues to be crucial to effective and efficient IAEA safeguards.

The Agency continued to implement the Plan of Action to Promote the Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, which was last updated in September. In addition to organizing an awareness-raising event with the Pacific island States on 25 April, the IAEA joined consultations throughout the year with representatives of a number of member and non-member States in Geneva, New York and Vienna. During those outreach activities, the Agency encouraged States to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols, as well as to amend or rescind their small quantities protocols based on the original standard text.

In 2023, a comprehensive safeguards agreement with a small quantities protocol, based on the revised standard text, entered into force for Sao Tome and Principe. Furthermore, additional protocols entered into force for the Plurinational State of Bolivia and for Sao Tome and Principe.

As concluded by the Board of Governors in 2005, the small quantities protocol based on the original standard text is a weakness in the Agency’s safeguards system. In 2023, a small quantities protocol was amended for Nauru. At the end of 2023, 79 States had operative small quantities protocols in force, based on the revised standard text.

Between 16 January 2016 and 23 February 2021, the IAEA, in the light of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), verified and monitored the Islamic Republic of Iran’s implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA. From 8 May 2019 onwards, however, the country reduced the implementation of those commitments on a step-by-step basis and, from 23 February 2021 onwards, stopped the implementation of those commitments altogether, including the additional protocol. That seriously affected the Agency’s verification and monitoring in relation to the JCPOA, which was exacerbated in June 2022 by the Iranian decision to remove all of the Agency’s equipment previously installed in the Islamic Republic of Iran for surveillance and monitoring activities in relation to the Plan of Action. In 2023, the IAEA Director General submitted quarterly reports to the Board of Governors and, in parallel, to the Security Council (GOV/2023/8, GOV/2023/24 and Corr.1, GOV/2023/39 and GOV/2023/57). He also submitted two reports providing updates on developments in between the issuance of the quarterly reports (GOV/INF/2023/1 and GOV/INF/2023/18), entitled “Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)”.

During 2023, despite the Agency’s continued efforts to engage with the Islamic Republic of Iran to resolve outstanding safeguards issues related to the presence of uranium particles of anthropogenic origin at locations in the country not declared to the Agency, limited progress was made. Unless and until the Iranian Government clarifies these issues, the Agency will not be able to provide assurance about the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. The Director General submitted reports to the Board of Governors entitled “NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran” (GOV/2023/9, GOV/2023/26, GOV/2023/43 and GOV/2023/58), as well as one update on developments in between the publication of the quarterly reports (GOV/INF/2023/14).

In August, the Director General submitted a report to the Board of Governors entitled “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic” (GOV/2023/42), covering relevant developments since the previous report from August 2022 (GOV/2022/41). The Director General informed the Board of Governors that no new information had come to the knowledge of the Agency that would have an impact on the Agency’s assessment that it was very likely that a building destroyed at the Dair Alzour site in 2007 was a nuclear reactor the Syrian Arab Republic should have declared to the Agency.^[24] The Director General, in his letter dated 11 August 2023, reiterated his willingness to engage with the Syrian Arab Republic to discuss all unresolved issues.

On the basis of an evaluation of information provided by the Syrian Arab Republic, and all other safeguards and relevant information available to it, the Agency found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and no indication of undeclared production or processing of nuclear material at declared facilities and location outside facilities. For 2023, the Agency concluded for the Syrian Arab Republic that declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.

In August, the Director General submitted a report to the Board of Governors and General Conference entitled “Application of Safeguards in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” (GOV/2023/41‑GC(67)/20), which included new information since the Director General’s report of September 2022 (GOV/2022/40‑GC(66)/16). In December, the Director General issued a statement on recent developments in the nuclear programme of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

Since 1994, the Agency has not been able to conduct all necessary safeguards activities provided for in the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Between the end of 2002 and July 2007, the Agency was not able to implement any verification measures in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; and this has also been the case since April 2009. Therefore, the Agency could not draw any safeguards conclusion regarding the country.

In 2023, no verification activities were implemented in the field, but the Agency continued to monitor developments in the nuclear programme of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and to evaluate all safeguards-relevant information available to it, including open-source information and satellite imagery.

In 2023, the IAEA secretariat continued to maintain the Agency’s enhanced readiness to play its essential role in verifying the nuclear programme of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The IAEA secretariat continued its collection and analysis of safeguards-relevant open-source information on the nuclear programme, increased its collection and analysis of high-resolution commercial satellite imagery, maintained necessary equipment and supplies, prepared Agency inspectors for verification and monitoring activities in the country, and continued to review and document the Agency’s knowledge of the country’s nuclear programme. Once a political agreement has been reached among the countries concerned, the Agency is ready to return to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in a timely manner if requested to do so by the country, and subject to approval by the Board of Governors.

In 2023, in Ukraine, the Agency continued to undertake a vital verification role to reach independent conclusions that nuclear material under safeguards remained in peaceful use and that safeguarded facilities were not used for the undeclared production or processing of nuclear material. The Agency continued to implement safeguards, including field verification activities, in accordance with Ukraine’s comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol. Based on the evaluation of all safeguards-relevant information available to the Agency to date, the Agency has not found any indication that would give rise to a proliferation concern.

As requested in operative paragraph 13 of resolution GC(66)/RES/12 on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East, adopted at the sixty-sixth regular session of the Agency’s General Conference, in 2022, the Director General submitted to the IAEA Board of Governors and to the General Conference at its sixty-seventh regular session a report on the implementation of that resolution (GOV/2023/45-GC(67)/17). The report on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East described, inter alia, the steps undertaken by the Director General in his efforts to further the implementation of his mandates conferred by the IAEA General Conference in resolution GC(66)/RES/12, as well as in decision GC(44)/DEC/12.

In relation to this, in September 2013, following the discussions of the Board of Governors, the Director General provided to the IAEA member States the background documentation^[25] prepared for the 2012 Conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, which described the work the IAEA undertook and the experience it gained with regard to modalities for a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Middle East region.^[26] Furthermore, in response to a request conveyed to the IAEA by the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, on behalf of the Secretary-General, pursuant to General Assembly decision 73/546, the IAEA secretariat provided in 2019 background documentation describing the work previously undertaken by the Agency on modalities of the application of safeguards in the Middle East and its role under nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and regional arrangements (A/CONF.236/3). The IAEA background documentation was updated in 2023 for the fourth session of the Conference (A/CONF.236/2023/BD.2). At the invitation of the High Representative, on behalf of the Secretary-General, and pursuant to General Assembly decision 73/546, the IAEA attended, as an observer, the Conference’s first, second, third and fourth sessions, held at United Nations Headquarters in 2019, 2021, 2022 and 2023, respectively.

In December 2010, the Agency’s Board of Governors approved the establishment of the IAEA low-enriched uranium bank, a physical stock of up to 60 30B-type cylinders containing standard commercial low-enriched uranium hexafluoride with enrichment levels of up to 4.95 per cent. The uranium bank serves as a supply mechanism of last resort in the event that an eligible member State’s supply of low-enriched uranium is disrupted and cannot be restored by commercial means.

The low-enriched uranium bank was established and became operational on 17 October 2019 with the receipt in the IAEA Low Enriched Uranium Storage Facility—located at and operated by the Ulba Metallurgical Plant in Kazakhstan—of 32 30B cylinders filled with low-enriched uranium. The physical stock of low-enriched uranium in the bank was completed with the receipt on 10 December 2019 of 28 additional 30B cylinders filled with low-enriched uranium.

The IAEA contracts with KTZ Express, TENEX (Techsnabexport) and CNEIC (China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation) to ensure possible shipments of the low-enriched uranium and equipment to and from the bank, either through China or the Russian Federation.

Under its cylinder management programme, the IAEA undertook activities in June to recertify 24 low-enriched-uranium-filled cylinders, so as to ensure their long-term safety and security, in situ at the IAEA Low Enriched Uranium Storage Facility and during subsequent transport, in compliance with the requirements of the revised ISO 7195:2020(E) standard. The recertification of the remaining 36 low-enriched-uranium-filled cylinders was planned for June 2024.

The IAEA maintained its efforts to minimize the use of highly enriched uranium in the civilian sector around the globe, both directly and through the support of member States. The Agency facilitates conversion of research reactors through supporting development of low-enriched uranium fuels and improved analytic techniques.

The IAEA also continued its direct support of efforts to remove highly enriched uranium fuel from various sites. In 2021, the Agency established contracts to enable preparations to ship spent highly enriched uranium fuel from the IVG.1M Reactor in Kazakhstan to the Russian Federation, anticipated to occur in the 2023–2024 period. Additionally, all major producers of the medical isotope Mo-99 were expected, in the following year, to finish converting their manufacturing processes to use low-enriched uranium rather than highly enriched material.

The IAEA continued to assist States, at their request, in making their national nuclear security regimes more robust, sustainable and effective, and to play a central role in enhancing international cooperation in nuclear security. In implementing the Nuclear Security Plan 2022–2025 (GC(65)/24) and contributing to global efforts to achieve effective nuclear security, the IAEA established comprehensive nuclear security guidance and promoted its use through peer reviews, advisory services and capacity-building, including education and training. Further, the IAEA worked to assist States in adhering to and implementing relevant international legal instruments, as well as in strengthening international cooperation and coordination of assistance.

The year 2023 saw continued progress towards the universalization of the principal binding international instruments relevant to nuclear security, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and its 2005 Amendment, both of which had been adopted under the auspices of the IAEA. During the year, the number of States parties to the original Convention remained at 164, and the number of States parties to the Amendment increased to 135. The Amendment entered into force in May 2016, establishing a legal basis for a strengthened framework to protect nuclear facilities and nuclear material in domestic use, storage and transport.

The IAEA continued to promote universal adherence to the Convention and its Amendment through various outreach activities, including two regional workshops held in March and May, as well as two country-specific workshops conducted in April and August.

The IAEA continued to publish the Nuclear Security Series as part of its central role in providing nuclear-security-related international support and coordination. In 2023, the IAEA held two meetings of the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee and released one new publication in the series, reaching a total of 44 published volumes. The Agency also continued to translate publications in the series into other languages, with 14 of them available in all United Nations official languages at the end of 2023. In total, 36 of the Nuclear Security Series publications were available in languages other than English.

The IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database remained an important source of information, assisting the IAEA secretariat, participating States and selected international organizations in strengthening nuclear security. In 2023, States reported 168 incidents of nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control, five of which were either confirmed or likely acts of trafficking,^[27] increasing the number in the database to 4,243. The database is a component of the information management systems supporting the implementation of the IAEA Nuclear Security Plan.

The IAEA continued to provide comprehensive assistance to States on nuclear security human resource development, including through programme development, needs analysis, training events, instructor training, educational programmes and further development of nuclear security support centres. In 2023, the Agency conducted 125 security-related training events, providing training to more than 2,900 participants from 164 States. The IAEA also continued to implement its e-learning programme, with over 1,500 users from 134 States completing more than 4,000 e-learning modules.

In February, the IAEA convened a leadership meeting of the International Nuclear Security Education Network. It also facilitated two courses under the “International Schools on Nuclear Security” series in 2023, including one for fellows of the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellowship Programme. In the same month, the IAEA also convened the Annual Meeting of the Nuclear Security Support Centres network.

Based on analysis of the needs of member States and the capabilities of nuclear security support centres in different regions, the IAEA established the Nuclear Security Training and Demonstration Centre at the Agency’s laboratories in Seibersdorf, Austria. Equipped with state-of-the-art technical infrastructure and equipment, the Centre entered operation in October 2023. The facility complements and fills gaps in existing national and international capabilities in nuclear security that do not commonly exist among institutions in States, and focuses on new capabilities for the IAEA, further enhancing capacity-building in nuclear security by providing hands-on training and using advanced technology and expertise. As at December 2023, the Centre’s training programme incorporated 23 courses and workshops. Those courses and workshops address member States’ training needs in the areas of physical protection of nuclear and other radioactive material and associated facilities, as well as the detection of and response to criminal or intentional unauthorized acts involving or directed at nuclear or other radioactive material, associated facilities or associated activities.

The IAEA continued to implement peer reviews and advisory services to help States to evaluate their nuclear security regimes. It conducted such missions with a focus on national nuclear security regimes, including practical security measures for nuclear and other radioactive material and associated facilities and activities.

In 2023, the IAEA carried out several expert missions and workshops to provide guidance to States on drafting regulating principles, reviewing regulatory frameworks and finalizing nuclear security regulations and associated administrative measures, including conducting five International Physical Protection Advisory Service missions, three International Nuclear Security Advisory Service missions and five Regulatory Infrastructure for Radiation Safety and Nuclear Security missions. In September 2023, the milestone of 100 International Physical Protection Advisory Service missions was reached with the completion of such a mission in Zambia. Since 1996, a total of 102 International Physical Protection Advisory Service missions have been conducted, upon request, in 60 Member States. The total number of Member States with approved Integrated Nuclear Security Sustainability Plans remained at 92.

The Agency continued to coordinate with educational, nuclear security operational, and research and development institutions to implement Coordinated Research Projects focused on various scientific and technical areas of nuclear security to address evolving threats and technologies, including the establishment and sustainability of national nuclear security regimes. In 2023, the IAEA initiated one new security-related Coordinated Research Project, addressing computer security for small and modular reactors. Meanwhile, the Agency continued seven other Coordinated Research Projects on topics related to computer security; nuclear detection technology; nuclear forensics; radioactive material security; radiation detection equipment; preventing and protecting against insider threats; and counterfeit, fraudulent and suspect items.

The IAEA continued to advise States on formal threat characterization and assessment; the development, use and maintenance of design-basis threats; the conduct and evaluation of exercises; methodologies for nuclear material accounting and control for security purposes; and the evaluation and inspection of physical protection systems. In 2023, the Agency continued to support member States in protecting radioactive material during and after use. The Agency assisted in the completed removal of 18 high-activity disused radioactive sources from two member States, continued work on the removal of 15 high-activity disused radioactive sources in six member States and the conditioning of four radioisotope thermoelectric generators, and initiated the preparatory work for the removal of more than 30 sources from seven States. The Agency assisted eight member States with physical protection upgrades at nuclear facilities. It also assisted member States in drafting nuclear security regulations.

Nuclear disarmament verification

Pursuant to its decision 76/515 of December 2021 (A/76/49 (Vol. II)), the General Assembly decided to hold two additional sessions of the Group of Governmental Experts to Further Consider Nuclear Disarmament Verification Issues in 2023 to compensate for the two planned sessions in 2021 that had to be postponed owing to COVID-19 travel restrictions. By that decision, the Assembly also called for one additional informal intersessional consultative meeting in New York and requested the Secretary-General to transmit the report of the Group of Governmental Experts to the General Assembly at its seventy-eighth session and to the Conference on Disarmament.

As requested by the General Assembly in operative paragraph 6 of resolution 74/50, the Secretary-General invited 25 Member States to nominate experts, selected on the basis of equitable geographical representation and equitable representation of women and men, to participate in the work.^[28]

The third session took place in February in Geneva. In April, the second informal intersessional consultative meeting took place in New York, allowing member States to further engage in interactive discussions and share their views.

Taking into account the views expressed during the intersessional consultative meeting, the Group held its fourth and last session in May in Geneva, successfully adopting a final report (A/78/120).

Export controls

The Nuclear Suppliers Group is made up of 48 nuclear supplier countries seeking to support the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons by implementing two sets of guidelines for nuclear transfers and transfers of nuclear-related dual-use equipment, materials, software and related technology. The aim of the guidelines is to ensure that nuclear trade for peaceful purposes does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and that international trade and cooperation in the nuclear field is not hindered unjustly in the process. The European Commission and the Chair of the Zangger Committee participate as observers.

In 2023, the Nuclear Suppliers Group held its thirty-second Plenary Meeting in Buenos Aires on 13 and 14 July. Chaired by Gustavo Ainchil (Argentina), the Meeting exchanged views and agreed on several proposals to clarify and update the Group’s Trigger List and Dual-Use List.^[29] During the 2023 Plenary Meeting, the Group also exchanged views on national practices focused on raising awareness and on tools designed for engaging with industry and research institutions working in the nuclear field.

The Group also exchanged information on all aspects of the 2008 Statement on Civil Nuclear Cooperation with India. Separately, it added an “awareness raising document” to its website under the “national practices” section, providing insight and information on the importance of responsible nuclear supplier behaviour and effective export controls.

After the Argentina’s term as Chair concluded in July 2023, the Group was chaired by Claudia Vieira Santos (Brazil).

Benno Laggner (Switzerland) served as the Chair of the Missile Technology Control Regime until 1 November, when Flávio Soares Damico (Brazil) assumed the responsibility for the period 2023–2024. During 2023, the Chair led outreach visits to Malaysia and Singapore. In addition, the Regime convened an intersessional Reinforced Point of Contact meeting in Paris in April.

The Regime held its thirty-fifth plenary meeting in Rio de Janeiro from 1 to 3 November. As in 2022 and previous years, Partner States were not able to adopt a public statement reflecting the outcome of their deliberations. However, those States did agree on substantive decisions, including to continue their outreach to non-partners in an effort to limit the spread of missile systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction by controlling the transfer of related technology and equipment.

Missile-related issues

The twenty-second annual regular meeting of Subscribing States to the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation took place in Vienna on 15 and 16 June, chaired by Ireland. As in 2022, Subscribing States were unable to agree on issuing a press release reflecting the outcome of their meeting. Sao Tome and Principe subscribed to the Code on 7 August, bringing the total number of Subscribing States to 144.

Political declarations and other initiatives

The Stockholm Initiative for Nuclear Disarmament was launched in 2019 by NPT States parties.^[30] Its aim is to strengthen disarmament diplomacy within the context of the NPT, as well as building bridges between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States.

Members of the Stockholm Initiative delivered a statement on its behalf to the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 NPT Review Conference. In the remarks, the members called for the implementation of its “stepping stones for advancing nuclear disarmament” (NPT/CONF.2020/WP.6), which was submitted to the tenth Review Conference in support of meaningful progress in implementing article VI of the NPT. They also called for nuclear-weapon States to build upon existing frameworks and commitments and to take all measures necessary to reduce the risk of the use of nuclear weapons, whether intentionally, by miscalculation, miscommunication, misperception or accident.

Founded in 2010, the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative is a ministerial-level group of NPT States parties^[31] focused on practical steps that would promote the consensus outcomes of the 2010 Review Conference.

Members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative delivered a statement on behalf of the group to the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 NPT Review Conference. In the statement, they reiterated that nuclear-weapon States must uphold their commitments reflected in the “Joint statement of the leaders of the five nuclear-weapon States on preventing nuclear war and avoiding arms races”. The members also expressed concern regarding the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and stressed that actions must be taken to reduce nuclear risks, acknowledging that the only way to eliminate risks was through complete, verifiable and irreversible nuclear disarmament.

Following the joint statement of January 2022 of the leaders of the five nuclear-weapon States recognized by the NPT, in which they affirmed that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought”, references to the assertion continued to appear throughout 2023 in various forums, including during the first session of the NPT Preparatory Committee.

The eighteenth Summit of the Group of 20 (G20), held in New Delhi on 9 and 10 September, stated in a declaration that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is inadmissible. Leaders at the Summit also underscored that all States must act in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations in its entirety. In line with the Charter, they said that all States must refrain from the threat or use of force to seek territorial acquisition against the territorial integrity and sovereignty or political independence of any State.

The 2022 joint statement of the five nuclear-weapon States was also noted in the G7 Leaders’ Hiroshima Vision on Nuclear Disarmament of 19 May. The G7 leaders called on the Russian Federation to recommit to the principles enshrined in the 2022 statement.

Owing to the ongoing war in Ukraine, no ministerial-level meeting took place under the P5 Process in 2023. The United States, as Chair of the dialogue among the P5, organized a working-level experts meeting of the P5 in Cairo. Topics of discussion included strategic risk reduction, as well as nuclear doctrines and policy.

The P5 did not deliver any joint statements and did not submit any working papers to the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 NPT Review Conference.