Developments and trends, 2023

In 2023, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) continued to deliver on its mandate and commitment to ensuring the full and effective implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention). OPCW marked several milestones during the year, including the inauguration and immediate start of operations of its Centre for Chemistry and Technology (ChemTech Centre), the convening of the fifth special session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (fifth Review Conference), and the end of the destruction of all declared chemical weapons stockpiles.

The year also marked one decade since OPCW began addressing the chemical weapons dossier in the Syrian Arab Republic. The organization’s Technical Secretariat continued to make efforts to ensure that the Syrian Government resolved all gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies that had arisen from the initial declaration of its chemical weapons programme. Since April 2021, the Technical Secretariat had attempted, without success, to organize the twenty-fifth round of consultations between the OPCW Declaration Assessment Team and the Syrian National Authority. That was owing to, inter alia, the Syrian Arab Republic’s refusal to issue a visa to the lead technical expert of the Declaration Assessment Team. In October, however, after two and a half years of delays, the Syrian Arab Republic finally issued visas to all members of the Declaration Assessment Team, and the twenty-fifth round of consultations was held in Damascus in November. The OPCW Fact-Finding Mission maintained its work to establish the facts surrounding allegations of chemical weapons use in the Syrian Arab Republic. The OPCW Technical Secretariat issued a report of the Mission on 28 June regarding incidents of alleged use of toxic chemicals in Kharbit Massasneh, Syrian Arab Republic, on 7 July and 4 August 2017 (S/2186/2023). Likewise, the OPCW Investigation and Identification Team kept up its activities to identify the perpetrators of chemical weapons use in the country, pursuant to the decision of the Conference of the States Parties adopted on 27 June 2018 (decision C-SS-4/DEC.3). The OPCW Technical Secretariat issued a report of the Investigation and Identification Team on 27 January 2023 focusing on an incident in Douma, Syrian Arab Republic, on 7 April 2018 (S/2125/2023).

Figure 2.1.
OPCW-designated laboratories (as at November 2023)

While OPCW completed its critical work of verifying the destruction of the remaining declared chemical weapons stockpiles in July, it ramped up its article VI chemical industry inspections despite the remaining impact of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic.

In its efforts to build capacities among States parties to prevent the re-emergence of chemical weapons, the OPCW Technical Secretariat delivered, through strong engagement with States parties, international cooperation programmes via hybrid, virtual or in-person events, some of them conducted at the OPCW ChemTech Centre. That allowed the Technical Secretariat to assist in promoting the peaceful uses of chemistry; advancing scientific and technological cooperation; countering the threats posed by non-State actors; and expanding partnerships with international organizations, non-governmental organizations, the chemical industry and other entities. The OPCW Technical Secretariat also continued to deliver support to Ukraine, upon its request, under article X of the Convention (assistance and protection against chemical weapons).

Figure 2.2.
Secretary-General’s Mechanism: nominated qualified experts, expert consultants and analytical laboratories by region (as at December 2023)

Additionally, OPCW continued its work to achieve the universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention, urging the remaining States not parties to the Convention to join without delay or preconditions. In October, at a major OPCW capacity-building exercise “CHEMEX Africa”, which was jointly organized in Algiers with Algeria, the Director-General of OPCW met with the Foreign Minister of South Sudan. During the meeting, both sides signed a joint communiqué and agreed to cooperate to complete South Sudan’s accession process as soon as possible.

The year 2023 was also important for the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (Biological Weapons Convention), as it marked the start of the 2023–2026 intersessional programme adopted by the ninth Review Conference of the Convention, in late 2022.

The centrepiece of the new intersessional programme, the Working Group on the Strengthening of the Biological Weapons Convention, held three sessions in Geneva in 2023. After considering organizational issues at its first meeting, held on 15 and 16 March, the body addressed substantive topics when it subsequently convened from 7 to 18 August and from 4 to 8 December. Additionally, delegations met from 11 to 13 December for the annual Meeting of the States Parties.

Figure 2.3.
Trends in confidence-building measures: participation of States parties in the Biological Weapons Convention’s confidence-building measures, 1987–2023

Despite continued challenging geopolitical circumstances, the Working Group was able to conduct substantive deliberations concerning the strengthening of the Convention and addressed the topics allocated to its 2023 meetings (BWC/CONF.IX/9, chap. II, para. 8). Furthermore, delegates discussed proposals regarding the mechanisms to be established on international cooperation and assistance under article X and on the review of scientific and technological developments. While discussions on the topics allocated to the Working Group remained at an early and conceptual stage, States parties shared a willingness and constructive spirit to make tangible progress by developing concrete recommendations and a road map for the way ahead.

On 15 February, South Sudan acceded to the Biological Weapons Convention, becoming the 185th State party. As at 31 December, four signatory States had not yet ratified the Convention, and eight States had neither signed nor ratified it. ^[1]

Chemical weapons

In 2023, the Secretary-General persistently emphasized that there could be no justification for the use of chemical weapons and that those responsible for such use must be identified and held accountable for their crimes. The Secretary-General also reiterated the importance of the Chemical Weapons Convention^[2] as an essential pillar of the disarmament and non-proliferation regime. He maintained his support for the OPCW Technical Secretariat as it carried out its vital work in upholding the Convention. Meanwhile, the Office for Disarmament Affairs continued to support the Secretary-General’s good offices in furthering the implementation of Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) on the elimination of the chemical weapons programme in the Syrian Arab Republic. The Office also sustained its collaboration with members of the Security Council in their efforts to build unity, restore cooperation and ensure adherence to the global norm against chemical weapons.

In April 2023, a dedicated Open-ended Working Group completed a series of consultations that were launched the previous year in preparation for the fifth special session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (fifth Review Conference). Chaired by Lauri Kuusing (Estonia), the Open-ended Working Group convened 22 meetings, during which States parties exchanged views on a broad range of issues and topics related to the implementation of the Convention since the fourth Review Conference, in 2018. As per past practice, the Chair summarized the deliberations of the Working Group by issuing the Chairperson’s draft provisional text (WGRC-5/2 RC-5/CRP.1), which was submitted to the fifth Review Conference for its consideration.

The fifth Review Conference was held in The Hague from 15 to 19 May with the participation of representatives from 137 States parties, one signatory State and one non-signatory State (RC-5/3, paras. 1.2–1.4); 14 international organizations, specialized agencies and other international bodies (RC-5/DEC.2, annex); and the chemical industry and scientific community (RC-5/DEC.3, annex). In addition, 74 civil society organizations participated in the Conference (RC-5/DEC.4, annex). The Secretary-General provided a recorded message, and the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs delivered a separate statement.

As set out in the Convention, the fifth Review Conference reviewed the implementation of all articles of the Convention, including developments in science and technology. Although the Conference could not reach a consensus to adopt a final document, its deliberations and preparatory process allowed for a thorough and comprehensive review of the Convention. States parties forged common ground on many issues—such as adapting the Convention’s industry verification regime to reflect developments in the chemical industry and in science and technology; enhancing OPCW programmes on international cooperation and assistance based on new opportunities created by the newly established OPCW ChemTech Centre; and strengthening organizational governance—some of which were followed up by States parties within the framework of the regular sessions of the OPCW policymaking organs. The Technical Secretariat, for its part, continued to be guided in its activities by the Convention, the recommendations contained in the final documents adopted by previous Review Conferences and decisions of the OPCW policymaking organs.

The twenty-eighth session of the Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention took place from 27 November to 1 December in The Hague. Representatives of 143 States parties, one signatory State and one non-signatory State attended the Conference (C-28/5, paras. 1.2–1.4). Delegates from 106 civil society organizations registered to participate (C-28/DEC.4, annex), along with representatives from the chemical industry and scientific community (C-28/DEC.3, annex). The session was also attended by eight international organizations, specialized agencies and other international bodies (C-28/DEC.2, annex).

The twenty-eighth session of the Conference considered questions, matters and issues within the scope of the Chemical Weapons Convention, including disarmament, the prevention of the re-emergence of chemical weapons, assistance and protection, and international cooperation. The Conference also adopted a decision on addressing the threat from chemical weapons use and the threat of future use (C-28/DEC.12), recommending that States parties take collective measures, in accordance with national laws, with respect to the continued possession and use of chemical weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic and its failure to submit an accurate and complete declaration on its chemical weapons programme and to destroy all of its undeclared chemical weapons and production facilities.

The Conference also heard a briefing on progress made by the last declared chemical weapons possessor State party, the United States, which had completed its destruction operations in July. Additionally, delegates received updates on the efforts of China and Japan to recover and destroy chemical weapons abandoned by Japan on the territory of China. The Conference considered and approved the programme and budget of OPCW for 2024–2025 (C-28/DEC.9), providing the necessary resources for OPCW operations. It also adopted decisions on the amendment of the OPCW tenure policy (C-28/DEC.10) and on an action plan for geographical representation within the Technical Secretariat (C-28/DEC.11).

On 7 July, OPCW verified that the last item of Category 1 chemical weapons declared by States parties, an M55 sarin rocket, was destroyed at the Blue Grass Chemical Agent-Destruction Pilot Plant, in Kentucky, United States. That marked a historic achievement for OPCW, as it completed the destruction of all categories of stockpiled chemical weapons declared by all the States parties that had possessed chemical weapons.

The total aggregate amount of Category 1 chemical weapons destroyed is 70,434 metric tons. Additionally, the total quantity of Category 2 chemical weapons destroyed is 1,811 metric tons, and the total for Category 3 chemical weapons is 417,833 items.

The year 2023 saw the continued destruction of abandoned chemical weapons in Haerbaling and Harbin, China, as well as the excavation of chemical weapons abandoned by Japan in several locations in China. Furthermore, China, Japan and the OPCW Technical Secretariat held their thirty-seventh and thirty-eighth trilateral meetings virtually, focusing on practical and technical aspects of the ongoing destruction projects.

Regarding industry verification activities in 2023, the Technical Secretariat was able to carry out 196 of 200 planned inspections pursuant to article VI of the Chemical Weapons Convention, including all planned inspections for chemicals listed in the Convention’s Schedule 1 and Schedule 2. Furthermore, it completed 8 of 10 planned inspections for Schedule 3 chemicals and 128 of 130 planned inspections of other chemical production facilities.

OPCW maintains a global network of designated laboratories that must meet its proficiency criteria and be capable of performing off-site analysis of samples collected by OPCW inspectors. In 2023, 61 laboratories from 37 States parties participated in OPCW confidence-building exercises and proficiency tests for the analysis of chemicals related to the Convention. As at November, there were 30 designated laboratories from 21 States parties, including one new laboratory added to the network in 2023 (see figure 2.1 for a map and list of the OPCW-designated laboratories).

OPCW started the process of constructing its ChemTech Centre in June 2021, culminating in an inauguration ceremony on 12 May 2023 in the presence of His Majesty King Willem-Alexander of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. By the end of 2022, OPCW had received more than €34.25 million in financial contributions and pledges for the Centre, from 54 countries, the European Union and other donors. Construction of the Centre was completed on schedule and within budget. The ChemTech Centre significantly bolsters the capability of OPCW to fulfil the objectives of the Convention, enhancing the organization’s ability to respond to emerging threats such as chemical terrorism, prevent the re-emergence of chemical weapons, and keep pace with developments in science and technology. The Centre also serves as a high-quality platform for research, analysis, training and various activities for international cooperation and assistance to improve the Convention’s implementation.

In addition to carrying out inspector training, laboratory exercises, proficiency testing and mission-preparedness activities at the ChemTech Centre’s Technology and Training Hub, OPCW used the Centre to convene several capacity-building events and topical meetings. Those events included an analytical chemistry course for women chemists, a training course on the investigation of incidents involving toxic industrial chemicals and a table-top exercise convened under the auspices of the OPCW Open-ended Working Group on Terrorism. In addition, an inter-agency workshop on deployments was organized in cooperation with the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism, drawing participation from across the United Nations system and beyond.^[3]

The OPCW Technical Secretariat and the chemical industry continued efforts to strengthen their cooperation in accordance with the relevant recommendations of the third Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention. In 2023, the Chemical Industry Coordination Group held two meetings where participants discussed current trends and challenges in the global chemical industry, among other issues. They also exchanged information on capacity development activities, focusing on the promotion of best practices in chemical safety and security.^[4]

In 2023, the OPCW Advisory Board on Education and Outreach met for its fourteenth session from 7 to 9 February and for its fifteenth session from 20 to 22 June. The fourteenth session focused on various topics, such as the importance of developing a network with academic institutions worldwide, the need to tap into synergies with international organizations in areas related to education and outreach, and the enhancement of OPCW e-learning offerings. At the fifteenth session, the Advisory Board emphasized the ChemTech Centre’s role in preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons through contributions to the research, analytical and capacity-building capabilities of OPCW. The session also included a visit to the ChemTech Centre, where members of the Advisory Board received updates on related activities, resources and plans. In addition, the Office for Disarmament Affairs participated in the fifteenth session, updating the Board on its new Disarmament Education Strategy and exchanging views with members.

OPCW continued to assist States parties in achieving the full and effective implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Its Technical Secretariat provided support in the areas of national implementation, assistance and protection against chemical weapons, as well as international cooperation in promoting peaceful uses of chemistry. It conducted 79 online and in-person capacity-building and knowledge-sharing sessions, benefiting 2,217 participants. Through the newly built ChemTech Centre inaugurated in May, the Technical Secretariat enhanced and expanded its capacity-building support to States parties while further promoting international cooperation. In 2023, the Technical Secretariat conducted 12 of its capacity-building activities at the ChemTech Centre, benefiting 255 participants from all regions.

Concerning national implementation, the Technical Secretariat continued to assist States parties, conducting 15 events that benefited 654 participants. It trained national authorities and other stakeholders on measures to meet the Convention’s national obligations related to declarations and inspections, and strengthened the relevant capacities of customs administrations. The Technical Secretariat also continued to give targeted legislative support to States parties without comprehensive legislation for implementing the Convention. For instance, a subregional forum for Caribbean States parties was held in October to strengthen subregional cooperation and engagement in implementing the Convention, focusing on trans-shipment controls for countries without a substantial chemical industry.

Regarding assistance and protection against chemical weapons under article X of the Convention, the Technical Secretariat supported States parties in enhancing their capacity to respond to chemical incidents, organizing 36 events that benefited 805 participants. Notably, it delivered such support to Ukraine upon the State party’s request under article X of the Convention. In particular, the Technical Secretariat conducted an online training course for Ukrainian first responders on emergency measures for incidents involving toxic chemicals; provided first responders opportunities for training related to assistance and protection; and acquired a significant quantity of protective, detection and identification equipment.

To support international cooperation in promoting the peaceful uses of chemistry under article XI of the Convention, OPCW focused on strengthening its existing programmes and activities as it continued to deliver them. It also developed new coursework in areas such as promoting integrated chemicals management, enhancing laboratory capabilities and facilitating the promotion and exchange of chemical knowledge. In total, the Technical Secretariat organized 28 capacity-building events in 2023, benefiting 758 experts. For instance, it jointly organized with Malaysia a forum on peaceful uses of chemistry in order to raise awareness of chemical safety and security, and held its annual Symposium on Women in Chemistry under the theme “Empowering women and promoting gender diversity in the peaceful uses of chemistry and chemical security”. The twenty-fourth iteration of the Associate Programme—the flagship capacity-building activity of OPCW—took place in three parts: a training segment in the Kingdom of the Netherlands; a university segment in the United Kingdom; and an industry segment in different locations. The programme benefited 31 professionals from 31 States parties.

On the Programme to Strengthen Cooperation with Africa on the Chemical Weapons Convention (Africa Programme), OPCW launched the initiative’s sixth phase (2023–2025), which focused on enhancing national implementation of the Convention, improving cross-border transfer controls on scheduled chemicals, developing capabilities for assistance and protection related to chemical emergencies, advancing management of chemical safety and security, and upgrading laboratory competencies across the continent. In 2023, the Technical Secretariat organized 55 capacity-building initiatives, including 22 intended specifically for Africa, reaching more than 850 participants from 45 African States parties. A key highlight of the year was CHEMEX Africa, a capacity-building exercise on chemical emergency response organized jointly with Algeria with funding from Canada. Held in Algiers from 23 September to 5 October with 81 participants from 33 African countries, the event included an activity simulating a coordinated response to a terrorist attack involving a toxic chemical agent. The Director-General of OPCW attended the high-level day of the event, meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Algeria and other senior officials.

In 2023, the OPCW Technical Secretariat continued its mission to verify the elimination of the Syrian Arab Republic’s declared chemical weapons. The OPCW Declaration Assessment Team continued its efforts to clarify all outstanding issues regarding the initial and subsequent declarations submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention, as well as with relevant OPCW decisions and Security Council resolutions.

As previously reported from 2014 to 2016 and from 2019 to 2021, the Declaration Assessment Team conducted 24 rounds of consultations with the Syrian National Authority. Since April 2021, the Technical Secretariat’s attempts to organize the twenty-fifth round of consultations in Damascus had been unsuccessful, mainly owing to the refusal by the Syrian authorities to issue an entry visa for the Team’s lead technical expert. Under the Chemical Weapons Convention, and pursuant to Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) and the corresponding OPCW Executive Council decisions (EC-M-33/DEC.1, EC-83/DEC.5 and EC-94/DEC.2), the Syrian Arab Republic has an obligation to allow “immediate and unfettered access” to personnel designated by OPCW.

In December 2022, the Technical Secretariat proposed to the Syrian Arab Republic that OPCW organize limited in-country activities with a reduced team composed of several members of the Declaration Assessment Team. The Technical Secretariat emphasized that the limited activities would not involve any consultations between the reduced team and the Syrian National Authority.

The Declaration Assessment Team subsequently conducted two limited in-country activities in January and April 2023 with a reduced team. During those deployments, the reduced team visited two declared sites and an additional site related to one outstanding issue, collected samples and interviewed personnel involved in the Syrian chemical weapons programme.

In June, a meeting took place in Beirut between the delegations of the Technical Secretariat and the Syrian Arab Republic. The Syrian delegation committed to presenting to the Secretariat a proposal with a view to better implementing its obligations.

In October, the Syrian National Authority informed the Technical Secretariat of its readiness to resume technical consultations with the Declaration Assessment Team without any conditions. After two and a half years, the twenty-fifth round of consultations between the Team and the Syrian Arab Republic took place in Damascus in November. During the consultations, the parties revisited outstanding issues and discussed the ways forward for the resolution of those issues. The Declaration Assessment Team also shared the results of the analysis of samples collected in April and requested the Syrian National Authority to provide the Technical Secretariat with scientifically plausible and verifiable explanations of the results.

In November and December, the Syrian Arab Republic shared a series of documents comprising amendments to the declaration of two research and development facilities, explanations of the analysis results for the samples collected in April and additional information on four outstanding issues. As at December, the Declaration Assessment Team was analysing the information received to subsequently engage with the Syrian National Authority on those matters and other outstanding issues during the next round of consultations.

Meanwhile, pursuant to the OPCW Executive Council decision adopted in November 2016 (EC-83/DEC.5), the Technical Secretariat conducted the tenth round of inspections in December at the Barzah and Jamrayah facilities of the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre.

Additionally, the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission continued to gather all available information related to allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. The Mission analysed all information obtained by its team and provided by the Syrian Arab Republic during several deployments.

After completing the analysis of all available and collected information, the Technical Secretariat issued a note with the report of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission regarding incidents of alleged use of toxic chemicals as a weapon in Kharbit Massasneh, Syrian Arab Republic, on 7 July and 4 August 2017 (S/2186/2023). According to the conclusions of the report, the information obtained and analysed by the Fact-Finding Mission “did not provide reasonable grounds for the [Mission] to determine that toxic chemicals were used as a weapon in the reported incidents that occurred in Kharbit Massasneh, in Hama Governorate in the Syrian Arab Republic, on 7 July 2017 and 4 August 2017”.

In addition, the Fact-Finding Mission handed over information to the OPCW Investigation and Identification Team,^[5] as per the note of the Technical Secretariat dated 28 June 2019 (EC-91/S/3). The Mission also transferred information to the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011, which the General Assembly had established in 2016 through its resolution 71/248.

In 2023, the Investigation and Identification Team continued its investigations into several incidents where the Fact-Finding Mission had found that chemicals had been used as weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. On 27 January, the Team’s third report (S/2125/2023) was released, focusing on the use of chlorine gas in the town of Douma on 7 April 2018. Based on all of the information it had obtained and analysed, the Team concluded in the report that there were reasonable grounds to believe that, on 7 April 2018, at least one Mi-8/17 helicopter of the Syrian Arab Air Force, operating under the control of the Tiger Forces, had dropped two yellow cylinders filled with chlorine gas, which had hit two residential buildings in a central area of the city. Forty-three named individuals were killed, and dozens more were affected. The Director-General and the coordinator of the Team briefed the OPCW member States on the report on 2 February 2023 and the Security Council on 7 February.

At the end of the year, the Investigation and Identification Team was still being denied access to and direct engagement with representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic, as well as to relevant locations. On 11 December, the Syrian Arab Republic addressed a note verbale to the OPCW Technical Secretariat in response to a request for information relevant to the Team’s ongoing investigations.

The Team also continued preserving and sharing information with the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism. The Team provided that information in line with paragraph 12 of a decision of the fourth special session of the Conference of the States Parties (C/SS-4/DEC.3).

The OPCW Technical Secretariat continued collaborating with broad sectors of the global scientific community throughout the year to maintain strong ties with scientists and scientific societies, as well as to keep abreast of developments in science and technology relevant to the Convention’s implementation. In support of those efforts and as a contribution to the fifth Review Conference, the OPCW Scientific Advisory Board issued a comprehensive scientific report on developments in science and technology (RC-5/DG.1).

The Scientific Advisory Board also adopted the final report of its Temporary Working Group on the Analysis of Biotoxins (SAB/REP/1/23). In connection with that report, as well as the outcome document of the Board’s thirty-seventh session (SAB-37/1), the OPCW Director-General announced his decision to establish a new temporary working group focused on chemical forensics (EC-104/DG.22).

In addition to participating in numerous scientific and technical conferences, the Technical Secretariat and the Scientific Advisory Board collaborated extensively with the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry during its World Chemistry Congress, held in The Hague in August.

Biological weapons

The Biological Weapons Convention^[6] was opened for signature on 10 April 1972 and entered into force on 26 March 1975, becoming the first multilateral treaty banning an entire category of weapons. As at 31 December, the Convention had 185 States parties. Four signatory States had yet to ratify the Convention, and eight States^[7] had neither signed nor acceded to it.

At the ninth Review Conference, in 2022, States parties agreed to establish the Working Group on the Strengthening of the Biological Weapons Convention to identify, examine and develop specific and effective measures, including possible legally binding measures, and to make recommendations to strengthen and institutionalize the Convention in all its aspects (BWC/CONF.IX/9, sect. II, paras. 8–16). The Review Conference decided that the Working Group would address measures on the following: (a) international cooperation and assistance under article X; (b) scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention; (c) confidence-building and transparency; (d) compliance and verification; (e) national implementation of the Convention; (f) assistance, response and preparedness under article VII; and (g) organizational, institutional and financial arrangements.

As per its mandate, the Working Group convened its first session in Geneva on 15 and 16 March to make necessary procedural and organizational decisions. The Chief of Service for the Geneva Branch of the Office for Disarmament Affairs opened the session, and one of its Vice-Chairs, Camille Petit (France),^[8] presided over it. A total of 86 States took part in the first session, including 82 States parties, two signatory States and two States neither parties nor signatories to the Convention (which attended as observers). United Nations bodies, including the Office for Disarmament Affairs and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, also attended. The European Union and the World Health Organization participated as observer agencies. Two non-governmental organizations and research institutes also joined the first session of the Working Group (BWC/WG/1/INF.1).

During the meeting, the Working Group elected Flavio Soares Damico (Brazil) as its Chair, and Camille Petit (France) and Irakli Jgenti (Georgia) as its Vice-Chairs. The Working Group also adopted its agenda (BWC/WG/1/1) and confirmed as its rules of procedure those of the ninth Review Conference, mutatis mutandis.

The first session of the Working Group dedicated most of its time to addressing the sequencing and allocation of the seven topics mandated to the Working Group by the ninth Review Conference. After intense negotiations, States parties adopted an indicative schedule of activities, distributing the 60 days allocated to the Working Group between 2023 and 2026 as follows:

• 10 days on compliance and verification
• 8 days on international cooperation and assistance under article X
• 8 days on scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention
• 7 days on assistance, response and preparedness under article VII
• 5 days on confidence-building and transparency
• 5 days on national implementation of the Convention
• 4 days on organizational, institutional and financial arrangements
• 2 days on a mechanism for international cooperation and assistance under article X
• 2 days on a scientific and technological review mechanism
• 4 days on the overall consideration of all topics, including the two mechanisms
• 5 days on the preparation of its report to be adopted by consensus, if it so decides.

The Working Group confirmed that its substantive meetings in 2023 would be held from 7 to 18 August and from 4 to 8 December, and decided that it could prepare reports of a procedural nature for its sessions, as appropriate, based on consensus. At the end of the first session, on 16 March, States parties adopted a procedural report by consensus (BWC/WG/1/2).

The second session of the Working Group was convened in Geneva from 7 to 18 August. On the first day of the session, the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs addressed the Working Group through a video message. More than 600 participants from 122 States parties, two signatory States, two States neither parties nor signatories to the Convention, four United Nations bodies, nine specialized agencies and regional intergovernmental organizations, and 21 non-governmental organizations and research institutes attended the session (BWC/WG/2/INF.1/Rev.1).

In accordance with the indicative schedule of activities adopted at its first session, the Working Group commenced its consideration of agenda item 6 on identifying, examining and developing specific and effective measures, including possible legally binding measures, and making recommendations to strengthen and institutionalize the Convention in all its aspects within the mandate of the Working Group. It focused on three topics: international cooperation and assistance under article X (three days), scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention (three days) and national implementation of the Convention (two days). The Working Group also devoted one day each to the mechanisms for international cooperation and assistance under article X and for the review of scientific and technological developments.

Deliberations on the topics above were enriched by nine panel sessions featuring representatives from States parties, regional and international organizations, United Nations bodies and non-governmental organizations. Additionally, the Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit provided brief overviews on relevant activities. After the presentations, States parties engaged in an interactive discussion, during which a total of 27 working papers were introduced (BWC/WG/3/WP.1–27).

At the first meeting of the session, on 7 August, the Chair announced that he had decided to appoint Friends of the Chair to assist him in his consultations and negotiations on the three issues under discussion during that session: Thomas Fetz/Trevor Smith (Canada) and Jonelle John S. Domingo (Philippines) on international cooperation and assistance under article X; Vincent Bodson (Belgium), Ljupčo Gjorgjinski (Canada), Grisselle Rodríguez (Panama) and Peter Ahabwe/Musa Kwehangana (Uganda) on scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention; and Michelle Carr (Australia), Reski Ilahi (Indonesia), Grisselle Rodríguez (Panama), Athikarn Dilogwathana (Thailand) and Faith Bagamuhunda (Uganda) on national implementation of the Convention. The Chair also announced that he had appointed Ichiro Ogasawara/Shigeru Umetsu (Japan), Arsen Omarov (Kazakhstan) and Husham Ahmed (Pakistan) as Friends of the Chair on organizational, institutional and financial arrangements.

Looking beyond the Working Group’s plenary deliberations, the Chair requested the Friends of the Chair to carry out informal consultations to further advance discussions. Furthermore, at the end of the meeting, the Friends of the Chair on international cooperation and assistance under article X and those on scientific and technological developments issued conference room papers, providing delegates with “food for thought” during the intersessional period (BWC/WG/2/CRP.2 and BWC/WG/2/CRP.5). The Chair also issued, under his own responsibility, a compilation of existing proposals on the two mechanisms (BWC/WG/2/CRP.3 and BWC/WG/2/CRP.4). At the end of the second session, on 18 August, States parties adopted a procedural report by consensus (BWC/WG/2/1).

In his closing remarks, the Chair provided an overall positive assessment of the session, attributing the productive outcome to the preparatory work done by all the Friends of the Chair, the substantive level of engagement by all States parties and the quality of the input from the invited international organizations and other experts. Additionally, the Chair expressed appreciation for the diversity of participation in the discussions, with 122 of the 185 States parties attending and delegations from around the world taking the floor on every topic. The Chair noted that they had witnessed a paradigm shift towards a much more practical and concrete mode of operation, in which they were now working on draft proposals and text, particularly on the development of “appropriate recommendations” for the development of mechanisms for international cooperation and assistance and for the review of science and technology.

The third session of the Working Group was convened in Geneva from 4 to 8 December. It was attended by more than 640 participants from 117 States parties, two signatory States, one State neither party nor signatory to the Convention, two United Nations bodies, eight specialized agencies and regional intergovernmental organizations (BWC/WG/3/1, paras. 3–7), and 28 non-governmental organizations and research institutes ( BWC/WG/3/INF.1).

In accordance with the indicative schedule of activities adopted at its first session, the Working Group considered three topics at its third session: confidence-building and transparency (one day); compliance and verification (three days); and organizational, institutional and financial arrangements (one day). Notably, the session was the first meeting of the Convention in more than two decades to discuss issues relating to compliance and verification.

Following the practice at the second session, deliberations on the three topics were stimulated by four panel sessions, with representatives of States parties, regional and international organizations, United Nations bodies, non-governmental organizations and academia composing the panel. Additionally, the Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit delivered presentations on its activities. In the ensuing interactive discussions, States parties introduced 18 working papers (BWC/WG/3/WP.1–18). In preparation for the discussions on confidence-building and transparency, the Friends of the Chair circulated a non-paper as an aide-memoire to help inform the deliberations.

The following Friends of the Chair who were designated to the three topics under discussion at the third session assisted the Chair in his consultations and negotiations: Angel Horna (Peru) and Laurent Masmejean (Switzerland) on confidence-building and transparency; Robert in den Bosch (Kingdom of the Netherlands) and Alonso Francisco Martínez Ruiz (Mexico) on compliance and verification; and Ichiro Ogasawara/Shigeru Umetsu (Japan), Arsen Omarov (Kazakhstan) and Husham Ahmed (Pakistan) on organizational, institutional and financial arrangements.

At the end of the third session, on 8 December, States parties adopted a procedural report by consensus (BWC/WG/3/1). Overall, the States parties carried out constructive exchanges at the third session of the Working Group, with many delegations presenting concrete proposals and making substantive interventions on the three topics addressed at the session.

The ninth Review Conference, held in 2022, decided to hold a three-day Meeting of States Parties each year from 2023 to 2026. Accordingly, delegations gathered from 11 to 13 December in Geneva for the 2023 Meeting of States Parties. The Meeting was attended by 120 States parties, two signatory States, three United Nations bodies and 25 non-governmental organizations and research institutes. Furthermore, three States neither parties nor signatories to the Convention and eight specialized agencies and regional intergovernmental organizations applied for observer status in accordance with the rules of procedure (BWC/MSP/2023/INF.1).

Cristian Espinosa Cañizares (Ecuador) chaired the Meeting. Thomas Göbel (Germany) and Nikola Yakov (Bulgaria) served as the Vice-Chairs.

On 11 December, the Meeting of States Parties adopted its agenda (BWC/MSP/2023/1) and heard a pre-recorded video message from the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs. However, the Meeting could not subsequently adopt its programme of work (BWC/MSP/2023/2) or its rules of procedure (BWC/CONF.IX/2), because no consensus on them could be reached. The Russian Federation objected to the inclusion in the draft programme of work of time for non-governmental organizations to address the plenary in an informal session, expressing its view that that was not in line with the rules of procedure. In response, 39 delegations took the floor to disagree with the objection, stating that it had been a long-standing practice, since 1996, for non-governmental organizations to be given the opportunity to speak at an informal session.

Regarding the rules of procedure, the Russian Federation insisted that they be applied strictly as written, thereby objecting to the long-standing practice of observer agencies being able to address formal meetings of the plenary. Again, several States parties objected to the Russian Federation’s position. The Chair noted the lack of consensus on the programme of work and on the application of the rules of procedure and suggested continuing consultations.

Notwithstanding the continued lack of consensus among States parties on two agenda items, the Chair of the Meeting of States Parties, with the agreement of delegations, moved to a later agenda item and invited the Chair of the Working Group on the Strengthening of the Biological Weapons Convention to provide an update on the Working Group’s work in 2023. Looking forward, the Chair of the Working Group spoke of the need to increase efforts in the coming year, adding that delegates should be “prepared to roll up [their] sleeves for a very intense 2024”. He concluded by saying, “I will protect the mandate, its bottom-up character, its member-driven process and the effort to arrive at a safe harbour by 2024”.

Despite informal consultations, States parties could not overcome the impasse concerning the adoption of the programme of work and the rules of procedure before the end of the Meeting. Therefore, several agenda items were not addressed, including the general debate, the management of the intersessional programme, budgetary and financial matters, progress with universalization of the Convention, and the annual report of the Implementation Support Unit. Delegations nonetheless agreed that in 2024 the Working Group would hold its fourth session from 19 to 23 August and its fifth session from 2 to 13 December. Additionally, they agreed that the 2024 Meeting of States Parties would be held from 16 to 18 December.

At the end of the Meeting, on 13 December, States parties adopted a brief report by consensus (BWC/MSP/2023/6).

As part of its mandated activities in 2023, the Implementation Support Unit provided administrative support for the Meeting of States Parties and the three sessions of the newly established Working Group. Its contributions included drafting and issuing communications for the office holders and to States parties, international organizations and non-governmental organizations; supporting the efforts of the Friends of the Chair of the Working Group; arranging 13 panel discussions for the second and third sessions of the Working Group, and processing almost 1,000 meeting registrations; researching, drafting and collating compilations of working papers; preparing conference documents and reports; processing working papers; and providing procedural, technical and substantive advice to the Chairs of the Working Group and the Meeting of States Parties, as well as the other office holders.

The Implementation Support Unit continued to maintain and update the website of the Biological Weapons Convention (https://disarmament.unoda.org/biological-weapons), increasing its utility not only for States parties, but also for outreach, awareness-raising and communication to a global audience. The Unit also continued to use social media to increase awareness about the Convention.^[9]

Additionally, the Unit assisted in the comprehensive implementation of the Convention (BWC/MSP/2023/4), despite a staffing shortage from April to October. At the same time, voluntary contributions from States parties enabled the Unit to enhance its ability to carry out its mandated tasks. Such contributions also allowed for the employment of 10 additional fixed-term staff members and the assistance of 26 developing States parties upon their request (see the next section for further information on these and other related activities).

In 2023, the Unit continued to collect and update details of national contact points for the Convention, making them available to all States parties via a restricted section of the Convention’s website. A total of 149 States parties had nominated a national contact point, as requested by previous Review Conferences, which represented an increase of 20 States parties since the last report of the Unit, in early 2022.

The Unit also assisted States parties in exchanging reports on confidence-building measures. Specifically, it maintained capabilities for electronic reporting, compiled and distributed submissions, provided routine assistance and substantive advice and followed up with States parties on their submissions. As part of those efforts, it launched an upgrade of the existing electronic platform for confidence-building measures in order to ensure continued compliance with United Nations cybersecurity standards.

In 2023, 104 States parties submitted annual reports on confidence-building measures covering relevant activities in 2022—the most to ever be submitted in a calendar year, reflecting a participation rate of more than 56 per cent. In its annual report, the Implementation Support Unit listed the States parties that had submitted reports on confidence-building measures in 2023 covering the 2022 calendar year (BWC/MSP/2023/4, annex 3). (See also figure 2.3 for a chart on the participation of States parties in the Convention’s confidence-building measures from 1987 to 2023.)

Meanwhile, voluntary contributions supported the Implementation Support Unit in providing several States parties, upon their request, with assistance related to confidence-building measures. In that regard, the Unit co-organized a subregional workshop in Kathmandu from 28 to 30 August, as well as a regional workshop in Bangkok on 10 and 11 October for member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. As a direct result of those events, plans were under way at the end of 2023 to hold national workshops on confidence-building measures in Cambodia, Timor-Leste and Viet Nam.

In addition, the Unit continued to maintain the database for assistance requests and offers under article X of the Convention. In 2023, it conducted a major review of the database requests and offers, contacting all States parties with active entries for confirmation or updates. As at 31 December, the database contained 29 new or updated offers of assistance from 11 States parties and 19 new or updated requests for assistance from nine States parties. An additional 27 assistance requests from eight States parties were undergoing updates.

From 14 to 16 June, the Unit co-organized a training course on virus detection and biosecurity in the framework of article X of the Convention, with the International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology at its headquarters in Trieste, Italy. Twenty-one technical experts (8 men and 13 women) from 20 developing States parties participated in the course, which consisted of both lectures and hands-on practical exercises in the Centre’s laboratories.

Separately, the Unit supported the Chair of the Meeting of States Parties in his activities to promote the Convention’s universalization, assisting him in corresponding with States not parties to the Convention and in preparing for his meetings in Geneva with representatives of non-States parties (see BWC/MSP/2023/3). The Unit also supported States parties in promoting universalization, coordinating their activities and informing them about progress on accessions or ratifications. Moreover, the Unit informed and advised several signatories and non-States parties about the Convention.

The Unit also administered the Convention’s sponsorship programme, designed to support and increase the participation of developing States parties in the meetings of the intersessional programme. In 2023, five States parties (Canada, France, the Republic of Korea, Spain and the United Kingdom) and the European Union contributed to the Convention’s sponsorship programme. In addition, the United States supported the programme through bilateral arrangements. The Unit arranged a record number of sponsorship grants (92) for the intersessional meetings in 2023. Thanks to voluntary contributions to the programme, 34 national experts from 28 developing States parties could attend the Working Group’s second session, and 35 national experts from 34 developing States parties attended its third session. Additionally, 23 national experts from 23 developing States parties were sponsored to participate in the 2023 Meeting of States Parties.

Funding from the European Union allowed the Office for Disarmament Affairs to carry out a number of activities in support of the Biological Weapons Convention. Through the 2023 Youth for Biosecurity Fellowship programme, held from March to August, the Office engaged 20 emerging biosecurity leaders from the global South in international biosecurity discussions within the framework of the Convention. The fellows from 17 States parties completed a three-month capacity-building programme consisting of online learning sessions, a collaborative research project and a one-week visit to Geneva during the second session of the Working Group. Marking its first year under the new format, the Fellowship saw a significant rise in interest, attracting more than 800 applicants from 84 countries—an increase of more than 600 per cent compared with previous years.

Separately, two “Science for diplomats” events took place on the margins of the organizational meeting of the Working Group on the Strengthening of the Biological Weapons Convention, in March. Scientific experiments and scenario exercises helped policymakers to learn more about potential policy challenges resulting from scientific advancements.

The Office for Disarmament Affairs also facilitated capacity-building activities at regional and national levels, mainly in Africa and Asia, to provide States parties with tailored assistance based on their specific requests. The initiatives included Cambodia’s first national awareness-raising event, held in Phnom Penh from 4 to 6 October; two regional workshops for reporting on confidence-building measures, held in Kathmandu from 28 to 30 August and in Bangkok on 10 and 11 October (mentioned in the previous section); and a workshop in Ulaanbaatar from 23 to 27 October (the first in-person workshop under the cooperation between Mongolia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands on the establishment, initiated in July, of a national inventory of dangerous pathogens, including the provision of relevant legislative assistance).

In addition, by the end of 2023, the comprehensive Guide to Implementing the Biological Weapons Convention was published in all six official languages of the United Nations. First issued in 2022, the Guide had become a valuable resource for stakeholders helping to implement the Convention at the national level. It is available both electronically and in printed copy at relevant events.

To help build capacity among the Convention’s national contact points, the Unit developed a set of dedicated training materials and organized two regional training workshops: on 16 and 17 May in Addis Ababa for national contact points from States parties in Africa; and on 25 and 26 October in Santo Domingo for national contact points from States parties in Latin America and the Caribbean. As at the end of the year, plans were under way to hold four more regional training workshops in 2024 for national contact points.

In 2023, voluntary contributions enabled the Office for Disarmament Affairs to maintain its active support for the Convention in Africa. Responding to requests by States parties, the Office aimed to promote and strengthen the Convention through efforts in four priority areas: promoting universalization; assisting States parties in developing and adopting national implementing legislation; supporting the preparation and submission of reports on confidence-building measures; and facilitating the establishment or designation of national contact points.

Throughout the year, the Office organized workshops in Africa designed to establish subregional implementation baselines, assess national needs and priorities and identify activities for supporting national implementation. After organizing the first subregional event, in 2022, for stakeholders in East Africa, the Office convened three additional workshops in 2023: from 24 to 26 May in Douala, Cameroon, for States in Central Africa; from 13 to 15 June in Rabat for States in North Africa; and from 11 to 13 October in Lomé for States in West Africa. The workshops addressed national implementation needs, priorities and challenges, and laid a foundation for fruitful and collaborative working relationships moving forward. The final subregional workshop, scheduled for 2024 in Gaborone for States in Southern Africa, would mark the completion of the project’s second phase, focused on establishing subregional baselines.

At the request of African States parties, the Office for Disarmament Affairs also organized national assistance activities for the Biological Weapons Convention. In 2023, the Office supported States in four key areas: general awareness-raising; legislative assistance; preparation and submission of reports on confidence-building measures; and general training of stakeholders and national contact points.

The Office facilitated four national workshops focused on raising awareness: on 29 and 30 August in Banjul and in Windhoek; on 23 and 24 October in Rabat; and on 21 and 22 November in Cotonou, Benin. The workshops were intended to familiarize participants with the Convention and the resulting obligations for States parties, while also focusing on the importance and benefits of comprehensive national implementation. By bringing together a diverse range of national actors, the gatherings represented important first steps towards promoting and strengthening inter-agency and stakeholder coordination at the national level.

The Office also supported three national workshops focused on legislative implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention. On 21 July, it collaborated with the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre and the United States Department of State to hold a national awareness-raising workshop in Naivasha, Kenya, to promote the importance of comprehensive national implementing legislation. From 13 to 15 September, a national legal drafting workshop took place in Accra, bringing together national stakeholders to provide tailored assistance in reviewing the initial draft of Ghana’s national implementing law.

A national workshop on preparing and submitting reports on confidence-building measures, held in Lomé on 9 and 10 October, familiarized participants with the processes for preparing and submitting such declarations, while helping them to collaboratively review and prepare a national-level draft. As a result of the workshop, Togo submitted its first report on confidence-building measures since 1988.

In 2023, the number of States parties to the Biological Weapons Convention grew to 185 with the accession of South Sudan. Meanwhile, the Office for Disarmament Affairs continued to promote universalization of the Convention through coordinated outreach to the six African States not yet parties to the instrument. Representatives from Chad and the Comoros participated in the above-mentioned workshops in their respective subregions and sent delegations to Geneva for a series of presentations and meetings with senior United Nations officials and representatives of States parties.

Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons

When Member States report the alleged use of chemical or biological weapons to the Secretary-General, he has a mandate to carry out investigations. To fulfil that mandate, the United Nations relies on countries to nominate technical experts to deploy to the field on short notice and expert consultants to provide advice, as well as analytical laboratories to support such investigations. The Office for Disarmament Affairs maintains a roster of those nominations (see figure 2.2 for infographics on the regional distribution of the roster’s membership).

In 2023, the Office, as custodian of the Mechanism, held in-person training and outreach events, complemented by virtual workshops and webinars.

From 27 February to 3 March, the Office organized a skills-training course on biological crime management, in cooperation with the INTERPOL Bioterrorism Prevention Unit and the National Microbiology Laboratory (part of the Public Health Agency of Canada). A group of 28 experts on the Mechanism’s roster, from 24 countries representing all United Nations regional groups, learned about personal protective equipment, considerations in accessing a contaminated scene, initial scene assessment, briefing and sampling strategy, as well as evidence packaging.

Experts nominated to the roster also took part in a two-week basic training course in Johannesburg, South Africa, in June and July. Organized by South Africa’s National Institute for Communicable Diseases, the training course was the second of its kind hosted by the country. Nineteen participants from 17 States learned about the background and mandate of the Mechanism. In addition, they discussed all relevant aspects of an investigation, including safety and security, sampling, decontamination, planning and report writing. The course concluded with a one-day field exercise centred on a fictitious scenario.

Germany held a training course on sampling and transporting infectious substances, in Berlin from 19 to 23 September, partnering with the Office for Disarmament Affairs and the Public Health Agency of Canada. For the first three days of the course, 14 participants from 10 countries learned about complying with regulations established by the International Air Transport Association for the shipment of infectious substances. In the next part of the programme, the participants received training in sampling biological material.

From 25 September to 6 October, the Office for Disarmament Affairs facilitated a basic training course for 24 nominated experts from 17 countries, in cooperation with the Directorate General for International Relations and Strategy (DGRIS) of the French Ministry of Armed Forces. The training course generally followed the same standardized agenda as the earlier course held in South Africa, and it was complemented by a short field exercise with support from Germany.

In cooperation with the Department of Safety and Security, the Office also organized a training course on “Safe and secure approaches in field environments”. From 26 November to 2 December, a group of 20 experts from 18 countries was given an overview of the United Nations Security Management System, as well as general guidelines for working in field environments. The course included training on medical aspects of working in the field, with theoretical lessons, demonstrations and practical exercises on individual first aid and managing injuries in field environments.

In addition, the Office continued the strong virtual engagement it had started with experts and partners during the COVID-19 pandemic:

• From 9 to 11 May, the Office hosted three virtual onboarding sessions for newly nominated experts and laboratory focal points. Seventy-eight experts from 31 countries participated in the sessions.
• In November, the Office conducted the Mechanism’s annual “call-out exercise”, a routine, unannounced activity aimed at testing the response time of rostered laboratories and checking the continued availability of experts on the roster.
• In December, the Office hosted a virtual round-table session where all rostered experts could discuss past and upcoming activities intended to strengthen the Mechanism. The 170 participants heard from partners about recent and upcoming training activities, followed by a question-and-answer session with staff of the Office.

The Office also continued to prioritize outreach to raise awareness about the Mechanism and to enhance the diversity of its rostered experts and laboratories with respect to subject-matter expertise, geography and gender balance. To support that goal, the Office provided its third annual briefing of Member States on the margins of the General Assembly, First Committee, in October. In his opening remarks at that gathering, the Director and Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs highlighted the essential role of Member States in maintaining and strengthening the Mechanism. Those remarks were followed by a presentation on the nomination process and further information on the Mechanism. In November, the Office distributed the annual note verbale to Member States requesting the nomination of experts and laboratories for the roster. In December, the Office briefed the Working Group on the Strengthening of the Biological Weapons Convention about the Mechanism.

Furthermore, the Office gave several presentations on the Mechanism in 2023 as part of its outreach efforts:

• In April, the Office delivered a briefing on the Mechanism at the World Organisation for Animal Health’s Global Conference on Emergency Management.
• In May, the Office organized an in-person outreach workshop in Addis Ababa for Member States in Africa. During the workshop, a representative from South Africa’s National Institute for Communicable Diseases spoke about the basic training course held in Johannesburg in support of the Mechanism.
• On 28 July, staff members of the Office discussed the Mechanism at a conference organized by the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism of the Organization of American States.
• In September, the Office participated in a meeting of the Nordic Biopreparedness Forum to present information on the Mechanism.
• In November, the Office introduced the Mechanism during the second annual meeting of the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.

Export controls: Australia Group

The Australia Group is an informal forum of 42 countries and the European Union, which, through the harmonization of national export controls, seeks to ensure that their exports do not contribute to the production or proliferation of chemical or biological weapons. Participants use their national licensing measures to ensure that exports of certain chemicals, biological agents and dual-use chemical and biological manufacturing facilities and equipment do not contribute to the spread of chemical and biological weapons and that legitimate trade is facilitated. All participants in the Australia Group are States parties to both the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention. Support for those regimes and their aims remains the overriding objective of the Australia Group’s participants. Export licensing measures instituted by individual members also assist in implementing key obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (article I, subparas. 1(a) and 1(d)) and the Biological Weapons Convention (articles I and III), as well as ensuring compliance with Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). The Group’s guidelines, common control lists, handbooks and public statements are available on its website.

In 2023, the Australia Group met twice to consider current developments related to chemical and biological weapons, explore the scope for increasing the effectiveness of existing controls and identify areas where updates may be necessary to existing common control lists.

Notably, the year saw the first in-person intersessional meeting of the Australia Group since the relaxing of COVID-19 pandemic travel restrictions. At the gathering, held in Rome in February, technical experts from participating countries took part in productive, face-to-face discussions on ways to further advance the Group’s mission in the areas of new and evolving technologies, implementation and enforcement. The meeting also included outreach to a range of non-member countries.

That meeting was followed by the Australia Group Plenary, which took place in Paris in June. Participants again exchanged views on a range of relevant topics, including shared approaches for keeping pace with rapidly evolving dual-use technologies and the relevance of those efforts for non-proliferation and export control. Participants agreed to continue an active outreach programme to non-members to enhance efforts for preventing the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. They also agreed to engage with representatives from the industry, academia and international organizations to further understand the impact and pace of new scientific and technological developments. The meeting resulted in further refinement of the common control lists.