Developments and trends, 2023

While components of the disarmament machinery remained stagnant in 2023, the year saw some positive developments, particularly around the Disarmament Commission’s achievement of consensus recommendations for the first time since 2017. Those recommendations, concerning the practical implementation of transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities, came six years after the Commission submitted a substantive report to the General Assembly on confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms. On another encouraging note, the Secretary-General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters concluded its two-year programme of work on the topic of global military spending, presenting a set of practical proposals aimed at curbing and reversing the upward trend of expenditure.

With respect to the First Committee of the General Assembly, the year saw record-high levels of participation, a growing number of votes on resolutions—148 in total—and a consistent trend of competing draft resolutions being tabled under the same agenda item. Discussions in the Committee were tense, with heated exchanges on the conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza, as well as other hotspots, such as the Korean Peninsula and Nagorno-Karabakh. Many States lamented the deteriorating international security environment, which was partly reflected in heightened nuclear weapons-related rhetoric, security challenges emanating from new domains in cyber and outer space, and the negative consequences of the proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons.

Figure 7.1.
From consensus to contention: tracking shifts in the General Assembly’s disarmament decision-making over the years

Overall, the First Committee considered a total of 60 draft resolutions and one decision, a decrease from the previous session. The First Committee also voted on two draft amendments, which the sponsors of the respective resolutions deemed “hostile”. Three new resolutions were adopted by vote, namely those on the topics of radiological weapons, the legacy of nuclear weapons and related victims’ assistance and remediation, and lethal autonomous weapons systems.

Meanwhile, States continued to express deep frustration over the ongoing stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament. That body once again remained unable to agree to a programme of work, despite efforts towards consensus undertaken by the first three presidencies of the 2023 session under Egypt, Ethiopia and Finland. In the absence of a programme of work, the presidencies convened formal and informal thematic plenaries under the agenda items of the Conference, enabling States members to discuss a variety of specific topics, including nuclear-weapon-free zones, disarmament and gender in the context of the women, peace and security agenda, the responsible use of AI in the military domain and the disarmament aspects of the vision presented in A New Agenda for Peace. Those States also considered “the improved and effective functioning of the Conference” after taking up the matter at an informal retreat organized by UNIDIR, held in June, with support from the presidencies of France and Germany. Later in the year, the Hungarian presidency secured consensus on a comprehensive final procedural report, as well as a return to consensus on the annual resolution adopted at the seventy-eighth session of the General Assembly, First Committee. However, in an unprecedented development, the Conference was not able to take any decision on the participation of non-States members, due to disagreements on the procedure for approving such requests.

A bright spot of 2023 was the Disarmament Commission’s submission of a substantive report to the General Assembly at its seventy-eighth session (A/78/42). Based on discussions in its Working Group II, the Commission adopted, by consensus, recommendations to promote the practical implementation of transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities with the goal of preventing an arms race in outer space, in accordance with the recommendations set out in the report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities. Unfortunately, for the nineteenth consecutive year, there were no consensus recommendations put forward for the agenda item “Recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons”, allocated to Working Group I of the Commission.

In its final report (A/78/287), the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters provided a set of practical and concrete proposals to curb and reverse the upward trend in military spending,^[1] centred around the belief that a more holistic conception of security is needed. To achieve that vision, the Board sought to identify three complementary pathways with associated actions at a time when new insights and energy were sorely needed. Those three pathways were centred on (a) encouraging critical, innovative and transformative thinking about military spending; (b) lessening threat perceptions and risk escalation and reducing military spending; and (c) strengthening analysis, data collection and public awareness.

Figure 7.2.
Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters: a diverse body of experts

First Committee of the General Assembly

The General Assembly First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) held its seventy-eighth substantive session from 2 October to 3 November.

On 28 September, the Committee held an organizational meeting, electing without a vote Rytis Paulauskas (Lithuania) as its Chair. The body approved its programme of work at the same meeting (A/C.1/78/CRP.1 and A/C.1/78/CRP.2/Rev.1).

In addition to the Chair, the Bureau comprised Heidar Ali Balouji (Islamic Republic of Iran) as Rapporteur and three Vice-Chairs: Matias Andrés Eustathiou (Uruguay); Yaseen Lagardien (South Africa); and Christine Nam (New Zealand).

Following the organizational meeting, the First Committee convened 29 in-person meetings, 3 fewer than the previous year. For the second consecutive year, 1 meeting was dedicated to discussions on programme planning and working methods.

The Committee maintained very high participation by delegations while streamlining its schedule; thanks in large part to strict time limits decided by the Bureau and imposed by the Chair, only one meeting was needed beyond those initially planned. That figure marked a significant improvement from 2022 when four additional meetings were necessary.

In addition to briefings from Chairs of disarmament bodies and components of the disarmament machinery, the First Committee held a high-level exchange on 13 October with the Director and Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs. Additionally, on 11 October, the Committee held an informal segment devoted to interventions by representatives of civil society, as per past practice.

The Committee structured its discussions in line with previous sessions, dividing its work into three stages: (a) general debate; (b) discussions on seven thematic clusters (nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, conventional weapons, regional disarmament and security, outer space (disarmament aspects), other disarmament issues and international security, and disarmament machinery); and (c) action on all draft resolutions and decisions. Eight meetings were dedicated to the general debate, followed by 13 meetings for thematic discussions and 6 meetings for action on all draft resolutions and decisions.

Interest among Member States in the First Committee remained high: 151 delegations delivered statements during the general debate, 3 more than in the previous year. The thematic discussion segment included 375 interventions, breaking the previous record of 365 interventions set in 2022. During the 30 meetings of the Committee, delegations exercised the right of reply at least 144 times (excluding second interventions), compared with 134 in the previous year. Additionally, women constituted 29 per cent of the speakers in the general debate—a slight increase from the previous session, demonstrating incremental progress by the Committee towards gender parity.

The First Committee’s 2023 session once again reflected the continuing deep divisions among Member States. Tensions were evident between nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States, between the Russian Federation and the United States along with its Western allies, and between developing and developed States. The war in Ukraine remained a notable focus. The conflict in Gaza also featured prominently, with States frequently exercising the right of reply. Further heated exchanges centred on other regional issues, including tensions on the Korean Peninsula and in Nagorno-Karabakh.

The High Representative for Disarmament Affairs opened the substantive proceedings on 2 October. Noting that it was her seventh year addressing the Committee in her current capacity, the High Representative referred to rising geopolitical tensions and unprecedented strain on the peace and security architecture. She emphasized several priorities from the Secretary-General’s policy brief A New Agenda for Peace, published in July: preventing the use and proliferation of nuclear weapons and accelerating their elimination; reducing the human cost of weapons, including by centring peace and security on the imperative to save human lives; addressing the potential risks emanating from emerging domains, including cyberspace and outer space; tackling evolving risks linked to advances in biology; and seeking ways to address the ongoing deadlock in some disarmament institutions.

On the same day, the President of the seventy-eighth session of the General Assembly, Dennis Francis (Trinidad and Tobago), also delivered opening remarks. He reflected on pervasive challenges to international security, including the war in Ukraine, the situation in Haiti, and other threats to peace and security spanning Africa to the Middle East. The President emphasized the existential threat posed by nuclear weapons and underscored the urgent need to counteract the misuse, illicit transfer and accumulation of conventional weapons.

Overall, the First Committee considered 61 draft texts (60 draft resolutions and one decision)—down from 74 the previous year—as well as two draft amendments introduced by the Islamic Republic of Iran. Of the drafts adopted, only 25 (41 per cent) were adopted as a whole without a recorded vote.^[2] Furthermore, Member States requested 110 separate paragraph votes, including 17 in one resolution alone.^[3] The Committee voted 146 times in total. (See figure 7.1 for an infographic showing adoption statistics from 2010 to 2023.)

The body adopted three new resolutions: a United States-sponsored text on prohibiting the use of radiological weapons (78/51), a joint text from Kazakhstan and Kiribati on the legacy of nuclear testing and related victims’ assistance and remediation (78/240), and an Austria-led resolution on lethal autonomous weapons systems (78/241). The resolution on lethal autonomous weapons systems garnered significant overall support, with 164 votes in favour, but the text faced scrutiny: States took 11 separate paragraph votes, both in the First Committee session and again during the General Assembly plenary.

In line with past practice, throughout the thematic debate, the Committee heard briefings from Chairs of disarmament bodies and expert groups whose sessions were ongoing or recently concluded, including the following: the Chair of the Group of Governmental Experts to Further Consider Nuclear Disarmament Verification Issues, Jørn Osmundsen (Norway); the Chair of the ninth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention, Leonardo Bencini (Italy); the Chair of the Open-ended Working Group on Conventional Ammunition, Albrecht von Wittke (Germany); and the Chair of the Open-ended Working Group on Security of and in the Use of Information and Communications Technologies 2021–2025, Burhan Gafoor (Singapore).

The Committee also heard briefings from the Directors of the regional centres of the Office for Disarmament Affairs for Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Asia and the Pacific. The traditional panel session on disarmament machinery, held on 26 October, included the President of the Conference on Disarmament, Margit Szücs (Hungary); the Chair of the Disarmament Commission, Akan Rakhmetullin (Kazakhstan); the Chair of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, Elissa Golberg (Canada); and the Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Robin Geiss.

On 13 October, at the Committee’s eleventh meeting, the Director and Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs engaged in a high-level exchange alongside other officials nominated by the General Assembly regional groups. The Director underscored concerns raised by States during the general debate, particularly around the deteriorating international security landscape and the associated pressures on disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control mechanisms. The Director also emphasized the importance of connecting disarmament to broader objectives, such as the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals, human rights and women’s empowerment. He outlined key focus areas for States in the session, such as reinforcing the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, recommitting to the humanitarian aspect of disarmament efforts and tackling challenges related to the weaponization of emerging technologies. Turning to the resolutions and decisions adopted at the Committee’s previous session, as well as relevant reports of the Secretary-General, the Director noted the low rate of response to requests for national views on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. In that context, he urged States to consider what types of reports could best facilitate substantive discussions.

As in 2022, the only organization represented on the First Committee’s panel of high-level disarmament officials was the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), nominated by the Group of Latin America and the Caribbean. Flávio Damico (Brazil), speaking on behalf of OPANAL, stressed the importance of multilateralism and international law in global nuclear disarmament efforts. He called on nuclear-weapon States to engage in dialogue with members of all nuclear-weapon-free zones and to resolve outstanding issues related to the ratification of the respective protocols and interpretative declarations. In the remarks, OPANAL also underscored the potential value of a comprehensive study on nuclear-weapon-free zones, both to advance the objectives of the underlying treaties and to support the establishment of new zones. Although a resolution on such a study was not tabled during the Committee’s seventy-eighth session, OPANAL encouraged the Committee to continue pursuing consensus on the proposal in future sessions.

On 4 December, the General Assembly took action on 55 of the 61 draft resolutions and decisions on substantive items approved by the First Committee. The Assembly did not take action on six texts owing to associated programme budget implications requiring review by the Fifth Committee (Administrative and Budgetary Questions): “Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security” (L.11); “Open-ended working group on security of and in the use of information and communications technologies 2021–2025 established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 75/240“ (L.13 (decision)); “Nuclear disarmament verification” (L.31); “Addressing the legacy of nuclear weapons: providing victim assistance and environmental remediation to Member States affected by the use or testing of nuclear weapons” (L.52); “Further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space” (L.55); and “Lethal autonomous weapons systems” (L.56).

In presenting the reports of the First Committee to the General Assembly, the Rapporteur, Heidar Ali Balouji (Islamic Republic of Iran), noted that the seventy-eighth session had required only one additional plenary meeting beyond those originally scheduled, despite featuring the highest level of participation by delegations to date. He acknowledged that, despite the challenging geopolitical circumstances, the Committee’s high level of professionalism had enabled it to efficiently conclude its work.

On 22 December, the General Assembly adopted the six outstanding proposals approved by the First Committee following consideration of their budget implications by the Fifth Committee.

On 11 October, the First Committee held its traditional exchange with members of civil society, hearing interventions from 16 organizations.^[4] The representatives reflected on a range of matters under the Committee’s purview, from the imperative of eliminating nuclear weapons to the need for enhanced efforts to combat the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. The interventions also addressed various cross-cutting matters, including gender mainstreaming and integrating the voices of youth into disarmament discussions.

On 12 October, at its tenth meeting, the First Committee held a debate on working methods and programme planning, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 77/254 and the First Committee’s adopted programme of work and timetable (A/C.1/78/CRP.1). The Committee Chair opened the meeting by inviting interventions from States on the topics at hand. The body heard from 14 States, 2 of them speaking on behalf of groups of States. At the meeting’s outset, the Chair announced his intention to prepare a summary of the discussion under his own responsibility for subsequent transmittal to the Fifth Committee Chair for further consideration.

Several delegations expressed regret that the Committee for Programme and Coordination could not reach consensus on conclusions and recommendations for “Programme 3: Disarmament”, among nine other programmes in the proposed 2024 programme plan (E/AC.51/2023/L.4/Add.3). Noting that guidance to the Secretariat on mandate implementation was lacking in the absence of such agreements, several States called for the Committee to redouble its efforts to reach consensus and fulfil its functions. At the same time, speakers emphasized the need to avoid increasing the workload of the General Assembly’s Main Committees.

Several delegations expressed concern about the First Committee’s working methods, lamenting both the declining rate of consensus on its resolutions and the proliferation of draft proposals on similar topics under the same agenda items. They noted an emerging trend of competing resolutions, including those establishing parallel intergovernmental processes, which had placed a considerable new burden on delegations, especially smaller ones. States also questioned the frequency of certain recurring resolutions, with some calling for less frequent introduction of annual texts that had incorporated only technical changes in recent years. One delegation suggested introducing such resolutions once every two to three years instead. Additionally, several delegations emphasized the importance of the meaningful participation by women in the Committee as well as the principle of multilingualism.

The Committee took action on 22 resolutions related to nuclear weapons, adopting 20 of them by vote. The annual text on the “African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty” (78/14) and the biennial measure entitled “Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes” (78/49), both introduced by the Africa Group, were the only resolutions that garnered consensus.^[5]

Continued acrimony between non-nuclear-weapon States and the nuclear-weapon States was starkly evident throughout the deliberations. Non-nuclear-weapon States continued to lament the gap in the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), especially its article VI, while nuclear-weapon States continued to assert that the long-term objective of nuclear disarmament could only be achieved under the “right” conditions. A vast majority of States welcomed a new resolution tabled by Kiribati and Kazakhstan, entitled “Addressing the legacy of nuclear weapons: providing victim assistance and environmental remediation to Member States affected by the use or testing of nuclear weapons” (78/240), but the text was still subjected to many paragraph votes. While China and the United States abstained on the resolution’s adoption, the Russian Federation, France and the United Kingdom voted against it, arguing that the text was inconsistent with their national positions on the legacy of nuclear testing.

The general debate reflected widespread concern among States about the implementation gap in the NPT. That dissatisfaction was heightened by a lack of progress at the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and at various working group meetings held in 2023. Many non-nuclear-weapon States observed a notable shift away from disarmament goals, while multiple countries expressed concern over plans by nuclear-weapon States to modernize and extend the lifespans of their arsenals. The humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons remained a recurring topic, with delegations stressing the need for victim assistance and environmental remediation and, in many cases, linking their concerns to appeals for increased membership in the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

Many States voiced support for establishing a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, welcoming the successful outcome of the first three sessions of the conference dedicated to that goal. However, Israel maintained its objection to the process, arguing that it contravened the principles and guidelines on establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones outlined in the 1999 guidelines of the United Nations Disarmament Commission (A/54/42, annex).

The First Committee adopted four resolutions under its cluster on other weapons of mass destruction. A new resolution introduced by the United States, entitled “Radiological weapons” (78/51), was adopted by vote, with a large majority of States voting in favour. However, it faced a paragraph vote on language advocating for the equal, full and meaningful participation of underrepresented groups and the incorporation of gender and diverse perspectives in future treaty negotiations, with four States voting against.^[6] The large majority of States rejected an oral amendment from the Islamic Republic of Iran, which sought to expand the resolution’s focus from “use” to include “development, production and stockpiling”. Several States criticized that amendment as “hostile”, arguing that it changed the resolution’s intention and objective.

The Committee voted for a tenth consecutive year on the resolution entitled “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction” (78/29). The need for a vote stemmed from contentious language on the possession and use of chemical weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic.

During the general debate and the thematic discussion, numerous States expressed regret over the inability of the fifth Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention to adopt an outcome document. Some delegations specifically called upon the Syrian Arab Republic to increase transparency and fully cooperate with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Several States emphasized the importance of ensuring the Convention’s continued effectiveness, particularly following the milestone destruction of the final declared chemical weapon stockpiles in 2023.

The First Committee maintained its past practice regarding biological weapons, achieving consensus on its annual resolution dedicated to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (78/67). States welcomed the outcome of the ninth Review Conference of the Convention, including the agreement by States parties to establish a working group on strengthening the Convention. However, tensions persisted in discussions about the instrument. The Russian Federation continued to accuse the United States of the development of biological weapons and conducting military activities in Ukraine in violation of the Convention, while the United States rejected the Russian claims as disinformation.

The First Committee took action on five resolutions under this cluster. Two annual resolutions, “Prevention of an arms race in outer space” (78/19) and “Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities” (78/52), were adopted without a vote.

Stark divisions on addressing security issues in outer space were evident in the proliferation of proposals for related intergovernmental processes. Many States expressed regret that the Open-ended Working Group on Reducing Space Threats through Norms, Rules and Principles of Responsible Behaviours could not agree on either a substantive or procedural final report due to one State’s objections. While a new group of governmental experts on the prevention of an arms race in outer space was set to begin in November, the First Committee also mandated two additional open-ended working groups with overlapping timelines, one from 2024 to 2028 and another from 2025 to 2027.

By a decision introduced by the United Kingdom on “Reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours” (78/20), the Committee voted to establish a new open-ended working group that would convene from 2025 to 2027. Building on its 2022–2023 predecessor of the same name, the working group would make recommendations on preventing an arms race in outer space through the development of relevant norms, rules and principles.

Separately, in adopting a text sponsored by the Russian Federation entitled “Further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space” (78/238), the Committee called for a new open-ended working group to convene from 2024 through 2028 to consider and to make recommendations on substantial elements of an international legally binding instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, including, inter alia, on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space, as well as to consider various aspects of the prevention of an arms race in outer space in the context of an international legally binding instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The First Committee adopted eight resolutions under the conventional weapons cluster, including annual resolutions on treaties such as the Convention on Cluster Munitions (78/32), the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (78/45), the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (78/64) and the Arms Trade Treaty (78/48).

The Committee’s deliberations on conventional weapons largely mirrored those of previous years, with States variously expressing support or opposition to weapons-specific treaties. The Committee adopted a new resolution on “Through-life conventional ammunition management” (78/47) with overwhelming support and only five States abstaining.^[7] The resolution advanced the agreements contained in the Global Framework on Conventional Ammunition, which was adopted earlier in the year (A/78/111, annex). Those agreements included initiating a regular follow-up process involving meetings and reports of the Secretary-General.

The First Committee adopted seven resolutions and one decision under this cluster, including three resolutions on the security of information and communications technologies. Its exchanges on information and communications technologies security proved notably fraught due to the ongoing divergence of views concerning the future format of a regular institutional dialogue on the matter under United Nations auspices.

In their interventions, States addressed various ongoing challenges to peace and security in the information and communications technologies domain. Many welcomed the recent consensus adoption of the second annual progress report by the Open-ended Working Group on Security of and in the Use of Information and Communications Technologies 2021–2025. However, while there was broad agreement among States on the importance of that consensus process, discussions on steps beyond the mandate of the Working Group, set to end in 2025, remained divisive.

Three separate texts were tabled on information and communications technologies. They included a draft decision from Singapore to endorse the latest progress report of the Open-ended Working Group on those matters (78/541) Separately, the Russian Federation tabled a text to commemorate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the first resolution under the agenda item in 1998, asserting the centrality of the ongoing Open-ended Working Group (78/237). In addition, France tabled a second iteration of the text on a proposed programme of action on responsible State use of information and communication technologies (78/16). France’s proposal received support from European and other Western States seeking to establish such a mechanism immediately following the conclusion of the current working group.

Under the same cluster, the Committee adopted the third iteration of the biennial resolution on “Youth, disarmament and non-proliferation” (78/31). Consistent with its predecessor, the resolution included a request for the Secretary-General to seek and report on the views of States, the United Nations, other relevant international and regional organizations, and civil society regarding the promotion of youth engagement and empowerment in disarmament and non-proliferation activities. Technical updates included acknowledgements of the Secretary-General’s first such report (A/78/164), as well as the General Assembly’s 2022 establishment of the United Nations Youth Office by its resolution 76/306.

The Committee also adopted a new resolution on “Lethal autonomous weapons systems” (78/241). Although supported by a large majority of States, the text was subject to 11 separate paragraph votes, targeting all 4 operative paragraphs. The resolution requested the Secretary-General to collect and report on the views of Member States, international organizations and civil society concerning ways to address the challenges and concerns raised by lethal autonomous weapons systems from humanitarian, legal, security, technological and ethical perspectives, as well as their views on the role of humans in the use of force.

With regard to gender and diversity, the Committee continued to hear a growing number of calls for the inclusion of more diverse voices, particularly those of women. For a second consecutive year, Ireland delivered a joint statement on behalf of 78 countries advocating for the integration of a gender perspective in the work of the First Committee and across the disarmament machinery. The statement addressed the differential gendered impacts of armed conflict on women, men, boys and girls, as well as the persistent underrepresentation of women in disarmament forums, especially in leadership roles.

The Committee adopted nine resolutions under this cluster, including those dedicated to the regional centres of the Office for Disarmament Affairs.^[8] The annual resolutions on the reports of the Conference on Disarmament (78/61) and Disarmament Commission (78/62) were adopted without a vote.

Discussions on the disarmament machinery were once again dominated by expressions of concern over the prolonged stagnation in the Conference on Disarmament. States called for launching negotiations in the Conference on a range of topics, including a fissile material cut-off treaty, a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention, and a legally binding prohibition on the use of radiological weapons. Regarding the annual resolution on the report of the Conference, which returned to consensus, informal consultations revolved around finding compromise language on the issue of observer States. Many non-member States of the Conference, especially European delegations, expressed a preference for stronger language, reflecting disappointment over the lack of a decision on allowing observers to participate in the Conference throughout the year, the responsibility for which they placed on the Russian Federation.

United Nations Disarmament Commission

The United Nations Disarmament Commission held its 2023 session at United Nations Headquarters from 3 to 21 April, completing its three-year cycle of deliberations. It adopted recommendations relating to transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities—the first substantive outcome of the Commission’s work since 2020 (for further details, see “Working Group II” below).

At its organizational session on 3 April (A/CN.10/PV.383), the Disarmament Commission elected Akan Rakhmetullin (Kazakhstan) as its Chair for 2023. The Commission also elected the following Vice-Chairs: Hugo Emmanuel Guerra (Argentina); Timothy O’Sullivan (Australia); Landry Sibomana (Burundi); Helena Ndapewa Kuzee (Namibia); Anna Shestopalova (Russian Federation); Jatuchatra Chommai (Thailand); and Anatolii Zlenko (Ukraine).

The Commission decided at its organizational session to consider the same substantive agenda items as in 2022: (a) recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; and (b) preparation of recommendations to promote the practical implementation of transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities with the goal of preventing an arms race in outer space, in accordance with the recommendations set out in the report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities (A/CN.10/L.90).

The Disarmament Commission opened its substantive session on 3 April (A/CN.10/PV.384). In his opening remarks, the Chair recalled the previous work done in the two working groups in 2022 and noted developments in multilateral disarmament forums since the Commission’s 2022 session. He noted that, even during the cold war, the Disarmament Commission had been able to agree on seven sets of recommendations. The Chair emphasized that this history demonstrated the Commission’s capability to contribute to global security and multilateral diplomacy, even in the most challenging political environments. He further stressed that a successful outcome of the year’s disarmament work would be important in efforts to revitalize the disarmament machinery.

In her opening statement, the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs expressed grave concern over the current state of nuclear disarmament. She noted that the risk of nuclear weapons use was now higher than at any time since the depth of the cold war, citing the erosion of the disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control regime. The High Representative called for immediate de-escalation and risk reduction measures, emphasizing that the complete elimination of nuclear weapons remained the only way to definitively remove their associated risks. Reflecting on recent developments, she voiced regret at the failure of the tenth NPT Review Conference to reach a consensus outcome. Looking ahead, she called for the pursuit of a successor framework to New START and noted the declaration and action plan adopted at the first Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

Turning to transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities, the High Representative called on the Disarmament Commission to consolidate and further elaborate on the measures agreed by the Group of Governmental Experts. She noted the importance of space to everyday life and referenced two other relevant intergovernmental processes: the Open-ended Working Group on Reducing Space Threats and the Group of Governmental Experts on Further Practical Measures for the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. She added that successfully implementing and further developing measures to build trust and confidence could provide building blocks for more ambitious measures in space security, including proposals for legally binding obligations.

At the same meeting, the Commission elected Kurt Davis (Jamaica) as Chair of Working Group I and Szilvia Balázs (Hungary) as Chair of Working Group II (A/CN.10/PV.384). The Commission then began its general exchange of views on all agenda items, holding four plenary meetings for that purpose on 3 and 4 April (A/CN.10/PV.384, A/CN.10/PV.385, A/CN.10/PV.386, and A/CN.10/PV.387). Thereafter, the two working groups commenced their work on their respective agenda items. Working Group I held 10 meetings from 5 to 20 April. Working Group II held 9 meetings from 4 to 20 April.

Following three weeks of deliberations in plenary meetings and its respective working groups, the Disarmament Commission concluded its 2023 substantive session at its 389th meeting on 20 April (A/CN.10/PV.389), adopting a final report containing the consensus reports of its two working groups for submission to the General Assembly at its seventy-eighth session (A/78/42). The final report contains, in its annex, recommendations under the agenda item relating to transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities. No recommendations were put forward under the agenda item on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

During the four meetings held for the general exchange of views on 3 and 4 April, 70 Member States, two observer States and two observer organizations addressed the Commission (A/78/42, para. 11).

Many NPT States parties voiced regret that the Treaty’s tenth Review Conference had failed to adopt a substantive outcome document. As in previous years, nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States expressed starkly different views: while the former emphasized the need to prioritize risk reduction in light of the international security situation, the latter rejected any conditionality for fulfilment of legal obligations related to nuclear disarmament, highlighting the lack of progress amid efforts by nuclear-weapon States to expand and modernize their nuclear arsenals. Arab States underscored the vital importance of establishing a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, in particular the urgent need for the implementation of the Middle East resolution adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference (NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I), annex).

Member States underscored the importance of adopting recommendations to the General Assembly on transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities. Many States noted such recommendations would support the work of other multilateral processes on outer space security. Nevertheless, a divergence of views was apparent on the approach to securing outer space and preventing an arms race. The United States, the United Kingdom and other Western States stressed the importance of achieving political outcomes in the short term, while China and the Russian Federation, supported by many other States, stressed the need for a legally binding instrument to prevent the weaponization of outer space, referring to the updated draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space and the threat or use of force against outer space objects proposed by China and the Russian Federation (CD/1985).

Working Group I based its discussions on agenda item 4, “Recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons”, on the Chair’s non-paper from the previous year’s session (A/CN.10/2022/WG.I/CRP.1). Following robust exchanges among Member States, the Chair circulated successive drafts of proposed recommendations on 12 and 14 April. At the Working Group’s final meeting on 20 April, delegations considered a further iteration circulated the previous day (A/CN.10/2023/WG.I/CRP.1/Rev.2). However, significant divergences persisted on key issues, leading the Chair to conclude that no consensus could be reached. His subsequent proposal to issue the 19 April draft as a working paper under his own responsibility was withdrawn due to lack of full support from Member States.

The deep division between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States continued to shape discussions. Non-nuclear-weapon States further articulated their opposition to any language that could be construed as setting preconditions for nuclear disarmament. Furthermore, they viewed attempts to narrow the deliberation to focus on nuclear risk reduction as a diversion from disarmament obligations and a justification for delays in implementation.

Delegations also differed over how to categorize States in relation to their nuclear weapons status. The Arab Group and the Islamic Republic of Iran opposed the proposed terminology for NPT non-States parties possessing nuclear weapons, arguing that such language would create an unrecognized category of States beyond the Treaty’s established framework. Concurrently, “umbrella States” in extended nuclear deterrence arrangements with nuclear-weapon States firmly rejected South Africa’s proposal to label them as “States that continue to rely on nuclear deterrence”. The issue of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction also remained contentious. The Arab Group and the Islamic Republic of Iran advocated for including references to the Treaty process, particularly the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. In contrast, the United States and the United Kingdom, along with Israel and several other States not party to the Treaty, pushed for language acceptable to the Commission’s full membership, which includes all United Nations Member States, extending beyond NPT States parties.

For the fifth consecutive cycle since 2006, the Disarmament Commission failed to achieve consensus on recommendations for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Despite the Chair’s best efforts, many States remained entrenched in their national positions and showed little willingness to make concessions or find a middle ground. Nonetheless, the Chair’s iterative approach to revising the initial proposals did yield some progress in narrowing gaps on a few contentious issues. While that incremental advance proved insufficient to achieve consensus in 2023, it laid important groundwork for future discussions both in the Commission and other disarmament forums.

Working Group II of the Disarmament Commission engaged in extensive deliberations to achieve a consensus outcome on agenda item 5, “Preparation of recommendations to promote the practical implementation of transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities with the goal of preventing an arms race in outer space, in accordance with the recommendations set out in the report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities.”

The Working Group opened its proceedings on 4 April by hearing a presentation from the Chair of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Juan Francisco Facetti (Paraguay). On 5 April, it received a briefing from the Chair of the Open-ended Working Group on Reducing Space Threats through Norms, Rules and Principles of Responsible Behaviours, Hellmut Lagos (Chile). Delegations also began a discussion that day on the report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-building Measures in Outer Space Activities (A/68/189), an exchange that continued over the following two days and concluded on 11 April. Member States exchanged views on the report’s provisions as follows: sections IV.A (“Information exchange on space policies” and “Information exchange and notifications related to outer space activities”) on 6 April; section IV.C (“Risk reduction notifications”) on 6 April; and sections IV.D, V and VI (“Contact and visits to space launch sites and facilities”, “International cooperation” and “Consultative mechanisms”) on 11 April. At those meetings, States introduced various proposals and reacted to those of other delegations. The Non-Aligned Movement and the United Kingdom also submitted working papers (A/CN.10/2023/WG.II/WP.1 and A/CN.10/2023/WG.II/WP.2).

The Chair circulated a draft outcome document on 12 April (A/CN.10/2023/WG.II/CRP.1/Rev.1), which the Working Group discussed the following day. Based on those discussions and written comments from delegations, the Chair circulated a revised draft on 15 April (A/CN.10/2023/WG.II/CRP.1), which the Group considered on 17 and 18 April. Subsequent revisions were circulated and discussed on 18 and 19 April (A/CN.10/2023/WG.II/CRP.1/Rev.2) and on 19 and 20 April (A/CN.10/2023/WG.II/CRP.1/Rev.3). The final revision, reflecting the latest discussions among delegations, was prepared and adopted, as orally revised, on 20 April (A/CN.10/2023/WG.II/CRP.1/Rev.4).

Entitled “Recommendations to promote the practical implementation of transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities with the goal of preventing an arms race in outer space, in accordance with the recommendations set out in the report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities”, the outcome of Working Group II was subsequently adopted by the Disarmament Commission as a whole and annexed to its report to the General Assembly (A/78/42).

The substantive outcome of the Disarmament Commission’s 2023 session (A/78/42, annex) consisted of an introduction, conclusions and recommendations on promoting the practical implementation of transparency and confidence-building measures for preventing an arms race in outer space. In its introduction, the Commission noted its previous consideration of the agenda item at its 2018, 2022 and 2023 sessions.

Under “Conclusions”, the Disarmament Commission reaffirmed the basic principle of free exploration and peaceful use of outer space by all States, while emphasizing the essential need to prevent an arms race in that domain. It stressed the importance of concluding negotiations on an international legally binding instrument or instruments to that end. It noted recent initiatives as well as current and future United Nations processes related to outer space security.

The Commission also underscored the importance of continuing and promoting the practical implementation of voluntary transparency and confidence-building measures, as recommended in the 2013 report of the Group of Governmental Experts (A/68/189). It recalled the criteria for transparency and confidence-building measures from that report, and that such measures could also complement and contribute to, but not be a substitute for, an international legally binding instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Furthermore, the Commission stressed the importance of universal participation in, implementation of and full adherence to the existing legal framework for outer space activities. It also acknowledged that some transparency and confidence-building measures for outer space activities had already been implemented at the multilateral and/or national level.

In its “Recommendations” section, the Disarmament Commission recommended 12 voluntary measures, subject to national security considerations, to promote the practical implementation of the transparency and confidence-building measures contained in the 2013 report. Those recommended measures included engaging in regular dialogues about national space policies and activities, as well as sharing space situational awareness data and information to the extent practicable. The Commission also recommended that States consider designating points of contact to facilitate notification, in a timely manner and to the greatest extent practicable, of potentially affected States of scheduled manoeuvres that may result in risks to the flight safety of space objects of other States.

Furthermore, the Commission put forward several recommendations related to strengthening international cooperation: that States with significant space technologies consider providing assistance and training and transferring technology, data and material to requesting States; that States participate in, implement and fully adhere to the existing international legal framework relating to outer space activities; that States strengthen the supervision of private sector actors under their jurisdiction; and that States further advance and regularly review transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities with the goal of preventing an arms race in outer space, as appropriate, in relevant standing United Nations bodies.

Conference on Disarmament

In 1978, at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, United Nations Member States recognized the continuing need for a single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum (S-10/2, paras. 120–124). The Conference on Disarmament assumed that role the following year, succeeding other Geneva-based negotiating forums that included the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament (1960), the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (1962–1968), and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (1969–1978).

The Conference on Disarmament opened its 2023 session on 24 January, presided over by Ahmed Ihab Abdelahad Gamaleldin (Egypt). At the second plenary meeting on 26 January (CD/PV.1646), the Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Conference, Tatiana Valovaya, emphasized the need to modernize the Conference to address contemporary disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control challenges.

The first President presented a draft decision based on the previous year’s proposal for a programme of work, which would have established five ad hoc committees without explicit negotiating mandates. However, despite consultations carried out under the first three presidencies, the Conference could not reach a consensus on the 2023 programme of work. Additionally, the Conference could not agree on a procedure for accepting requests for participation by non-member States, leading to their exclusion from the 2023 session. The first President also convened two formal plenary meetings under the Conference’s agenda items, focusing on thematic discussions about nuclear-weapon-free zones and negative security assurances.

The second President, Yanit Abera Habtemariam (Ethiopia), convened the high-level segment from 27 February to 2 March (CD/PV.1656–1661). The segment featured over 50 ministerial-level statements. On the opening day, the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs urged States to work together and rebuild trust despite ongoing global tensions. She highlighted the Secretary-General’s policy brief on A New Agenda for Peace as an opportunity to propose innovative ideas for achieving sustainable peace and security. The armed conflict in Ukraine remained a prominent topic throughout the high-level discussions.

In the absence of a programme of work, the next three presidencies coordinated with one another to ensure that the Conference addressed all agenda items throughout the remainder of the session. The third President, Kirsti Kauppi (Finland), convened formal plenary meetings under the agenda items of the Conference, in which the Conference held thematic discussions on the following: cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, including on the specific topic of nuclear risk reduction; prevention of an arms race in outer space; new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, radiological weapons; comprehensive programme of disarmament, including on the specific topic of disarmament and gender in the context of women, peace and security; and transparency in armaments. The Conference also held informal meetings on disarmament and gender in the context of women, peace and security.

The fourth President, Camille Petite (France), convened formal plenary meetings under the agenda items of the Conference, in which the Conference held thematic discussions on transparency in armaments, including on the specific topic of transparency on nuclear doctrines and arsenals and on a comprehensive programme of disarmament, which included discussion on education and research in disarmament. The Conference also held an informal discussion on revitalizing the work of the Conference on Disarmament, at which the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) presented an illustrative compendium of proposals submitted to the Conference on Disarmament. Subsequently, UNIDIR, with the support of the French and German presidencies, organized a high-level retreat on revitalizing the work of the Conference at Montreux, Switzerland, on 22 and 23 June.

The fifth President of the Conference, Thomas Göbel (Germany), convened formal plenary meetings under the agenda items of the Conference, during which the Conference held thematic discussions on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, including on the specific topic of nuclear disarmament verification. One of the plenary meetings featured briefings by representatives of disarmament youth programmes. The Conference also convened informal meetings on the disarmament aspects of the Secretary-General’s vision for A New Agenda for Peace, which featured a briefing by the Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference, as well as discussions on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference. Furthermore, the German presidency hosted a demonstration of a nuclear disarmament verification virtual reality training tool for inspectors developed by the University of Hamburg as part of the nuclear disarmament verification initiative sponsored by France and Germany.

The sixth President of the Conference, Margit Szűcs (Hungary), facilitated negotiations on the consideration and adoption of the annual report of the Conference to the General Assembly. Her efforts succeeded in returning the Conference to the adoption of a comprehensive procedural report (CD/2380), avoiding the same outcome as 2022. Hungary also led the consultations on the annual draft resolution submitted to the First Committee on the report of the Conference on Disarmament. The updated draft resolution included new language on the importance of multilateralism and the principle of inclusivity in the work of the Conference, noting with regret that the latter had not always been sufficiently ensured, while recalling in that regard the Conference’s rules of procedure. A new operative paragraph called upon the Conference on Disarmament to undertake efforts to ensure inclusivity and multilateralism in its work, including through participation in its sessions, in accordance with its rules of procedure. Those new paragraphs were in reference to the fact that the Conference was unable to reach any decision on accepting requests for participation by States not members of the Conference. The General Assembly adopted the resolution without a vote (78/61), returning to consensus following a vote on the resolution in 2022.

Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters

The Secretary-General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters was established in 1978 pursuant to paragraph 124 of the final document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly (resolution S-10/2) and received its current mandate pursuant to General Assembly decision 54/418 of 1 December 1999. The Board issues recommendations to the Secretary-General on matters within the area of arms limitation and disarmament, including on studies and research under the auspices of the United Nations or institutions within the United Nations system. Additionally, it advises on the implementation of the United Nations Disarmament Information Programme and serves as the UNIDIR Board of Trustees. (See figure 7.2 for an infographic on trends in the composition of the Advisory Board over the years.)

The Advisory Board held its seventy-ninth session from 1 to 3 February in Geneva and its eightieth session from 21 to 23 June in New York. It convened informal intersessional meetings in October 2022 and January, April and May 2023.

Following two years of in-depth discussions, the Board concluded a programme of work on the topic of global military spending. Its aim was to offer a fresh perspective on ways to manage and eventually reverse the upward trajectory of such spending, limit its negative impacts and contribute to a constructive conversation that could foster meaningful, transformative shifts. The Board also considered obstacles to past efforts to reduce military spending, aiming to determine which initiatives might remain relevant and what new avenues could be explored.

Noting that military spending had reached an all-time high of $2.24 trillion in 2022, the Board centred its report (A/78/287) and final recommendations on a belief in the need for a more holistic approach to security. According to the Board, such an approach should be built on dialogue and diplomacy, respect for international law, a recommitment to the elements that made up the contemporary peace and security architecture, and the design of new strategies, as means to both improve the wider security climate and meet the needs of peoples and the planet, such as by mitigating climate change and reducing socioeconomic inequalities. By doing so, the Board believed, States could get on track towards achieving “the least diversion to armaments of the world’s economic and human resources”, as envisaged in the United Nations Charter.

To achieve that vision, the Advisory Board identified three complementary pathways, each with associated actions: (a) encouraging critical, innovative and transformative thinking about military spending; (b) lessening threat perceptions and risk escalation and reducing military expenditure; and (c) strengthening analysis, data collection and public awareness on such spending. Designed for use by States, the United Nations system, academia, regional and civil society actors, and others, the pathways involve recommitting to the contemporary international peace and security architecture, including the United Nations Charter and international law, with the primary purpose of cultivating a climate more conducive to achieving greater human security.

Under the first pathway, the Board acknowledged the persistent difficulty of balancing national security needs with social and economic progress, a key disarmament goal in the Charter of the United Nations. Its members agreed that in the current environment, realizing that objective would require a renewed focus on diplomacy and a broader understanding of “security”. That expanded view would consider not just real and perceived military threats but also risks and threats related to climate change, gender inequality, crime and poverty. The Board found that such a holistic approach would enable countries to address a wide range of threats while mitigating risks associated with excessive military spending. Furthermore, the Board envisioned a key role for the United Nations system in stimulating and promoting multilateral and multi-stakeholder discussions, including with civil society, to enable that shift in perspective and resource allocation.

Regarding the second objective, the Advisory Board emphasized that focused dialogue, enhanced transparency and confidence-building measures could help prevent and reduce the ambiguities and tensions among States that often drive military spending. That approach could encourage restraint, decelerate military build-ups and increase trust, leading to greater stability, according to the Board. In the present moment of heightened geopolitical risk, the Board felt that disarmament and arms control measures should be areas of urgent attention, as cooperative arms control could help mitigate threat perceptions used to justify increases in military spending while allowing Governments to reallocate resources to other concerns. In addition, the Board underscored the need to promote a better understanding of the implications of emerging fields—such as outer space, cyberspace and artificial intelligence—on perceptions of military threats and their influencing impacts on military discussions.

The report’s third pathway stressed the need to revitalize research and reporting so that comprehensive data on military spending and impacts that reflected twenty-first-century realities could be secured. In that regard, the Board recommended several studies. First, it called for an updated study on the social, cultural, economic and environmental consequences of military spending, as well as separate research into the elements of a more comprehensive and cooperative approach to global, State, and human security, and what it meant for various levels and types of military spending. Additionally, the Board advocated for practical and applied research that enabled Governments to put in place or optimize internal checks and balances to prevent misuse and wasteful spending. The Board noted that its proposals to encourage a transformative approach to security necessitated more robust public education and engagement, akin to what had been achieved with climate action, because fostering greater accountability and positive actions for peace required citizens across the globe to be actively informed about the principles of disarmament and arms control and their vital contributions to a safer, sustainable, equitable and just world. The Board also acknowledged the vital role of the United Nations system in that regard and encouraged specific capacity-building and awareness-raising activities to enhance its outreach.

In its capacity as the UNIDIR Board of Trustees, the Board reviewed and provided strategic advice on the Institute’s consolidated programme of work, activities and finances. The Institute’s unique position as a bridge-builder and convenor in the disarmament field led to several achievements in 2023, including the following: (a) a substantial increase in events and publications; (b) new digital policy portals on artificial intelligence and space security; and (c) influential expert technical support to States, regional organizations and multilateral bodies, including through signature events on innovation, outer space and cyberstability. The Board was briefed on the evolving global disarmament research network of UNIDIR and the UNIDIR Academy, as well as on improvements made to the website and research dissemination that enabled cost optimization and enhanced outreach.

The Board approved the Director’s report on UNIDIR activities from January to December 2022 and the proposed programme of work and financial plan for 2023 and 2024.